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ABSTRACT

Stayin’ Alive: Transnational Sanctuary and Insurgency
By
Matthew D. Murray

Advisor: Susan Woodward

The conventional wisdom of counterinsurgency runs that insurgent groups with bases in
neighboring states (transnational sanctuaries) are relatively more difficult to defeat than
comparable groups without such bases. Insurgents with transnational sanctuaries benefit from
relative protection from attack by counterinsurgents, they may recruit, train, and arm safely in
their sanctuaries, transmit propaganda into their target state, and use these sanctuaries as staging
points for infiltration or raids into their target state. Counterinsurgents have gone to great lengths
to disrupt or destroy insurgent bases in neighboring countries based on the belief that this is
necessary to defeating insurgents. However, several groups have lost their sanctuaries but won
their wars, while others maintained their sanctuaries throughout their conflicts, yet lost, raising
questions about whether the presence of transnational sanctuary is as important as the
conventional wisdom assumes. In examining the record of post-1945 insurgencies, this
dissertation finds some limited support for the conventional wisdom: overall, insurgents with
sanctuary do win at a higher rate than average. However, that advantage largely depends on
including several cases against external interveners, who almost always lost, regardless of
whether insurgents had sanctuary. Most insurgencies are fought against domestically constituted
regimes who lack the option to withdraw, and insurgents generally lose these conflicts far more
often, and the presence of transnational sanctuary does not appear to affect the outcome of these
conflicts.
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Chapter One
Theoretical Framework, Statement of the Argument, Methods

Cross-border bases, known as transnational sanctuaries,1 are used by insurgents to train,
arm, recruit, and generally strengthen their organization, and are believed to be one form of
external support commonly available and beneficial to insurgents. According to the conventional
wisdom of counterinsurgency doctrine, these transnational sanctuaries provide insurgents certain
benefits, and prudent counterinsurgents must cut off or destroy these sanctuaries if they are to be
successful. Yet, insurgencies are decided by a number of factors other than sanctuary, and
insurgents with sanctuary have lost while those without sanctuary have won, raising questions
about whether and why transnational sanctuary matters.
Does transnational sanctuary aid insurgents, and if so, how? Insurgents with transnational
sanctuaries are more likely to defeat counterinsurgents when they are fighting external
interveners, either supporting a local ally or maintaining an overseas possession by a foreign
power. However, insurgents facing regimes that are not primarily dependent on some external
supporter for their long-term survival, that is to say regimes that maintain themselves primarily
through some domestic base of support, are not more likely to win than those insurgent groups
without transnational sanctuary. External interventions, which include counterinsurgencies, must
be kept limited in duration and scope because of prevailing international norms against territorial
conquest and aggression. If the belief that transnational sanctuary’s utility to insurgents is
correct, then I expect to find evidence that insurgents with sanctuary win more frequently against
external interveners than against domestically-constituted incumbents.

Unless indicated otherwise, the term “sanctuaries” in this dissertation refers to transnational
sanctuaries. I will note internal sanctuaries where they are present.
1

1

Much has been written about the onset, duration, and periods of peace following civil wars
and insurgencies. This dissertation will examine how one type of transnational effect,
transnational sanctuary, shapes the outcomes of insurgencies. This study has important policy
implications for policymakers tasked with resolving civil conflict, academics who study the laws
of armed conflict, and those interested in opposing the unnecessary expansion of war.
Theoretical Framework
There is a large literature on the factors that affect the outcomes of civil wars and
insurgency, some of which posit that sanctuary aids insurgents against their targets. Yet, there
has not been a comprehensive study that demonstrates the ways that sanctuary aids insurgents.
This theoretical framework is divided into three sections. First, I will review the literature about
transnational effects that affect insurgency, including external support and sanctuary. Next, I will
review the literature about why powerful states tend to lose small wars, such as insurgencies.
Finally, I will examine the literature about norms of self-defense.
Internal and transnational sanctuary and insurgency
Sanctuaries may arise in areas within states where governments do not effectively
exercise control over significant parts of their territory. Regional conflict dynamics are one
transnational effect of civil wars and may facilitate the creation of sanctuaries. A region beset by
several conflicts produces new refugee flows and new regional war economies, and reshape
zones of effective government control. Neighboring states may be too constrained managing
their own internal unrest to check transnational effects emanating from their territory to
neighbors. The diffusion of conflict and fighters across weakly defended borders increases the
likelihood of spreading regional conflict. Low state capacity increases the likelihood of conflict
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because weak states are not able to provide the public goods to prevent conflicts from breaking
out and may allow insurgents to establish sanctuaries from which insurgents may attack their
targets (Buhaug et al. 2009; Raleigh 2010).
Ungoverned or under-governed territories provide opportunities for insurgents to
mobilize and establish bases in peripheral regions (Pugh, Cooper, and Goodhand 2004).
Previously peaceful governments may be toppled and replaced with unfriendly regimes with
unforeseen consequences for conflict in neighboring states. The Vietminh did not become an
effective fighting force until 1950, after the Communists had come to power in neighboring
China (Galula 1964). Similarly, the Portuguese exit from Mozambique led to more extensive
support and sanctuary for anti-Rhodesian fighters, who were allowed sanctuary in Mozambique,
and to transit supplies and fighters to other sanctuary states, such as neighboring Zambia.
Conversely, improving ties between neighbors may stem external support for insurgents. Tito
disallowed Greek Communists to cross the border into Yugoslavia in 1949-50, which contributed
to a successful Greek counterinsurgency after previous attempts to defeat the insurgents failed.
Geography is critical to the establishment of both internal and transnational sanctuaries.
Insurgents tend to fare better in geographically large land-locked countries where the population
is dispersed rather than concentrated, the economy is primarily agricultural as opposed to
industrialized, the weather is temperate, and there are abundant swamps and mountains (Galula
1964). Difficult terrain that is mountainous or heavily forested poses obstacles for conventional
militaries that cannot penetrate these areas (Buhaug and Gates 2002). Furthermore,
counterinsurgents’ ability to project force declines as they get farther from their home bases as
they leave men and material behind to defend their long supply lines. The combination of
distance and terrain ruggedness erodes the counterinsurgents’ ability to use force and provides
3

insurgents opportunities to establish base zones in these remote, difficult to access areas.
Insurgents may establish internal sanctuaries at the confluence of provincial boundaries to take
advantage of weak coordination among administrative districts. Just as transnational insurgents
may seek to escape repression by taking advantage of transnational boundaries, those operating
from internal sanctuaries will cross over provincial lines to evade capture (Galula 1964).
The literature on insurgency and sanctuary posits a number of advantages for insurgents
with sanctuary. Transnational sanctuary refers to areas contiguous to conflict zones that are used
by insurgent groups and separated by international borders (Fall 1967). It can aid insurgent
groups in a number of ways: protection from counterinsurgent attacks; recruitment; training;
access to arms; infiltration; and opportunities to transmit propaganda to a target population (Fall
1967; Pugh and Cooper 2004; Staniland 2005; Ruys and Verhoeven 2005). These potential
benefits are vital to nascent insurgent groups who are vulnerable to government attacks because
they have limited manpower and little experience evading government forces. Sanctuary can also
serve as rear bases for insurgents in later stages of conflict where they can cache weapons and
manpower.
Sanctuary may facilitate the onset of insurgency by lowering the expected costs to
insurgents, and may enable insurgents to continue fighting longer. Sanctuary may allow
insurgents to build up their arms to the point where they can challenge the conventional military
power of their target state (Galula 1964). Staniland (2005) finds that base areas near a border
allow insurgents to infiltrate fighters to replace their killed or captured comrades, allowing
insurgents to keep constant pressure on government forces without risking their entire force to
counterinsurgent attack.
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Transnational sanctuary is a frequent correlate of post-1945 insurgencies, although there
are considerable disparities in its prevalence. Buhaug, et al.’s (2009) finding that internal
conflicts cross borders in one-third of conflicts is one of the more conservative indicators of the
prevalence of sanctuary. Salehyan (2007) finds that 55% of rebel groups used transnational
sanctuaries. Furstenberg (2010) focuses on cases of African civil wars in the period between the
early 1990s and mid-2000s and finds that 60% of the 30 insurgent organizations were
transnational.
Many argue that sanctuary significantly increases the likelihood of insurgent victory
(Galula 1964; Fall 1967; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Staniland 2005; Bruscino 2006), but the effect
varies across studies. Bernard Fall believes that the outcomes of all rebellions after 1945 were
determined by the absence or presence of transnational sanctuary (Fall 1967, in Monarch, 2009).
Furstenberg’s study of thirty African conflicts found that 47% of insurgents and rebels with
sanctuary won, 21% lost, and 31% were ongoing, and none signed a peace agreement or agreed
to a regulated ceasefire. By contrast, those insurgents who did not have sanctuary won only 9%
of the time and lost 54% of the time. This appears to partly confirm the conventional wisdom
that sanctuaries help insurgents achieve victory. However, Furstenberg tempers the potential
positive impact of sanctuary for insurgents with another potential explanation: stronger
insurgents used sanctuary and the outcomes were more likely a product of the balance of
capabilities between insurgents and states. After analyzing 89 insurgencies, Gompert and Gordon
(2008) conclude that “(o)btaining sanctuary helps a lot.” They found that 66% of insurgencies
had sanctuaries, and the likelihood of insurgents winning a conflict outright increased from a
baseline of 28% to 36% when the cases were restricted to just those with sanctuary. The
likelihood of government victory declined from 31% to 25% when sanctuary was present.
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Insurgents in a transnational sanctuary can avoid “do or die” situations where they have
to attack counterinsurgents or else risk becoming irrelevant to their target population (Nagl
2002). Insurgents in internal sanctuary can always lose their base of popular support if the
government undertakes measures to undercut insurgent support. If those insurgents cannot block
a potentially popular government reform, they may become irrelevant.
Greater fine-grained data are needed to show that transnational sanctuary actually
contributes to victory and is not a product of insurgent strength or weakness. With the potential
benefits and costs of transnational sanctuaries outlined, it still remains to be seen how
transnational sanctuary affects war outcomes. Sanctuary may affect the outcome, but it may also
be present in those cases where insurgents were more likely to win anyway. While he believes
the data underestimate the importance of transnational sanctuary, Furstenberg (2010) found that
only 4.5% of recorded activities took place in another country, indicating that civil war and
insurgency remain primarily domestic phenomena.
External support and outcomes in insurgency
Winning the support of the population is a priority for most insurgent groups. Insurgents
need resources to conduct their struggle against their target states and often seek the support of
population centers that can help provision their fighters. Dense forests tend not to be full of
natural or lootable resources and are not ideal for growing food to sustain an insurgent army
(Rustad, et al. 2008). Insurgents need to station themselves near towns and villages and will not
survive long if they are confined to uninhabited regions of a country (Raleigh 2010). The
Malayan Communists were dependent on Chinese squatters who had drifted toward the
periphery and the jungle. They did not choose the peripheries and jungles because they were
remote, but because it was where the sympathetic population was located (Nagl 2002). In the
6

absence of strong support within their target state, insurgents may find transnational sanctuary an
appealing option to provide them with the resources they need to win their struggle.
External support and transnational population linkages are transnational effects that can
affect the outcome of civil wars and insurgencies (Gleditsch 2007; Checkel 2010). External
support for insurgents can come in the form of moral, political, technical, financial, and military
support (Galula 1964). External support can allow insurgents to make up for their initial
weakness relative to their target state, perhaps contributing to insurgent victory. Writing during
the period that witnessed a spike in wars of national liberation, Galula (1964) believes that moral
support is almost always on the side of the insurgents. Military support can come in the form of
giving weapons or providing facilities to help them train. States may funnel arms or money to
insurgent groups with the goal of weakening a target state, and prefer to support insurgent groups
to avoid risks and costs that could degrade their own military strength (Salehyan, Gleditsch,
Cunningham 2011). Saleyhan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) further find that democracies
fighting insurgents tend not to face insurgents who receive external support. This finding seems
difficult to reconcile with the several cases of democracies combatting insurgencies in other
countries, as well as the wars of national liberation that were fought against democracies by
insurgents who received a variety of external support.
Not only is transnational sanctuary a form of external support, but insurgents who have
sanctuaries are also more likely to be able to access other forms of external support that would be
made more difficult to acquire if the insurgents only had internal sanctuaries. Counterinsurgents
would have greater ability to deny external support to insurgents who operated solely from
internal sanctuary because counterinsurgents have greater control over and may use greater
violence in their own territory, which would disrupt the flow of external support to insurgents.
7

External support, including transnational sanctuary, may prolong a conflict by keeping
one side of the conflict in the conflict longer than it would have been without external support, or
it may extend the conflict by making it more difficult for the belligerents to reach an agreement.
Once a conflict is underway, the presence of a sanctuary may produce private information about
insurgent capabilities that leads to bargaining failure because of the information asymmetry
between insurgents and states (Salehyan, 2007). Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011)
further find that a state receiving external support increases the likelihood that insurgents will
receive external support by 2.3 to 2.6 times. This suggests that external support may lead to
proxy wars and rival governments may try to stop target states from defeating transnational
insurgents whom they support. Cunningham, et al. (2009) find that conflicts against rebels with
base areas tend to last longer, although this holds for all types of sanctuary, not just transnational.
Apparently, rebel control of any area, even by weak rebels, will allow them to continue to
survive in the face of counterinsurgent actions. Given that 38% of civil war conflict outcomes
were some kind of long-term low-intensity conflict, it could be assumed that both internal and
transnational sanctuary were contributing to these ongoing stalemates (Cunningham, et al. 2009).
External support is not always a boon to insurgent groups. Insurgents prefer more
resources to make up for their initial material inferiority, but accepting aid may reduce their
autonomy to act (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011). All things being equal, insurgents
should prefer their own domestic support base because they could maximize their resources
without constraints on their autonomy. Acquiring heavy weapons can be a long-term liability for
insurgents because they decrease the fluidity that insurgents depend on to survive (Galula 1964).
They may also prefer domestic support among their target population rather than being viewed as
tools of foreign influence if they have external support. External support in the form of sanctuary
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introduces a principal-agent relationship between the supporting state and the group using the
sanctuary. Insurgents who accept aid and sanctuary may be forced to accept conditions by their
benefactors that jeopardize their chances of defeating their target state (Salehyan, Gleditsch,
Cunningham 2011). Potential loss of autonomy may lead insurgents to reject external support
and sanctuary. If outside support is easy to obtain, there is the possibility that insurgents will take
less care to provide for themselves, thereby increasing their dependence on their benefactors
(Galula 1964).
External support may be more important to weaker insurgents, who are not strong enough
to confront their target states. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) find that the
strongest rebels do not have external support. Since transnational sanctuary is a type of
assistance to insurgents, this finding is at odds with Furstenberg’s (2010) that the strongest
insurgents operate from transnational sanctuary. Transnational sanctuary may not aid insurgents
if they already have ample weapons and fighters inside their target state (Bairstow 2006).
Powerful states losing “small wars”
There is a literature that identifies a tendency among powerful states to lose small wars,
such as insurgencies (Mack 1975). This literature potentially undercuts the arguments that
sanctuary is decisive in determining the outcome of insurgencies. External interveners may lose
for a number of reasons unrelated to sanctuary.
Conventionally armed and trained counterinsurgents often try to use maximum force
against insurgents, as they would conventional enemies. Conventional military operations that
emphasize firepower and rely on heavily armed personnel, artillery, and armor, tend to receive
the bulk of resources, which cannot be spent on effective counterinsurgency policies (Lyall and
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Wilson 2009). Relying on training for conventional warfare can deprive a state’s military of past
“lessons learned” from irregular warfare. For instance, the U.S. Army’s field guide Border
Security/ Anti-Infiltration Operations (FM 31-55), which may have proven useful to U.S. forces
in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, was left unrevised from the Vietnam War on microfiche at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, far from where it was needed (Bairstow 2006).
The predilection for offensive conventional warfare found in professional armies may
lead it to neglect valuable defensive options in counterinsurgency. Neither the French in Algeria,
nor Rhodesians or Americans in Iraq spent more than one percent of their military budgets for
those conflicts on border interdiction, despite the apparent importance of containing transnational
insurgents (Bairstow, 2006). Finally, counterinsurgent militaries and governments may purposely
distort history to avoid blame or protect their reputations. Pinning a defeat on insurgents in a
transnational sanctuary can allow a government or military to escape blame by claiming
international law and state sovereignty tied its hands and prevented it from defeating insurgents
that did not observe such rules.
Norms of state sovereignty and self-defense
Non-state actors generally have far less to lose by crossing international borders and
using violence because they are not bound by international borders whereas states are.
International borders are supposed to constrain counterinsurgent attacks because states are
expected to refrain from using force against the territory of a state with whom they are not at
war. States that violate that accepted norm usually face strong international condemnation and
may become the victim of reprisal attacks. Condemnation of counterinsurgent cross-border
attacks usually happens even when a counterinsurgent can show that it is responding to an attack,
perhaps in “hot pursuit,” or it is responding to a series of attacks over time that come to be
10

viewed as an ongoing attack against their state. Thus, even states that claim to be exercising their
right to self-defense usually have to acknowledge limits on the duration, intensity, and area of
attacks outside of their borders. Transnational sanctuary ostensibly protects insurgents because
they are not bound to respect state sovereignty whereas their state pursuers face costs for
violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their neighbors (Deeks 2011; Reinold 2011).
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter commits members to refrain from violating the territorial integrity
of other states, but insurgent groups are not bound to observe this because they are not members
of the United Nations.
While condemnation of cross-border reprisals against insurgents had been routine after
1945, the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States may have helped dampen the criticism of
governments responding to attacks emanating from states with whom they are not at war. This
may signal an international environment in which international borders are not the constraining
institutions that they were for the past half century prior to 2001. Insurgents are potentially less
secure in transnational sanctuaries if target states feel less constrained to use force abroad than
within their borders. International norms about the legitimate use of force against domestic
groups may restrain the use of force within a state’s borders but lead it to use greater violence
against groups operating from neighboring territory (Ron 2003). Therefore, the amount of force
used against transnational sanctuaries may be greater than against internal sanctuaries. Some
evidence from Rhodesia confirms this. The Rhodesian’s most lopsided victories came in
neighboring transnational sanctuaries where the insurgents presented relatively fixed targets for
conventional Rhodesian forces. This may be especially true when the outside group is attempting
to overthrow a recognized government.

11

Statement of the Argument
Sanctuary’s contribution to insurgent victory has often been taken for granted, and that
conventional wisdom ought to be tested. Previous studies of insurgency and sanctuary have
failed to explain why insurgents still lose despite having transnational sanctuary and why
insurgents without transnational sanctuary still win. To be sure, there are many factors that
influence the outcome of insurgencies, but the conventional acceptance that sanctuary leads to
insurgent success is quickly imperiled after an analysis of the historical record since 1945.
I argue that transnational sanctuary facilitates insurgent victory against governments and
counterinsurgents who are not domestically constituted.2 These foreign-imposed governments
are the result of colonialism, imperialism, and external intervention. This much of my argument
is consistent with the conventional wisdom that transnational sanctuary aids insurgents.
However, I part with the conventional wisdom and argue that transnational sanctuary does not
significantly enhance insurgents’ ability to defeat domestically constituted governments.
Insurgents with transnational sanctuary do occasionally defeat domestically constituted regimes,
but transnational sanctuary is incidental. My revision of the conventional wisdom significantly
reduces the importance of transnational sanctuary as an explanatory factor in insurgent victory
because most insurgencies occur against domestically constituted incumbents, which are no more
likely to lose when fighting insurgents with sanctuary.

2

While it is usually clear what kind of incumbent is present, there are a few cases where the
government appears to be so poorly embedded in society and there are so few supporters that it
could flee with its supporters even though it was domestically constituted. White-minority
governments, such as Rhodesia through the end of the 1970s, are indicative of this kind of
government. In these cases, although they are domestically constituted, the “waiting game” could
be used effectively by insurgents to wait for the regime to flee.
12

Causal Mechanisms
I have proposed four causal mechanisms that explain why sanctuary facilitates
insurgents’ victory against some forms of government but not others. The four mechanisms are:
(1) The stopping power of international borders; (2) The “waiting game” that insurgents may
play against external interveners; (3) The limitation on insurgent power created by an
organizational inflection point; and (4) The inability of external interveners to create enduring
governments in the countries in which they intervene.
The first mechanism, the stopping power of international borders, does not mean that
international borders completely prevent cross-border attacks, but borders do place relative
constraints on counterinsurgents, especially the duration of those cross-border attacks. The
constraining effect of international borders can be traced to the generally accepted prohibition on
aggression, codified in Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter and the acceptance of state
sovereignty precluding external powers from exercising control over another’s territory without
their consent.3 The extent of the constraining effect of international borders may vary among
cases, especially when neighboring states agree to coordinate their actions and/or allow one
another’s forces to enter their territory in pursuit of insurgents. The constraining effect may also
diminish if insurgents’ sanctuary is located in an ungoverned, or under-governed part of a
country where the recognized government does not effectively exercise control over its territory
and does not prevent attacks against neighboring states.4 Despite these exceptions,

Article 2 (4) reads “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
4
This happens despite the United Nations’ International Law Committee assertion that these
states cannot be held responsible for the acts of private actors.
3
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counterinsurgent cross-border attacks directed against insurgents usually face strong
international condemnation. External interveners who carry out these cross-border attacks often
face additional scrutiny and condemnation because they are already close to violating the antiimperial and anti-colonial norms established in the United Nations Charter and reconfirmed in
subsequent United Nations General Assembly Resolutions (Pangalangan and Aguiling 1983).
Domestically constituted regimes are more easily able to temper condemnation of crossborder attacks if they can credibly claim that they are doing so in self-defense against insurgents
who are likely to attack them in the future.5 Those domestically constituted incumbents can offer
self-defense against an armed attack as a competing claim against the aggrieved state’s violated
sovereignty; external interveners conducting cross-border attacks against sanctuaries have a more
difficult time convincing international opinion that those attacks are self-defense.
The second mechanism, the “waiting game” that insurgents can play against external
interveners, is related to the first. The strong norm against territorial conquest (Fazal 2007)
means that foreign occupations and counterinsurgencies are expected to be of limited duration.
Insurgents know this to be the case and generally prefer to avoid direct confrontations with
external interveners who tend to possess the most lethal weaponry and have a substantial supply
of it. Once the intervening power withdraws, the costs to the insurgents tend to decrease and
insurgents have an incentive to increase attacks against the government left in power. Sanctuary

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter reads “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”
5
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facilitates the “waiting game” for reasons largely explained in the first causal mechanism: it
provides them the relative protection without which they would likely be eliminated if subjected
to the full force of the counterinsurgents. International borders blunt the counterinsurgents’ force,
enabling insurgents a greater opportunity to survive. The “waiting game” that may be successful
in waiting out external interveners will likely be far less useful against domestically constituted
governments that have no option to withdraw.6 Insurgents with sanctuary fighting a domestically
constituted government would need to ensure that it maintained a sufficient presence inside its
target state or else face irrelevance and defeat. Similarly, insurgents in that position would be
more open to the charge of being tools of foreign influence if they operated and received support
from abroad; that nationalist argument would likely be in the insurgents’ favor if they were
facing an external military intervener.
The third mechanism, the organizational inflection point that limits otherwise successful
insurgents, explains why domestically constituted regimes can often keep insurgents from posing
an existential military threat. It also explains why the benefits of transnational sanctuary may not
lead to insurgent victory. The arming, training, recruiting, and all the other benefits of sanctuary
that enhance the fighting potential of insurgents up to a certain point may become a liability.
Insurgents who lack heavy weapons and are few in number tend to avoid large, pitched battles
with counterinsurgent forces that they will likely lose. As insurgents gain increasingly advanced
weapons, including heavy weapons and artillery, they are also more susceptible to conventional

6

While it is usually clear what kind of incumbent is present, there are a few cases where the
government appears to be so poorly embedded in society and there are so few supporters that it
could flee with its supporters even though it was domestically constituted. White-minority
governments, like the one in Rhodesia up through the end of the 1970s, are indicative of this
kind of government. In these cases, although they are domestically constituted, the “waiting
game” could be used effectively by insurgents to wait for the regime to flee.
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military operations carried out by counterinsurgents. This does not necessarily portend disaster,
but it may if the insurgents undertake this transformation prematurely. Insurgents are usually
able to negate much of the superior military strength of the incumbents because they are difficult
to find. Insurgent bands coalescing into a rebel army may be necessary to take and hold territory
in the target state, but it also exposes them to what is likely still the state’s superior firepower.
This happened to the insurgents in El Salvador who prematurely launched conventional assaults
and incurred significant losses from government forces until they dispersed back into smaller
bands.
Finally, external interveners have generally proven incapable of building enduring states
in the countries in which they intervene.7 This is true regardless of whether the insurgents that
they faced had sanctuary. In critiquing the conventional wisdom about sanctuary in this
dissertation, I put forward a rival explanation for insurgent loss and victory: the nature of their
target. My theory predicts that insurgents will usually win when they face external interveners,
and sanctuary may help them stay alive long enough to defeat the residual government left in
place once the external intervener withdraws. Failure to build lasting structures may be traced
back to the cause of the intervention in the first place: namely, the weakness of the client.
External interveners often come to the aid of their clients and frequently go on to assume many
of the responsibilities of the client governments, including fighting and administration. External
interventions to save clients may work in the short term by altering the domestic balance of

7

Table 2.1 in Chapter Two gives the results of all insurgencies waged against external
interveners. Notable examples of failed efforts by external interveners to build enduring states
abroad include the French in Algeria and in conflicts in what was French Indochina, Portuguese
attempts to build enduring states in Angola and Mozambique, American efforts to create an
enduring Republic of Vietnam, and the Soviet Union’s attempt at cultivating a government in
Afghanistan.
16

forces in favor of the regime facing insurgency, but this is not a long-term solution for stability in
the country unless that temporary distortion of forces can be made permanent by either
permanently strengthening the imperiled domestic government or permanently weakening the
insurgents. Economic aid, armaments, training, and sometimes foreign troops are often enough to
keep the imperiled government in power for a time, but that relative security brought about by
external intervention insulates the regime from having to have to embed itself in society by
incorporating more segments of it. Furthermore, a government that is viewed as having been
rescued by a foreign power is not likely to win new domestic supporters in an age in which
nationalism remains a prevalent force in politics. If the people generally believe that insurgents
will win the “waiting game,” they are less likely to support the incumbent, which is viewed as
temporary.8
Methods
The compilation of post-1945 (1945-2016) insurgencies allows a test of whether my
refined version of the conventional wisdom, which takes the nature of the counterinsurgent into
account, explains the data better than the conventional wisdom. Previous studies of insurgency
have generally indicated that insurgents with sanctuary tend to win more frequently than
insurgents without it. However, those same studies often fail to differentiate between
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I do not further develop this observation in this dissertation, but I have found, in the course of
my research, often-repeated phrases by politicians, military officers, and diplomats that justify
external military intervention on the grounds that it provides “breathing space” for an embattled
foreign regime. The foreign military intervention is supposed to take over some of the
warfighting for the embattled regime, which will then, ideally, concentrate its resources on
broadening its domestic political base. I have not found any cases where this actually worked as
predicted or described, but that has not, apparently, diminished the appeal of the logic, since it
continues to resurface. One possible explanation for why this “breathing space” never
materializes is that the military and political resources available to the embattled regime are not
fungible.
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domestically constituted governments and insurgencies against external interveners. Previous
studies’ inclusion of all insurgencies together may hide important trends that would benefit from
disaggregation, such as systematically different outcomes because of differences in the nature of
the insurgents’ target. My survey of post-1945 insurgencies should help determine whether
sanctuary has different effects in different contexts. Table 1.1 below demonstrates how the
results will be reported to measure the conventional account’s predictions against my own. This
study contains two independent variables, sanctuary and the nature of the target regime,
measured against the outcome variable, the success of the insurgency. The first independent
variable, sanctuary, is in the left-hand column, while the second, the nature of the target regime,
is across the top. The four categories of insurgencies created by the two independent variables
explain the divergent predictions of my theory and the conventional wisdom. There will be four
possible outcomes for each case in each box (insurgent loss, insurgent victory, mixed, ongoing)
that will be reported in Chapter Two.
As Table 1.1 demonstrates, if the conventional wisdom is true, then the cases in Boxes
One and Two should be insurgent victories and the cases that fall into Boxes Three and Four
should be insurgent defeats. My refined version of the conventional wisdom makes slightly
different predictions, although my refined conventional wisdom overlaps with the conventional
wisdom in Boxes Two and Four. Boxes One and Three will be the crucial tests for my argument.
In Box One, the conventional wisdom predicts that those insurgents with sanctuary will likely
defeat their domestically constituted target governments. My argument predicts insurgent defeat
in these cases where the insurgents’ target, being domestically constituted, chooses to fight and
pay the costs of insurgency and counterinsurgency because there is no option to withdraw if the
costs become high. Insurgents may continue to benefit from sanctuary in these cases, but even
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substantial material and psychological support from sanctuary will not usually be enough to
defeat a regime with sufficient local support. The logic of the conventional wisdom about
sanctuary would predict insurgent defeat for those without sanctuary, even when facing an
external intervener. Moreover, because many of these external interveners have more lethal
weaponry and superior technology to use it, the logic of the conventional wisdom would predict
that insurgents without sanctuary fighting against outside powers should lose. My argument
predicts that the nature of the target regime is a more powerful explanatory variable than
sanctuary. While external military interveners may have superior weapons, technology, and
training, among other advantages, they are mitigated by global public opinion, which prefers
foreign counterinsurgencies to be brief, and, perhaps, domestic political opinion, which shares
the same sentiment.
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Table 1.1: Comparing the Conventional and Refined Theories of Transnational Sanctuary
and Insurgency

Transnational
Sanctuary
Present

Transnational
Sanctuary Not
Present

Domestically Constituted Incumbent

External Intervener as Incumbent

Box 1

Box 2

- Conventional wisdom predicts
insurgent victory.

-Conventional wisdom predicts
insurgent victory.

-Refined explanation predicts
insurgent loss.

-Refined explanation predicts
insurgent victory.

Case: FMLN and El Salvador

Case: Vietnam War

Box 4

Box 3

-Conventional wisdom predicts
insurgent defeat.

-Conventional Wisdom predicts
insurgent defeat.

-Refined explanation predicts
insurgent defeat.

-Refined explanation predicts
insurgent victory

Case: Shining Path in Peru

Case: Mau Mau in Kenya

The data for the survey of post-1945 insurgencies comes from various Correlates of War
databases and UCDP/PRIO databases. My sources for the case studies consist of secondary
source materials, including books, newspaper and journal articles, think tank publications, but
also primary source documents that have been made public.
Outline of the dissertation
Chapter two will contain the reported results of my collection of post-1945 insurgencies
and will contain the information about how I operationalize key terms, such as victory,
insurgency, sanctuary, the nature of the target regime, and others. Chapters three through six will
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present the four case studies that follow the reporting of post-1945 insurgencies attempt to
demonstrate sanctuary’s varying effects in different contexts. I also chose cases from different
eras and regions to investigate whether the benefits of sanctuary tend to be consistent across time
(after 1945) and location. The benefits the Viet Cong received in the 1960s and 1970s were very
similar to FMLN fighters in the 1980s and 1990s. The dependent variable, the outcome of the
insurgencies, varied across the cases, though variation on the dependent variable was not the
determining factor during the case selection process. I did not choose cases that confirmed my
expectation on the dependent variable in each box since I expect the large-n survey to be a more
appropriate measure of the two explanations’ strengths. The variations in the dependent variable
across the four cases demonstrate three of the four major outcomes in insurgencies: insurgent
victory, insurgent loss, and mixed outcome. I will not include a case study of an ongoing
insurgency. Chapter seven will be the last chapter in which I assess the relative contribution of
my refined conventional wisdom in light of the results reported in chapter two and the four case
studies.
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Chapter Two: Results and Discussion
Insurgency Since the End of World War Two
Since this dissertation seeks to understand if and how sanctuary benefits those engaged in
insurgency, several other forms of political violence have been excluded. Terrorist campaigns,
violent protest, one-sided mass killing, coups, civil wars that are largely fought by conventional
forces, and interstate war are excluded because those conflicts are not likely to be affected by the
presence of sanctuary. Terrorist campaigns are inappropriate to include because terrorist groups
are clandestine organizations that do not require holding territory from which to launch attacks
against their target state. Terrorists tend to operate in territory controlled by some other group or
government and are able to avoid detection and capture because of their clandestine nature.
Protest movements may lead to political change, but these movements do not seek to use
organized political violence to achieve their aims. One-sided mass killing lacks the necessary
dynamic of contestation to be included. Coups are discreet events and are inappropriate to
include in this study because they also lack the dynamic of contestation. International borders do
not confer protection to belligerents during interstate war, so the limitation on the use of force
that sanctuary requires is not in force. Insurgencies possess the requisite dynamic contest where
the balance of forces is closer to parity than one-sided violence, but often more asymmetric than
interstate conflicts. Insurgents are usually weaker than the target states with whom they are at
war, but strong enough to potentially defeat them.
Sanctuary
Sanctuary refers to insurgent bases in territory that is either contiguous to the challengers’
target state or separated by narrow stretches of water. Sanctuaries may be fixed bases or
geographical spaces where challengers have camps that they use to train, securely receive arms,
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treat their wounded, plan, recuperate, transmit propaganda into their target state, and receive
relative protection from incumbent attacks.
I make no distinction between sanctuary that is allowed to insurgents by another state and
sanctuaries that emerge because neighboring states are unable to prevent insurgents from using
their territory. Some studies of sanctuary note a difference between active sanctuaries that arise
because a neighboring state supports insurgent groups against a rival, and passive sanctuaries,
which arise because a state is too weak to prevent groups from using its territory. The literature
about sanctuary and insurgency usually posits active sanctuaries as more dangerous because of
the greater level of state support. I did not differentiate between these two types of sanctuary
because it was too difficult to consistently differentiate between active and passive sanctuaries.
Labeling sanctuaries as either active or passive pushed me toward ambiguous concepts such as
“political will” and “state capacity,” which I did not believe that I could accurately capture, and
certainly could not measure. These measures, especially state capacity, were going to be
especially difficult to measure in the extrastate conflicts, where at least one major external
intervener was employing some of their state capacity to assist an embattled ally. Several
sanctuaries appear to exist because the hosts chose not to devote resources to prevent them, but it
is unclear whether those hosts ever could have prevented them if they tried.9
From the case studies I conducted for this dissertation and prior to it, I have found limited
support for this conventional wisdom that the nature of a sanctuary affects the likelihood of
insurgent success. Many of the clear-cut cases of active sanctuary, such as Tunisia in France’s
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For example, sanctuaries in Ecuador in the conflict with Colombia, FMLN use of Guatemala in
the case of El Salvador, at least Cambodia, if not also Laos, in Vietnam’s case, and the
contemporary concern about Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan.
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conflict in Algeria, and North Vietnam’s support for the Viet Cong, were also cases where
external interveners were present, so while these groups received a lot of support, they waged
insurgencies that were, historically, very likely to succeed. Active sanctuaries against
domestically constituted governments, such as Yemen’s support of Dhofari insurgents against
Oman, also gave significant support to insurgents, but those insurgents lost. While the outcome
of the war in El Salvador was less one-sided than Dhofar, the FMLN used active sanctuaries in
some neighboring states, but was not able to oust El Salvador’s domestically constituted regime.
Outcome
These conflicts are coded according to the outcome for the insurgents. Coding conflict
outcome from the perspective of the insurgent is the most precise test of the conventional
wisdom that insurgents with sanctuary tend to achieve their aims more often than those that do
not have those sanctuaries.
Each conflict is coded as either being an insurgent loss, an insurgent victory, a mixed
case, or ongoing. Most insurgent groups articulated goals for their organization and each case
was coded against those stated goals. Most insurgents’ primary goal was a change in the political
status quo. The kinds of political change most frequently sought included independence leading
to statehood, autonomy within an existing state, or greater inclusion within an existing
government. Whether those political goals were achieved determined the coding of insurgent
success. Generally, I discounted more far-reaching economic and social goals of insurgents
because holding them to aspirational goals that would be nearly impossible to reasonably expect
any group to achieve would distort the data. Under such high standards, almost every insurgent
group would be labeled a failure, even when it is evident that they achieved significant success.
Mixed cases are those in which insurgents do not fully realize their primary political goal, but
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their actions contribute to comparable changes. For instance, a case would be coded as mixed for
a group that sought independence but settled for greater autonomy. Ongoing cases are those in
which the challengers have not given up their armed struggle against the incumbent government
and the conflict remains active.
The nature of the incumbent regime
I argue in this dissertation that sanctuary is likely to contribute to insurgent victory when
their target is an external intervener that has the option to withdraw from a foreign territory. Two
of the four mechanisms that I use to explain this refined version of the conventional wisdom are
linked to the nature of the external intervener. First, insurgents can wait out an external
intervention in a neighboring sanctuary. Second, external interveners are usually unable to build
a viable state in the territory in which it has intervened. The residual authorities who are present
when external interveners leave often lack organic domestic support and falter under renewed
pressure from insurgents.
Therefore, I code incumbents as either external interveners or domestically constituted
regimes. External interveners are those governments that hold colonial or imperial possessions,
or engage in counterinsurgency outside of their recognized borders. External, colonial, or
imperial conflicts are relatively easy to identify, as those were the trust and non-self-governing
territories of the United Nations.10 The other cases of external intervention where the primary
counterinsurgents are external interveners are those cases in which the domestic regime would
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There are some exceptions, such as French possessions in North Africa, which were not
included as an UN non-self-governing or trust territory.
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likely collapse absent continued intervention.11 The Correlates of War project has an extrastate
conflict database that provided the core of cases that I coded as external interveners.
My coding of these insurgencies is almost always consistent with the literature. The case
histories detailed in the Non-State Actor dataset (Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013) were
the first sources I consulted for most of the Table 2.1 categories, as well as the Armed Conflict,
Conflict Termination, Peace Agreements, and External Support codebooks by the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP), as well as the Correlates of War Intrastate and Extrastate
datasets and codebooks. Salehyan’s (2011) data on sanctuaries and conflicts helped ensure the
accuracy of my coding, as did the Rand Publications, which I cite.
Different databases frequently gave slightly different dates for the same conflict, so I
made judgments about what the preponderance of evidence supported. I also tended to combine
conflicts between insurgents and governments that started and stopped several times into one
conflict dyad. Nevertheless, the broadly reported results in Table 2.1 are very similar to the
existing literature (see discussion following Table 2.1), and are also consistent with those authors
who have looked at success rates for insurgent groups with and without sanctuary. What is new
and different in Table 2.1 is that I take the comparison of groups with and without sanctuary a
step further and look at the nature of the counterinsurgents. As Table 2.1 makes clear, that
additional step reveals a lot about the conditions under which sanctuary appears to matter. Where
insurgents face external interveners, they usually have sanctuary, and they almost always win
regardless of whether they have sanctuary. Surprisingly, insurgents with sanctuary win and lose
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There are very few of these cases in this collection of cases. These kinds of cases include the
United States’ counterinsurgency in South Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s in Afghanistan.
These cases are selected based in part on what happened to these governments once the external
intervener ceased its operations.
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more often when they have sanctuary because, surprisingly, there are fewer ongoing conflicts
among the cases with sanctuary. This finding is at odds with those studies who have found
sanctuary more likely to produce mixed outcomes or ongoing conflicts.
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Results

Table 2.1: Comparing the Peformance of the Conventional Wisdom and the Refined Explanation
All results reported using the following format: number of cases, its equivalent percentage of all
cases, its equivalent percentage of cases in that category. For example, the line “Insurgent Loss”
in Box 1 reads 12, 15%, 32%, which means there are 12 cases where insurgents lost when they
had sanctuary and faced a domestically constituted regime. Those 12 cases were 15% of all cases
examined, and that case outcome represented 32% of the cases in Box 1.
Overall (79 cases)
Insurgent Loss:
22, 28%
Insurgent Win: 31,
39%
Mixed: 12, 15%
Ongoing: 14, 17%

Transnational
Sanctuary Present
(51 cases=65% of
all cases)
Insurgent Loss:
13, 16%, 26%
Insurgent Win: 23,
29%, 46%
Mixed: 10, 13%,
20%
Ongoing: 5, 6%,
10%

Transnational
Sanctuary Not
Present: 28
cases=35% of all
cases)
Insurgent Loss: 9,
11%, 32%
Insurgent Win: 8,
10%, 29%
Mixed: 5, 6%,
18%
Ongoing: 6, 8%,
21%

Domestically Constituted Target
Overall (61 cases=77% of all cases)
Insurgent Loss: 20, 25%, 33%
Insurgent Win:17, 21.5%, 28%
Mixed: 14, 17%, 23%
Ongoing: 10, 13%, 16%

External Intervener as Primary
Counterinsurgent Force (18
cases=23% of all cases)
Insurgent Loss: 2, 2.5%, 11%
Insurgent Win: 14, 18%, 78%
Mixed: 1, 1%, 5.5%
Ongoing: 1, 1%, 5.5%

Box 1 (38 cases= 48% of all cases)

Box 2 (13 cases= 16% of all cases)

- Conventional Wisdom predicts
insurgent victory.

-Conventional Wisdom predicts
insurgent victory.

-Refined Explanation predicts insurgent
loss

-Refined Explanation predicts
insurgent victory.

Insurgent Loss: 12, 15%, 32%
Insurgent Win: 12, 15%, 32%
Mixed: 10, 13%, 26%
Ongoing: 4, 5%, 7%
Case Study: FMLN in El Salvador

Insurgent Loss: 1, 1%, 8%
Insurgent Win: 11, 14%, 85%)
Mixed: 0
Ongoing: 1, 1%, 8%
Case Study: Viet Cong and Vietnam
War

Box 4 (23 cases=29% of all cases)

Box 3 (5 cases=6% of all cases)

-Conventional Wisdom predicts
insurgent loss

-Conventional Wisdom predicts
insurgent loss.

-Refined Explanation predicts insurgent
loss.

-Refined Explanation predicts
insurgent victory.

Insurgent Loss: 8,10%,35%
Insurgent Win: 5, 6%, 22%
Mixed: 4, 5%, 17%
Ongoing 6, 8%, 26%

Insurgent Loss: 1, 1%, 20%
Insurgent Win: 3, 4%, 60%
Mixed: 1, 1%, 20%
Ongoing: 0

Case Study: Shining Path in Peru

Case Study: Mau Mau in Kenya
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Box One Cases: Insurgents With Sanctuary Against Domestically Constituted Regime (38 Cases)
Insurgency

Time

Outcome
(Government win,
Insurgent win,
mixed, ongoing)

Iran (MEK)

1960s-

Government

Laos (ULNLF)

1960-1993

Government

Laos/ Pathet Lao government vs Hmong insurgents

1975-early
1990s

Government

Malaysia (Communist insurgents)

1968-1989

Government

Malaysia (CCO)

1962-66

Government

Nicaragua (Contras)

1981-1992

Government

Nigeria (Biafra)

1967-70

Government

Oman (Dhofar Rebellion)

1965-1975

Government

Russia (Chechnya)

1993-2003

Government

Sri Lanka (Tamils)

1976-2009

Government

Thailand (Communist Party of Thailand)

1950s1980s

Government

Morocco/Western Sahara (POLASARIO)

1975-1989

Government

Afghanistan (Taliban)
Ethiopia (EPRDF)
Kosovo/Serbia (KLA)
Liberia (NPFL and INPFL)
Liberia (LURD)
Nicaragua (FSLN)
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)
Rhodesia (ZANU, ZAPU)
Rwanda (RPF)
Sierra Leone (RUF)
South Africa (ANC)
Sudan (SPLM)
Bosnia (Muslim insurgents)

1994-96
1974-1991
1996-2008
1989-1996
1996-2003
1977-1979
1989-2001
1965-1980
1989-1994
1990-97
1961-1994
1983-2010
1992-94
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Insurgent
Insurgent
Insurgent
Insurgent
Insurgent
Insurgent
Insurgent
Insurgent
Insurgent
Insurgent
Insurgent
Insurgent
Mixed

Burundi (CNDD, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA, CNDD-FDD, and others)
Colombia—various leftist groups (FARC, ELN)
El Salvador (FMLN)
India (Mizo)
Mozambique (RENAMO)
Pakistan (Baluchistan)
Tajikistan (UTO)
Senegal (MFDC)
Sudan (SPLM)
India (Tripura)
Indonesia (Aceh)
Kashmir (JKLF)
Turkey (PKK)

1992-95
1964-2016
1980-1992
1965-1986
1977-1992
1973-77
1992-96
1980-1991
1983-2010
1978197519891984-

Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing

Box Two Cases: Insurgents with Sanctuary Against External Intervener (13 Cases)
Malaya (MNLA)

1948-1960

Government

Afghanistan (Anti-Soviets)

1978-89

Insurgent

Algeria (Independence)

1954-1962

Insurgent

Angolan Independence (MPLA)

1961-75

Insurgent

Cambodia/ Kampuchea (various insurgent groups)

1978-1992

Insurgent

Cameroon (anti-French)

1955-1960

Insurgent

Free Laos forces v. French

1946-53

Insurgent

Guinea-Bissau

1962-74

Insurgent

Indochina (Vietminh)

1946-1955

Insurgent

Mozambique (FRELIMO)

1964-1975

Insurgent

Namibia/ South Africa (SWAPO)

1966-1988

Insurgent

Vietnam (FLN and Viet Cong against RVN and USA)

1959-1973

Insurgent

Afghanistan (Taliban against ISAF)

2001-

Ongoing
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Box Three Cases: Insurgents without Sanctuary Against External Intervener (5 Cases)
Kenya (Mau Mau)

1948-60

Government

Indonesia/ Timor L’este (Fretelin)

1975-1998

Insurgent

Indonesian war of independence

1945-1949

Insurgent

Yemen (Aden Emergency)

1964-1967

Insurgent

Iraq (various Sunni Insurgent groups)

2003-2011

Mixed

Box Four Cases: Insurgents Without Sanctuary Against Domestically Constituted Regime (23 Cases)
Congo (Katanga)

1961-63

Government

Congo (South Kasai)

1961-63

Government

Kurdish separation from Iran (KDPI)

1946-1990s

Government

Myanmar (Shan)

1961-1996

Government

Myanmar (Various Communist groups)

1948-1988

Government

Peru (Shining Path)

1980-1993

Government

Philippines (Huk)

1946-1954

Government

Sri Lanka (JVP)

1988-90

Government

Chinese Civil War

1946-49

Insurgent

Cuba (26th of July Movement)

1952-56

Insurgent

Ethiopia (Eritrean secession)

1961-1993

Insurgent

Laos (Pathet Lao insurgents)

1960-1975

Insurgent

Nepal (Maoists)

1996-99

Insurgent

Sudan (Anya Naya)

1963-72

Mixed

Suriname (SLA/ Jungle Commandos)

1986-1988

Mixed

Guatemala (various leftist groups)

1960-95

Mixed
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India (Naxalite)

Late 1960s-present

Mixed

Philippines (NPA)

1960s-current

Ongoing

Nagorno-Karabakh

1992-94

Ongoing

Myanmar (Karen)

1949-

Ongoing

India (various Manipur groups)

early 1960s-

Ongoing

Georgia (Abkhazia)

1992-97

Ongoing

Pakistan (Balochistan)

2004-

Ongoing

Discussion
The results from Table 2.1 suggest that my refined version of the conventional wisdom may have
greater explanatory power than the conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom and my refined
version of it predict the same outcome for Boxes Two and Four, and both predictions are correct. My
argument makes divergent predictions about Boxes One and Three, and my predictions are accurate far
more often than the conventional wisdom.
The collection of cases yields some noteworthy observations about the prevalence of sanctuary in
insurgency. Sanctuary is a common feature of post-1945 insurgencies, being present in about two-thirds
of cases. About 65% of the insurgent groups that have sanctuary are facing domestically constituted
regimes, not external interveners. About half of the cases in this study were insurgencies against
domestically constituted regimes where insurgents had sanctuary, about one and a half times as common
(47%) as the next category of cases, insurgents without sanctuary facing a domestically constituted
regime (30%).
Overall, insurgents have better chances of winning than being defeated (insurgents won 39% of
the time and lost 28%) when all cases are included, but that masks significant differences between cases
where the target is domestically constituted and or an external intervener. Second, insurgent victory is
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nearly three times more likely against external interveners than domestically constituted regimes
(insurgents win 78% of conflicts against external interveners and just 28% against domestically
constituted regimes), regardless of the presence of sanctuary, and insurgents are three times more likely to
lose against domestically constituted regimes than external interveners (insurgents lose 33% of the time
against domestically constituted regimes and just 11% against external interveners), regardless of the
presence of sanctuary. This finding probably understates insurgent success against external interveners
because the victorious external intervener in both cases (the U.K. in Malaya and Kenya) withdrew its
forces shortly after the insurgency was declared over and won. Third, many insurgencies against
domestically constituted regimes tend to have less clear-cut outcomes, but this is not true against external
interveners. Forty percent of insurgencies against domestically constituted regimes had either mixed
outcomes (18%), or they were ongoing (21%). Insurgencies against external interveners had just 5.5% of
each. Taken together, these results strongly support the argument in my refined conventional wisdom that
the nature of the target of insurgency affects the outcome.
The results offer some support to the conventional wisdom that sanctuary aids insurgents, but
they are only slightly more likely to do so. Insurgents with sanctuary are more likely to win than their
targets (insurgents win 46% of the time with sanctuary, compared to 26% for the governments), which is
better than insurgents experienced overall (39% versus governments’ 28%), which includes those groups
without sanctuary. The cases where insurgents did not have sanctuary lent some moderate support to the
conventional wisdom with insurgents losing slightly more frequently than they won (31% and 28%,
respectively). Also consistent with the conventional wisdom, sanctuary nearly doubles the likelihood of
insurgent victory over cases where they do not have sanctuary (insurgents win 28% of cases without
sanctuary and 46% with it). When comparing the cases with sanctuary against those without it when both
types of groups are facing domestically constituted regimes, insugents win roughly 50% more frequently
with sanctuary (32% versus 21%), but insurgents continue to lose at nearly identical rates regardless of
the presence of sanctuary (32% with sanctuary and 33% without it). Notably, and this was surprising,
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insurgencies without sanctuary tend to have less clear-cut outcomes than those with sanctuary (42% of
insurgencies without sanctuary are mixed or ongoing compared to 32% of insurgencies with sanctuary).
So, if one just looks at the results from the two boxes in the far left column of Table 2.1, they would find
strong support for the conventional wisdom and my refined version of it would not appear to offer much.
Disaggregating the data further reveals strong support for my refined version of the conventional
wisdom. The nature of the target regime appears to be a much stronger explanatory factor than the
presence of sanctuary. External interveners tend to lose against insurgents whether sanctuary is present
and the presence of sanctuary seems to have relatively little effect when their targets are external
interveners, although the percentage of cases is small (only 23% of all cases). Insurgents with sanctuary
defeated external interveners 78% of the time when they had sanctuary and 60% of the time when they
did not. These findings are very sensitive to codings and slightly different codings, or the addition or
subtraction of a small number of cases could significantly alter these percentages.The overwhelming
majority of insurgencies (77%) are against domestically constituted regimes and insurgents are much less
likely to win those conflicts than against external interveners, regardless of sanctuary.
Consistent with my refined version of the conventional wisdom and the data discussed so far,
sanctuary is correlated with very different outcomes against different kinds of targets. Insurgents with
sanctuary fighting domestically constituted regimes lost about four times as frequently (32%) as
insurgents with sanctuary fighting against external interveners (8%), and those facing a domestically
constituted regime won slightly less than three times as much as those facing external interveners (32%
and 85%, respectively). Put another way, insurgents with sanctuary win/loss ratio against external
interveners was 10:1, but was approximately 1:1 against domestically constituted regimes.
A nearly identical pattern emerges in cases without sanctuary. Insurgents lost slightly more than
50% as often against domestically constituted regimes (33% versus 20% against external interveners) and
won only about a third as frequently against domestically constituted regimes (21% versus 60% against
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external interveners). Insurgents without sanctuary had a win/loss ratio of 3:1 against external interveners
but a 2:3 ratio against domestically constituted regimes.
The disaggregated results reported in Table 2.1 show that the nature of the target regime is a
much stronger predictor of insurgent success than the presence of sanctuary. The results indicate that the
win/loss ratios for insurgents change only moderately when the presence of sanctuary is varied, indicating
it is not a strong explanatory factor for insurgent success. Against domestically constituted regimes,
insurgents with and without sanctuary lose slightly more frequently than they win, but against external
interveners insurgents have an an 8:1 win/loss, regardless of sanctuary. However, there are very few cases
in both categories and insurgents lost just once when sanctuary was present and once when it was not.
In a regression analysis using the data compiled to create Table 2.1, the only statistically
significant result was for the interaction term with the presence of sanctuary against an external
intervener, further supporting my argument that sanctuary has different advantages in certain contexts.
Overall, the Table 2.1 results are consistent with much of the existing literature. The Table 2.1
results are roughly consistent with Jones’ (2016) finding that insurgents with sanctuary win about 38
percent of the time (Table 2.1 reports insurgents winning 46% of these conflicts) and governments win
about 30 percent of the time when facing insurgents with sanctuary (Table 2.1 results reports a lower win
rate for governments against insurgents with sanctuary, with counterinsurgents winning just 26% of these
conflicts). My results are also consistent with his conclusion that “sanctuary does not necessarily translate
into insurgent victory. Not all sanctuaries are equal.” The Table 2.1 results are very similar to Gompert
and Gordon’s (2008) finding that sanctuary was present in 66% of their 89 cases (63% of 79 cases in
Table 2.1), and my findings about insurgent victory are very similar as well (Gompert and Gordon
recorded an insurgent victory rate of about 30%). Overall, I find strong support for Andrew Mack’s
(1975) observation long ago that big states tend to lose small wars (insurgencies) even when they are not
colonial conflicts. Consistent with Connable and Libicki (2010), governments, not insurgents,

generally fare better over a long conflict, although I found that it depends on the nature of the
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government under challenge. The evidence from Table 2.1 suggests that Kalyvas and Balcells
(2010) are largely right that insurgency and civil war has evolved over the course of the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. There were fewer cases of external interveners fighting
insurgencies abroad after the Cold War ended than between 1945 and 1991. The dates given for
the 83 insurgencies in this study also indicate that more insurgencies after 1991 have mixed or
ongoing outcomes, while the Cold War conflicts against external interveners almost always
ended with a decisive victory for insurgents.
Other data reported in Chapter Two showed that insurgents tended to win against external
interveners regardless of whether they had sanctuary in a neighboring state, lending credence to
my argument about the limited benefits of transnational sanctuary. My findings tend to support
Lyall and Wilson’s (2009) finding that states identified as occupiers are more likely to lose
insurgencies, although I did not test, as they did, whether rates of mechanization of
counterinsurgent armed forces explain outcomes of insurgencies. The observations and
conclusions in this dissertation also appear consistent with Pape’s (1998) finding that suicide
terrorism against democratic external interveners succeeds, although it does not appear that their
democratic nature explains their defeat. The democratic nature of the democratic intervener does
not appear to be what is important here, but rather that external interveners of all regime types
tend to lose, and since 1945, democracies have on several occasions fought insurgencies outside
their recognized borders.
The results presented so far lend some support to the refined version of the conventional wisdom
that I have put forward in this dissertation. The conventional wisdom and my alternative to it made
different predictions about two kinds of cases, representing about 53% of the cases compiled for this
study. My alternative correctly predicted far more cases than the conventional wisdom. However, the
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results presented here do not confirm my theoretical explanation for why sanctuaries aid insurgents
fighting certain types of regimes but not others. My four causal mechanisms—the limitation on
counterinsurgent force bought on by international borders, insurgents’ ability to wait out a
counterinsurgent, the inability of external interveners to forge enduring governments in the countries in
which they intervene, and an organizational inflection point that limits insurgents’ ability to overpower
counterinsurgents—have not been confirmed by the data presented so far. Those causal mechanisms will
be tested in the four following case studies, each having been selected from one of the four boxes in Table
2.1 to demonstrate how insurgencies fare with and without sanctuary, and against external interveners and
domestically constituted regimes. The cases were selected to vary on their outcome, so there is a case of
insurgent victory (Vietnam), insurgent loss (Peru and Kenya), and a mixed outcome (El Salvador).
Case Selection

The first two cases detailed in chapters three and four illustrate how insurgencies fare
against domestically constituted regimes. In the first case, the Shining Path in Peru, the
insurgents do not have sanctuary in a neighboring state, but the FMLN in El Salvador, the second
case, does. El Salvador allows three of the four causal mechanisms to be tested, only excluding
the one that examines external interveners’ ability to forge an enduring regime in another state.
Chapter three, the Shining Path in Peru is a fascinating insurgency to study, even though
it only allows for direct tests of two causal mechanisms, because the group did not use
sanctuaries in neighboring states. Although they are rightly coded as having lost, they were
perceived by many to be on the cusp of victory until their leader was serendipitously captured,
triggering the implosion of the group. The Shining Path in Peru is representative of Box Four
conflicts, although the group appeared to be ascendant prior to its rapid downfall. I did one predissertation case study about Nepal’s Maoist insurgency in the 1990s, although the insurgents in
Nepal won their conflict while the Shining Path did not. The Peruvian insurgency is interesting
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because the group appeared to do quite well without sanctuary, and if not for the government’s
luck in apprehending the Shining Path’s leader, Guzman, may have won. But they did not and
that is the most typical outcome in these types of cases. In this case and the Mau Mau case, I end
the chapter with a counterfactual analysis of whether having sanctuary would have altered the
outcome. That analysis provides limited insight into the explanatory power of the causal
mechanisms related to the presence of sanctuary.
The final two cases detail how external interveners fare against insurgents with and
without sanctuary. The first, the Mau Mau insurgency against the British and others in Kenya,
affords the chance to examine all causal mechanisms except for the limitations on
counterinsurgents’ actions brought on by sanctuaries and international borders. The final case
study, the U.S. counterinsurgency in Vietnam, is the only case where all four causal mechanisms
can be and are tested in a single case.
Admittedly, the selection of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya is questionable because it is
unrepresentative of the small number of cases that exist in that category, and because I already
have a case that details insurgent defeat when sanctuary is not present. These problems aside, I
felt the two reasons for selecting the case outweighed its unrepresentative nature. First, I wanted
to include one of the anomalous cases where an external intervener defeated an insurgency, and
this was the only one available in Box Three. In selecting this case, I thought I could learn
something about insurgency and sanctuary by studying a case where sanctuary was not present
and comparing it to the two cases where it was. I thought a failed insurgency without sanctuary
might give the most insight into the benefits of sanctuary by seeing what happens to a group
when they do not have it and are especially likely to win, at least according to my argument,
because they faced an external intervener. My second reason for selecting the Mau Mau was that
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I found far more information available for this conflict than the four others. More information
about the insurgency would shed light on the importance of not having sanctuary. Because
sanctuary was not present, this chapter, like the case of the Shining Path, will contain a
hypothetical counterfactual to assess whether sanctuary could have altered the outcome.
The case of the National Liberation Front/Viet Cong insurgency against the United States
and others in South Vietnam has a representative outcome for those types of cases, and the
documentation of sanctuary was extensive, so this was a logical case to include. The only
previous case study I conducted on these kinds of conflicts was the Soviet experience in
Afghanistan, which had the same representative outcome of insurgent victory.
Some may object to the cases selected to study in this dissertation because not all of them
are representative of the typical outcomes of those kinds of cases detailed in Table 2.1 in Chapter
Two. While it is true that two of these cases are not representative of the most common outcome
for the type of conflict they are representing, I chose the cases that I did because there were more
serious pitfalls to selecting only the most representative cases. If I only chose the most
representative cases, then there would be no cases where the outcomes were anything but a win
by one side. Given that about 29% of cases in my collection of post-1945 insurgencies were
either mixed outcomes or ongoing insurgencies, I thought that would be a significant omission.
Prior to this dissertation, I studied an ongoing insurgency (at the time) when I examined how the
FARC used sanctuaries in its conflict with the Colombian government, but I had never
completed a case study where the result was mixed. The benefits of selecting the FMLN in El
Salvador for my Box One case study seemed to outweigh the costs of selecting a nonrepresentative case. Prior to this dissertation, I completed two representative cases of Box One
insurgencies (Rhodesia and Oman), where insurgents lost, so conducting a third study with the
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same outcome would likely shed less light than studying a case where sanctuary was present in a
long-running conflict.
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Chapter Three
The Shining Path and Peru: No Sanctuary and a Domestically Constituted Regime

Map 3.1 Peru and its departments (Hudson, in McClintock 1998)
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The conflict in Peru pitted the government against a Maoist group, Sendero Luminoso, or
Shining Path, which lacked sanctuary in a neighboring state. The outcome of this conflict
corresponds to the conventional wisdom that insurgents require sanctuary to win. However, a
closer analysis of the conflict reveals that the Shining Path’s strengths, limited as they were in
some respects, likely would not have existed if they relied on sanctuary.
Background to the conflict
Although the Shining Path’s armed struggle began in May 1980, the top members of the
group began organizing in the 1960s. A military coup in Peru in 1968 began the period of the socalled Military Socialist regime in Peru. The Shining Path’s leader, Abimael Guzman, a college
professor, and the upper ranks of the Shining Path, would be dominated by educators. Guzman, a
Maoist, found a receptive audience in Ayacucho, where many of the students came from
indigenous backgrounds and felt the European descendants in the towns and cities created a
government that disadvantaged the indigenous population. There was a sense that rural areas
were being left behind as the Peruvian economy increased by 3% annually during the 1960s and
1970s (McClintock, 302).
The Shining Path would eventually declare that it intended to seize power in Peru and
institute a new order, although the specific design of the new order remained obscured in
revolutionary platitudes. To take control in Peru, the Shining Path’s aim was to seize the control
of government by winning the capital, Lima. While the Shining Path broadly set out to follow the
three stages of revolutionary warfare—defensive, equilibrium, and offensive— the Shining Path
would make use of terrorism to try to persuade supporters of the regime to leave the country
(McClintock, 65-66). Clearly drawing from Mao, the Shining Path did not want to assault the
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capital directly, but instead sought to cut it off from food and electricity by establishing a
presence in the countryside. Over time, the Shining Path would drive away the capitalist
supporters of the regime through terrorism, while the army and police would abandon their posts
as a result of demoralization brought about by terrorism. And, it almost worked.
Overview of the conflict
The Shining Path established its first bases in the relatively poor Peruvian departments of
Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica in the early 1980s (McClintock, 86). The onset of
violence in Peru happened to coincide with the establishment of democracy in 1980. In the early
1980s, the Shining Path was able to expand because the democratic government refrained from
using the military against it. Fernando Belaunde Terry, Peru’s president from 1980-1985,
thought using the military against the Shining Path would undermine the credibility of the
democratically elected government, which would be viewed as maintaining itself through force.
The army was eventually called out to deal with the Shining Path once the police demonstrated
their complete inability to reverse or even stem the tide of the Shining Path’s advance. The
hesitation on the part of the Belaunde government to call out the army to deal with the Shining
Path is often cited as a critical error that allowed the Shining Path the time to establish a
relatively secure area from which to operate.
The army’s initial response to the Shining Path insurgency in 1983-4 was mass
indiscriminate violence, which produced one-half of all the casualties incurred in Ayacucho
through 1992 (Starn 1998). Some officers, particularly the lower level officers who were drawn
from rural areas, believed that a military solution to the problems in rural areas was likely to fail
if there was not a development program accompanying the use of force. The government failed
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to bring development to rural areas, arguing that such a program was prohibitively expensive.
Despite the government’s rejection of the proposal by some in the military to engage in greater
development in the countryside, there were some ad hoc attempts by the government to address
some of the peasants’ complaints. President Garcia, who led Peru from 1985-1990, committed
himself to addressing peasant concerns and committed the government to making “investments
in public works, implementation in rural zones of emergency employment programs, loans
without interest, price supports for peasant products, and a generous policy of legal recognition
of communities” (Manrique, 314). Yet, these reforms were often undermined by local officials
who objected to land reform.
The military’s brutally indiscriminate campaign continued and facilitated the dispersal of
Shining Path cadres north to the Upper Huallaga Valley in the mid-1980s where they began their
relationship with Peru’s coca cultivators. By the late 1980s, the Shining Path was establishing a
presence in new provinces, including Puno, an area along the border with Bolivia, and in others
to the south of the capital, Lima, and near Ayacucho (McClintock, 86).
Two significant developments facilitated the fall of the Shining Path. First, peasants
began organizing their own self-defense forces, called rondas, which severely curtailed the
Shining Path’s freedom of movement in rural areas and undermined the resource base that fed
the insurgency. Second, and more importantly, the government of President Alberto Fujimori
(1990-95) began a serious effort to collect intelligence on Shining Path’s leadership, creating
special police forces designed to go after the group’s top leadership. That effort led to Guzman’s
capture in a safe house in Lima, which in turn led to netting several other Shining Path leaders,
significantly reducing the level of threat that the Shining Path posed to the Peruvian state. The
movement imploded in the wake of Guzman’s capture. What is interesting about the end of the
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conflict is that it happened nearly just as the Shining Path appeared to be on the cusp of winning.
The number of car bombs in Lima had reached eight per month by July 1992 and the Shining
Path’s plan of defeating the regime without a large-scale military confrontation appeared to be
working. The Shining Path hoped that terrorism in Lima would force wealthy Limans to leave
the country, withdrawing their money as they left. They believed that this in turn would lead to
the collapse of the country’s banking system, bringing even greater hardship, and leave the
regime resting on armed forces, which were already plagued by desertion (McClintock, 89).
The Shining Path’s Internal Sanctuary
The establishment of internal sanctuaries was absolutely necessary for the Shining Path.
The Shining Path’s adherence to Maoism meant that the group tried to win over peasants in the
countryside and defeat the government by cutting off the cities from their supplies in the
countryside. The Shining Path sought to overturn the existing order where it controlled territory
in the countryside. At first, the Shining Path’s presence was often viewed as a reprieve from the
“arbitrary rule of the authorities, police, merchants, and teachers,” and its punishment of
“adultery, alcoholism, vagrancy, robbery, and cattle rustling” was welcomed (Del Pino, 161).
The government repression in the early period shaped the Shining Path’s relationship
with the people they governed in two ways. The people stayed loyal to the Shining Path in the
short term because they viewed the Shining Path as the lesser of two evils, and one who would
protect them from an abusive state. However, the Shining Path’s increasingly strict governance
over the people led the people to view the state as the lesser of the two evils as the conflict wore
on, and the Shining Path’s tactic of fleeing in the face of military sweeps undermined an
accepted norm that local rulers were supposed to protect the people they governed.
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Recruiting and Training
Recruits were drawn from many areas in which the Shining Path had influence, which
often included the university. The Shining Path had to contend with the twin problems of
recovering from the hammering they took from the military in 1983-4 and the increasing
presence of self-defense forces set up by rural communities. The heavy repression of 1983-4,
while winning the government no good will, inflicted substantial losses on the Shining Path. The
losses that it inflicted on the Shining Path led the group to begin seeking more recruits from the
less committed populations. The Shining Path became more dependent on coerced participation
as the war wore on, and this contributed to a decline in the quality of Shining Path governance
and combat performance as committed cadres were replaced by uncommitted, fearful, resentful
peasants.12 Over time, the populations in the Shining Path’s base areas became more important to
supply the Shining Path with replacements for fallen fighters.
Male youths were generally the most receptive demographic to the Shining Path’s
message, which often put them at odds with older members of their community, who were
skeptical of the Shining Path’s program (Del Pino, 161). Many youths were drawn to the
destruction that the Shining Path wrought.13 Those who chose to become Shining Path insurgents
were well compensated relative to the peasants whose loyalty they were trying to win. The
Shining Path was able to pay its fighters salaries ranging from $250-$500 a month by the late
1980s, a figure three to eight times higher than monthly teacher salaries (McClintock, 292).
According to a study cited by McClintock, over half (57%)of the fighters reported earning a
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Del Pino gives several examples of the Shining Path coercing the relatives of those they had
killed to fight for them. Children were often sent in the first wave of an attack on a community
and mothers often went along to try and protect their children.
13
Degregori (2012) relays a quote from a young militant: “we blew it up just to blow it up,
nothing else” (130).
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salary, while another thirty-six percent reported receiving “food, housing, or money for
expenses” (p.292).
The Shining Path raised children to become soldiers in the areas that they governed. The
Shining Path began giving military training to children when they were eight and nine years old
and would add them to their ranks around the age of twelve (Del Pino, 174). Del Pino relates that
the Shining Path also used to send children in the first wave of any attack, forcing difficult moral
decisions on those who were being attacked. Children, though, were not the only ones to be
conscripted to fight. The Shining Path expected all able-bodied members of the population it
controlled to participate in attacks, even though the general population was never well-armed.
Del Pino relates that a typical attack on a target could consist of one hundred people, including
mothers who went to protect their children, yet only about five in the group would have guns.14
The Shining Path did this so as to lend credence to its claim to have forged “iron legions” in the
countryside that were waiting to strike the cities.
The Shining Path found themselves in a difficult situation by 1984, one that would only
worsen as the conflict dragged on. The Shining Path expected to draw on the rural population to
replace its losses but increasingly faced resistance. The solution that the Shining Path came to for
this problem, and many others, was to use greater violence to cow the population. The
effectiveness of increased violence against the population diminished over time as it drove
people to towns and cities where they could not aid the Shining Path, or they became
desensitized to the violence, or it led them to become more willing to form self-defense
committees. Desertions among the Shining Path ranks picked up as the war dragged on and the
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The Shining Path did often divide the spoils of an attack with those it governed, usually
consisting of money, livestock, or other goods (McClintock, 292).
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combatants and noncombatants were subjected to serious deprivations of food and medicine. The
Shining Path responded to these desertions by publicly killing the relatives of those who deserted
as a warning to other would-be deserters of the costs of desertion (Del Pino).
Arming and Provisioning
In addition to creating their own state in the countryside, the Shining Path needed to
requisition resources from the population in its rural bases. Food was one important provision
that the countryside could and did provide. As part of its state-building efforts, the Shining Path
collectivized agriculture, which became unpopular once the population over which they
governed realized that it meant that food could no longer be produced for sale to urban areas
(Degregori, 132). Cutting the cities off from the countryside proved to do more harm than good
for the Shining Path and the maintenance of their internal sanctuaries. The ban on producing
more than subsistence levels of goods and agricultural produce greatly upset urban-rural linkages
that the peasants, as well as those in towns and cities, had come to depend on. The ban on trading
with the cities and towns became irrelevant in some Shining Path-held areas as the war went on
because the population was not producing what could have been considered subsistence
provisions. A survey conducted with members of a Shining Path camp in Sello de Oro revealed
that all of them suffered from anemia, “and many were afflicted with tuberculosis, acute
bronchitis, and malaria” (Del Pino, 177). Arming came from capturing police posts and from
ambushing military units. Additional weapons were purchased through the relationship that the
Shining Path developed with narcotraffickers, who were allowed to use at least one airstrip that
came under Shining Path’s control (McClintock, 72).
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State-Building
Building a new state in the countryside was a fundamental component of the Shining
Path’s strategy (Degregori, 128). The Shining Path assumed many of the roles of government:
resolving marital disputes, overseeing teachers, punishing criminals, and organizing recreation
(Manrique, 204). The peasants were initially receptive to the presence of the Shining Path
because many of them felt that the Peruvian government had forgotten them, and they believed
that the Shining Path’s promised agricultural campaigns would eradicate hunger.
In 1982, the Shining Path announced its plan to “hammer” the countryside, meaning not
only that they would seek to remove all vestiges of the state, but also rid the countryside of all
practices that it considered feudal or reactionary (Del Pino, 162). Specifically, this meant
proscribing religious beliefs and holidays, and replacing traditional means of governance and
individuals with Shining Path governance and individuals. Traditional holidays were replaced by
Shining Path holidays, which included a day to remember those members of the group who had
been killed in a prison massacre, the onset of hostilities, and Guzman’s birthday (Del Pino 176).
The Shining Path’s prohibition on religion created the most tension with Evangelical Peruvians
who did not join in Shining Path’s attacks because it violated the Ten Commandments. What
further alienated the Shining Path from the people it ruled over was that its members regularly
transgressed the organization’s stated rules with impunity, but local peasants were punished for
breaking the same rules. The best example of this was the frequency with which guerrillas felt
free to take liberties with women, even though it was against the Shining Path’s own rule “do not
take liberties with women,” and the Shining Path could punish rape and adultery among the
peasants with death (Del Pino 181).
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One of the Shining Path’s base zones established in 1983, the San Francisco Guerrilla
Zone in the province of Ayacucho, was a good place to set up a base for the Shining Path
because the small communities there lacked real links with the cities, the area was economically
depressed because of low prices for their agricultural produce, and government devaluations of
the currency hurt what little money residents had (Del Pino, 170). The Shining Path set up new
political-military hierarchies where it set up bases.15
The Shining Path’s increasingly violent actions towards those viewed as innocents by the
local population eroded the Shining Path’s support base. The initial assassinations of unpopular
officials or lenders were gradually replaced by less discriminate assassinations of increasingly
marginal enemies of the people. Part of the reason for this violence was the generational gap
between the young Shining Path militants who challenged the older, traditional community
leaders.16 The group began to go beyond simply assassinating government representatives in the
countryside and began targeting the families of those representatives, as they did to the family of
the president of the Board of Elections in Ayacucho shortly before the 1989 elections.17 The
relatives of every individual needlessly killed by the Shining Path came to harbor deep

The Shining Path’s Open People’s Committees were part of a local governance structure that
the Shining Path introduced in the areas where it had influence. Besides the Committees, there
was a “secretary general, secretary of security, secretary of production, secretary of communal
affairs, and a secretary of organization” with local party movements, such as the “Poor Peasants
Movement, Youth Movement, Feminine Movement, and Pioneer” Children Movement (Del
Pino, 176).
16
Degregori argues that the generational challenge was compounded by a Shining Path ideology
that viewed violence as “a purifying force that extirpated the old at its roots (136).” [please fix]
17
It appears that the Shining Path’s efforts to intimidate voters into not voting worked better in
some areas than others, and worked best in the areas where the Shining Path had the greatest
presence. Nationwide, 36% of voters did not vote in the 1989 municipal elections and 22% of the
ballots cast were invalid. In the Shining Path’s stronghold of Ayacucho, 85% did not vote and
70% of the ballots were judged to be invalid. (McClintock 79) fixThis indicates that the Shining
Path could still strike fear into a large part of the population even if it was finding it difficult to
maintain its force (Del Pino, 167).
15
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resentments about the group, and made them more likely to support the local self-defense forces
(Starn, 237). Shining Path assassinations of local authorities sometimes led to reprisal
assassinations by the peasants as cases in Huaychao and Macambama illustrate. In January 1983,
peasants killed seven members of the Shining Path in retaliation for the assassination of three
communal authorities (Del Pino, 162). The spiral of violence often accelerated rapidly. Three
senderistas (members of local self-defense forces) were assassinated and seven captured in
Saccsamarca in February 1983, leading the Shining Path to respond by massacring eighty
peasants at Lucanamarca (Del Pino, 163).
The Shining Path’s increased violence in areas it controlled contributed to the
population’s disillusionment with the Shining Path’s revolutionary program, even though that
same population had often initially welcomed the Shining Path’s presence (Degregori, 142). It is
surprising that a group that placed such an emphasis on winning the peasantry proved to govern
so poorly, quickly erasing any goodwill they earned by getting rid of corrupt government
officials, largely because of a lack of discipline among its members and the group’s infatuation
with violence. The increasing violence of the Shining Path led many rural communities to begin
forming their own montoneras (self-defense forces) to defend themselves from the Shining
Path.18 These communities felt that the Shining Path’s retreats in the face of large government
military action violated “the traditional Andean patron who protects his clients” (Degregori,
141). Del Pino believes that the formation of local resistance to Shining Path rule was the first
great challenge to the organization’s success (p.159). Even though the Shining Path was facing
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The montoneras were the precursors to the Civil Autodefense Committees (CACs), which
were sanctioned by the state.
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difficulty in 1989, it still controlled 28% of Peru’s municipalities,19 it had the support of 15% of
the population, and was inflicting about 1,526 casualties per year while maintaining a force of
about 10,000 combatants.20
Causal Mechanisms
This case allowed for a direct test of two of the causal mechanisms: waiting for the
government to withdraw and whether the Shining Path faced an organizational inflection point.
There was no evidence that the Shining Path attempted to wait for the government forces to
withdraw, not that they could because they were a domestically constituted regime. There is no
strong evidence of an organizational inflection point either. The Shining Path suffered casualties
due to government repression, but that repression occurred because the government decided to
launch offensives against Shining Path internal sanctuaries. It does not appear that their growing
numbers made it easier for government forces to find and attack them. The creation of local
rondas were not a result of the Shining Path’s growing power, but by local distrust of the Shining
Path, following their mistreatment of local populations.

19

McClintock explains that this figure represents the percent of municipalities that were not able
to renew their local officials, and this may understate the amount of territory that the Shining
Path either controlled or influenced. By December 1991, 47% of Peru’s provinces were declared
states of emergency and yet another study suggests that the Shining Path controlled about 40% of
Peru’s territory (Gustavo Gorriti and Simon Strong in McClintock, 81).
20
The casualty figure cited above may overstate the Shining Path’s military strength, since only
17% of the Shining Path’s victims were members of the police or military (McClintock, 68).
McClintock also notes that the public approval of Shining Path was often difficult to discern, but
the percentage of Peruvians approving of the Shining Path never got above twenty-five
(McClintock, 78).
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Counterfactual Analysis
Because this is a case where there was neither an external intervener nor a transnational
sanctuary, two of the four mechanisms cannot be investigated in this case. However, in this
section I will analyze whether sanctuary could have aided the Shining Path. Specifically, I want
to investigate whether transnational sanctuary could have afforded the Shining Path greater
relative protection from attack, and, perhaps, altered the outcome. The second missing
mechanism, the inability of an external intervener to create an enduring government in the
country in which they intervene, will not be part of the counterfactual analysis because the
government based in Lima was a domestically constituted regime.
The Shining Path likely would have found substantial protection from Peruvian
government attacks by moving to a sanctuary in a neighboring state. Since the military had
difficulty locating the Shining Path on its own territory, it is unlikely that they would have done
better on foreign territory where knowledge of the population and terrain would have been
worse. Peru’s relative military weakness, and in some cases its history of conflict with
neighboring states, meant that it was unlikely that Peruvian military forces would have been
granted substantial access to neighboring territories, and would likely be very limited if it was
allowed access.
While the Shining Path likely would have been more secure from government attack in
transnational sanctuary in one or more neighboring states, it seems unlikely that the Shining Path
would have fought more effectively if they were primarily operating from transnational
sanctuary, as opposed to internal sanctuary. First, there would have been large logistical barriers
caused by operating exclusively from transnational sanctuary. The capital, Lima, is just about the
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furthest point in the country from any of its international borders. Operating exclusively from
transnational sanctuary would have imposed large constraints on the Shining Path’s ability to
threaten Lima and many of the other towns and cities along the coast. Fighting primarily from
transnational sanctuaries would have forced a different strategy on the Shining Path, who would
have had greater difficulty restricting the flow of food to urban areas. As it happened, the
Shining Path’s presence in the departments of Ayacucho and Apurimac, as well as to their north
in the Huallaga Valley, served as a buffer between Lima and neighboring countries and nearly
cut the country in half along a north-south axis of Shining Path-controlled territory. If operating
largely from transnational sanctuary, it would have been difficult for the Shining Path to claim
that they had a large following in the country, if they could not control any of it. Failing to
control territory within Peru could have led to higher morale in both the police and the military,
and dampened the sense of the Shining Path’s inevitable victory, which reportedly had seized the
capital in 1992. While government forces were making gains in the countryside, thanks in part to
the rondas, it has been reported that much of the population, especially in and around Lima, were
consumed by a sense of an impending Shining Path victory and the collapse of the government.
The population was generally weary of the war, the government appeared unable to stop Shining
Path terrorist attacks in and around the capital, the government still could not apprehend
Guzman, President Fujimori curtailed liberties in the name of fighting the Shining Path, and
many urban poor had been driven deeper into poverty by Fujimori’s economic policies, possibly
portending greater economic disaster in the future (Burt, in Stern 1998; Degregori 2012;
McClintock 1998).
Internal sanctuary was a requisite of their Maoist strategy of gaining power, and internal
sanctuary required some degree of governance by the Shining Path. Governing poorly eventually
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cost the Shining Path their internal sanctuary and contributed to their defeat. They did not have
the option to wait out the Peruvian government in a transnational sanctuary because the
government in Lima had nowhere to go. The strategy had been, and remained until the end, a
campaign of demoralization against the Peruvian state. The Shining Path, despite their own
propaganda about having “iron legions” in the rural areas, knew well from the mid-1980s-on,
that it was very difficult to muster enough fighters just to try and hold onto what they had and
remain relevant, much less win a firefight with the Peruvian military for the capital. The
Peruvian government, inept as it was at managing its macroeconomic problems and developing
its rural areas, showed a great deal of staying power in weathering repeated attacks on the capital
and the infrastructure outside of the capital that supported it. Fighting exclusively from
transnational sanctuary would have been a strategy for long-term irrelevance, rather than a
strategy of winning power. They chose the correct strategy given their ideological orientation
and political program, but they executed it poorly, and the odds were still long even if they had
managed themselves and the people in their territory better.
The bases were rural as opposed to urban because the rural areas were difficult for Peru’s
armed forces to access, and because the populations in the rural areas were viewed as more likely
to sympathize with the Shining Path’s aims. The Shining Path’s internal sanctuaries were in
Peru’s highlands and in the jungle in the east of the country. The bases areas, including the rural
populations who supported the Shining Path, provided the group with relative protection from
attack because the peasants did not give them up when the army came. The Shining Path tried to
keep peasants around their camps so that the military would have to use greater restraint when
attacking these bases lest they kill a large number of civilians. They also used them as forced
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labor to dig trenches and fortify bases, increasing the defensive capabilities of the Shining Path
(Del Pino).
The Shining Path enjoyed many of the benefits of transnational sanctuary within its
internal sanctuary in Peru, and likely would not have gained additional benefits from a
transnational sanctuary. It is possible that a sanctuary in a neighboring state would have allowed
the Shining Path to obtain some of the same kinds of benefits that it did from internal sanctuary,
but there is no reason to expect that it would have caused the Shining Path to perform better, and
there is good reason to think that the group probably would have done worse. The Shining Path’s
focus on seizing power in Peru would have made it difficult to recruit foreign fighters to fight
against the Peruvian state, and they likely would have been limited to organizing Peruvians who
left their homes and sought out the Shining Path in their foreign bases. Given that the Shining
Path relied heavily on coerced recruitment of Peruvians, especially following the deaths of its
most ardent supporters during the course of the insurgency, it is unlikely that they would have
been able to coerce and use foreigners to launch attacks inside Peru in the same way they used
rural Peruvians.
Arms procurement was not difficult for the Shining Path, who were able to obtain
explosives from Peru’s mines and small arms from defeated government forces and
narcotraffickers, but it is conceivable that they could also have obtained arms and munitions
from groups such as the FARC in neighboring Colombia, a country that shares a considerably
long border with Peru.
The Shining Path’s program of gaining control of the countryside in Ayacucho finally
elicited a response from the military in 1983. The Shining Path’s response to the government’s
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repression was to disperse north to the Huallaga Valley and east toward the jungle (Del Pino).
The remoteness of these internal bases allowed the Shining Path ample time and space to flee in
the wake of military incursions into their base areas. The populations the Shining Path governed
often went with them either out of fear of what the government would do to them, or what the
Shining Path would do to them if the group one day returned.21
The abrupt implosion of the Shining Path raises the possibility that they could have
continued fighting longer if Guzman had been hiding in a base in a neighboring country, beyond
the reach of the special units designated to go after the Shining Path leadership. The conflict
almost certainly would have gone on longer if Guzman had not been captured and then brought
out on television a number of times to announce that the Shining Path was seeking peace terms.
The image of the leader who had been revered as a deity by his followers shattered the group’s
morale in equal proportion by which it raised morale for the security forces, government, and the
loyal public. But the counterfactual “What if Guzman had not been caught when he was?”
obscures the degree to which the Shining Path appears to have already lost the war when
Guzman was captured. One of the reasons he was in Lima was because the military and selfdefense groups had taken back the countryside where the Shining Path had previously had
relatively secure bases. Guzman chose the strategy of moving to “strategic equilibrium” and
attacking the cities over the advice of his advisers, who wanted to concentrate on winning back
the countryside, because Guzman believed that the Shining Path had established a momentum of
expansion that had to be continued.
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Del Pino relates that the Shining Path would kill anyone who fell behind on their forced
marches fearing that they would give up the group’s location if they were captured by the
military (pp.186-7).
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Conclusion
At first glance, the conventional wisdom about sanctuary appears to be confirmed by the
outcome of the case of the Shining Path in Peru. According to this line of thinking, a group with
a secure base in a neighboring country will have time to build up and train its forces, infiltrate
into the target country and carry out attacks, care for their wounded, obtain arms and provisions,
and transmit propaganda into the target country, and all of this presents a considerable foe for
any would-be counterinsurgent. Those groups lacking these neighboring bases will not be able to
withstand the attacks by the government and will lose. Therefore, the Shining Path lost because it
could not withstand the attacks by the government.
The Shining Path’s inability to win in Peru is a puzzling case given the serial ineptness of
the government. Here was a government that was perceived as being corrupt, a military of little
accomplishment and meagre capabilities, a stagnant economy, and a political system that had
already democratized, so it did not have the option of holding out the carrot of greater political
participation to frustrated and impoverished peasants.22 The Shining Path faced a
counterinsurgent force that could have been the envy of other insurgent groups, and yet they
could not take power. Proponents of the conventional wisdom about sanctuary could say that this
case largely confirms transnational sanctuary’s importance: groups lose without it. As I
explained above, that is a more difficult proposition to defend when one looks at the history of
the conflict. The best explanation for the defeat of the Shining Path, given the serial ineptness of
the government, is that the Shining Path was even worse.
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McClintock presents data showing that the majority of Peruvians did not perceive their
government to be democratic although the elections held between 1980 and 1991 were perceived
to be free and fair. Only thirty-eight percent believed Peru to be “a lot” or “a good deal”
democratic (p. 295).
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The Shining Path’s organization, political program, military strategy, and tactics forced
them to eliminate certain options open to other groups. Promising a revolutionary transformation
of the country, the Shining Path’s governance at the local level, with all its differences from
previous arrangements, and appreciated by the locals for a time, ultimately proved a weakness.
The revised explanation that I put forward in this dissertation is that sanctuary aids those
groups who can afford to wait out their targets. Most often that type of situation occurs in
reaction to some sort of external military intervention. I argue that those sanctuaries do not
substantially alter the outcome of conflicts where the government does not have an option to
pack up and leave. Because my explanation does not differ from the conventional wisdom on this
case, and the case confirms both explanations, there is no way to assess the relative strength of
the two different explanations by just looking at this result. The evidence presented here shows
that insurgents can readily obtain the benefits of a sanctuary in an internal sanctuary, thereby
undermining the importance of transnational sanctuary. The conventional wisdom rests on the
assumption that insurgents seek transnational sanctuary because it is relatively far away from the
counterinsurgents, who will not be as effective projecting power over longer distances, and
because international borders limit the intensity and duration of cross-border attacks. But groups
such as the Shining Path were not chiefly concerned with staying as far away as possible from
attack, and they initially established their internal sanctuary in the middle of the country, near the
capital. Understanding the course of the conflict makes the conventional account difficult to
accept. Some groups, by the very nature of what they set out to accomplish, are not
preconfigured to benefit from transnational sanctuary. This is particularly true of those groups
who seek to overthrow a government that is domestically constituted, as was the case in Peru.
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While the purpose of this chapter was primarily about assessing how groups fare when
they do not have transnational sanctuary and are fighting a domestically constituted government
that lacks the option to withdraw, it yielded an unanticipated observation. Counterinsurgents do
not necessarily need to address the core grievances, or root causes of a conflict, in order to end it.
Peruvian peasant grievances about corrupt officials, lack of economic opportunity, and the
distribution of land had not been met when the conflict ended. The government rejected a call by
some junior officers in the Peruvian military in the mid-1980s to undertake serious development
efforts in rural areas because the government could not afford those programs. When
development or aid workers went into those areas, they were often attacked or killed by the
Shining Path who wanted revolution, not reform.
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Map 3.2 Ayacucho, Peru. This is the department where the Shining Path formed (Degregori, in
Stern 1998).
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Map 3.3 Shining Path Internal Sanctuaries in Northeast Ayacucho: The San Francisco Guerrilla
Zone in northeast Ayacucho (del Pino H., in Stern 1998)
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Chapter Four
The Mau Mau Emergency in Kenya, 1952-1956: International Intervention and Insurgents
without Transnational Sanctuary 23

Map 4.1 Colonial Kenya. This map is from Anderson (2005), and also appears in Bennett (2013).
The one above shows areas relevant to the Mau Mau and the Emergency in Kenya and the one
below shows Mau Mau sanctuaries in the forests. Fort Hall and the Rift Valley are a few of the
common points of reference between the two maps.
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I will use the term Mau Mau, because that is the term that has come to be accepted in Western
scholarly discourse about the (largely) Kikuyu fighters during this time. The label “Mau Mau” was a
construct of the counterinsurgents, and the so-called Mau Mau referred to themselves as ithaka na wiathi,
which Percox relays as either “land and moral responsibility” or “freedom through land” (p.67).
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Introduction
Insurgents without transnational sanctuary potentially face destruction if their internal
sanctuaries are compromised. This is more likely to happen when insurgents are fighting external
interveners, who usually have the most sophisticated military technology available. Insurgents
without transnational sanctuary will require formidable internal sanctuary if they are to survive
counterinsurgent attacks. However, internal sanctuary also affords insurgents opportunities to
display their governing prowess if they can control territory and population, and is a more direct
challenge to the authority of the target state they are fighting. The Mau Mau in Kenya lacked
sanctuary in a neighboring state, but they had dense forests abutting the population from which
their support came. The following chapter examines some of the causes that contributed to the
onset of the conflict, the role of internal sanctuary and the British response to it, and then
concludes with a counterfactual analysis of how the conflict likely would have differed if the
Mau Mau had had sanctuary in a neighboring state.
Economic and political conditions in the lead-up
The British occupation and settlement of Kenya began in the 1890s. European settlers
began to quickly displace native Kikuyu (the largest tribal group in Kenya and the group from
which virtually all Mau Mau came) from some of the most fertile agricultural lands in what
became known as the “White Highlands” (Percox, 50). Following the Second World War, Kenya
experienced rapid economic growth in the years leading up to the Mau Mau insurgency. The
white settler population benefitted disproportionately from this growth, and continued pushing
large numbers of Kikuyu squatters off their land as the mechanization of agriculture reduced the
demand for native labor. The displaced Kikuyu who went to find work in urban areas, such as
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Nairobi,24 fared poorly as the British Provincial Administration continued to maintain its lowwage policy that made it difficult to support a family (Berman, 163). The inequitable distribution
of land between Europeans and Kikuyu contributed to the latter’s demands for land reform and a
change in development policy (Bruce, 1976: 163).
The struggle over inequitable land distribution facilitated the rise of what became known
in the West as “the Mau Mau.”25 The Murang’a peasants’ revolt and Mombasa general strike are
sometimes viewed as precursors to Mau Mau (Percox, 51). The following year, 1948, was the
first year in which the Kenya Government detected the Mau Mau (Percox, 53). Subsequently,
the Kenya African Union (KAU), along with the Nairobi trade unions, began a campaign of mass
oathing, which was a commitment to significant land reform, in Central Province (where there
were large numbers of Kikuyu) in February 1950, which coincided with a general strike in
Nairobi of the same year. The oathing was done on a large scale because it was believed to be
necessary to generate a sustained group commitment (Berman, 167). In 1950, the British
authorities first learned of the Mau Mau’s oathing campaign and set about arresting oath
administrators (Percox, 53). The mobilization of the Kikuyu through mass oathing was
interpreted by the colonial authorities as the beginning of a campaign to murder the Europeans,
and it convinced colonial administrators that the Kikuyu could not be trusted.
The declining trust between the colonial authorities and the KAU leadership made it
difficult for colonial authorities to make any peaceful accommodation of African demands, and
the lack of compromise was used as an excuse for the more violent tactics that Mau Mau later
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The African population of Nairobi is estimated to have more than doubled from 1948-1952, largely as a
result of white settler evictions of Kikuyu tenant farmers (Newsinger, 1981: 161).
25
By 1948, land distribution had become so unequal that 1.23 million Kikuyu lived on 2,000 square miles
of tribal lands, while about 30,000 white settlers had 12,000 square miles (Newsinger, 160).
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employed. The KAU sought greater political representation in colonial government for Africans,
but their demands were largely rebuffed.26 This disappointment energized the more violent
elements within the Kikuyu who subsequently came to reject the formal political process
established by the colonial authorities. Some Kikuyu began preparing for violent conflict in
1952. The militants hoped that limited violence would be enough to force authorities in London
to intervene over the heads of the colonial administrators and grant the Kikuyu what the local
administrators would not (Berman, 167).
Onset of the Emergency
On October 20th, 1952, the British declared an emergency and the Kikuyu leadership,
including Jomo Kenyatta and 145 others, were arrested. At this point, the fighters who would
become known as Mau Mau were an insignificant military threat to the British, having neither
abundant weapons nor military training (Berman, 170). The Mau Mau’s military ineffectiveness
was compounded by the preemptive strike against Kikuyu political leadership at the outset of the
Emergency.
The British desired to keep down the direct economic and military costs of the Emergency,
then, after winning the war, feared the diplomatic cost of hanging on too long.27 The British
Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, was eager that the State of Emergency declared in Kenya be
ended as quickly as possible “in order that he could avoid the embarrassment of Opposition
questions in Westminster” (Percox, 63). However, Lyttelton was not able to avoid
embarrassment from the Opposition who introduced a motion censuring Lyttelton for his
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The KAU sought twelve seats in the Legislative Council, but were given only two.
“[I]ntelligence failures occurred…invariably because the British ran their empire on a shoestring and
simply could not afford effective police force” (Popplewell, cited in Percox). The total cost of putting
down the Mau Mau rebellion to the British government was 55 million pounds (Newsinger, 182).
27
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“handling of African affairs,” something that Percox says was an “unprecedented situation in
Parliament’s history” (p.64).
Even though Operation Jock Scott deprived the Mau Mau of their leadership in 1952, the
counterinsurgents did little in the following six months to actually stop young Kikuyu from
forming armed groups in the forests in the Aberdares and Mount Kenya.28 The initial punitive
measures by the British,29 in addition to other violence in the form of beatings, forced
confessions, summary executions, and mass expulsion from settlers’ farms by the European
settlers, drove many Kikuyu to support the Mau Mau (Percox, 66). By April 1953, between
70,000 and 100,000 Kikuyu had left the Central Provinces either voluntarily or because they
were forcibly evicted by settlers or the colonial authorities. The British increased their harsh
response to all Kikuyu throughout 1953 in an attempt to crush the insurgency at the outset and
end it quickly. Because the bands of fighters had not yet emerged from the forests, the British
failed to grasp how many more Mau Mau they were creating as a result of their repressive
policies. British policies were not only creating more Mau Mau, but their policies were also
eliminating neutral or loyal Kikuyu as a source of intelligence on actual Mau Mau.
The initial British response in the wake of the Emergency and Operation Jock Scott was to
raise penalties for civilians collaborating with the Mau Mau. This often meant the confiscation of
cattle, sheep, and goats, and even included collective punishments, such as communal fines, the
forcible resettlement of resident laborers to the reserves, and a punitive tax and mandatory
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There are number of different forces that can be considered counterinsurgents in this conflict. The most
significant counterinsurgent forces were the colonial police force (Kenya Police), the British military,
European settlers, and Loyalist black Africans, many of whom were also Kikuyu.
29

During this period of early repression, Kenyan authorities screened 58,864 Africans by
February 1953, of which 17, 613 were sent to trial, 2,249 were detained, and the rest let go
(Percox, 69).
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registration for all Kikuyu.30 The British Governor of Kenya during the Emergency, Evelyn
Baring, while insisting that the Mau Mau had no legitimate economic grievances, set out on a
program of economic development in Kenya almost from the start of the Emergency. Seven
million pounds were spent on “road-building and water projects, the construction of schools,
community centers, village halls, hospitals, urban housing, and a new airport for Nairobi,” as
well as funds for the construction of an oil refinery and a program of agricultural improvement
(Percox, 65).
The end of the Mau Mau
The British counterinsurgency succeeded because it combined repression against the Mau
Mau and their actual and suspected supporters, and economic development policies designed to
maintain the support of loyal Kikuyu (Percox, 48). Governor Baring had an interest in ending the
insurgency as quickly as possible because he was eager to get the civilian reconstruction efforts
going and wanted them underway within a year of the declaration of the State of Emergency, but
believed that the “law and order” problems with the Mau Mau had to be addressed first. Baring
believed it was crucial to improve the lives of Kenyans or else the Mau Mau could come back in
the future and bring about another Emergency.31 The British government responded to Baring’s
planned economic development proposal with a one-time payment of five million pounds for

30

The punitive tax that was imposed was not just done to deprive Kikuyus of resources that they could
transfer to the Mau Mau or serve as a warning against joining Mau Mau to the Kikuyu fence-sitters, but
was done to partially offset the cost of the State of Emergency. More on the British desire to limit the
costs of the counterinsurgency below (Percox, 64).
31
While that was Baring’s position, a lot of the early development assistance went to the tribes other than
the Kikuyu because the British did not want to set the precedent for other tribes that rebelling would bring
about more funding for their areas, so they sent the opposite message, which was that the loyal tribes
would receive economic incentives for their loyalty, including loyal Kikuyu, in the form of “a small
increase on wages, better living standards for chiefs and headmen,…and the cheap sale of confiscated
Kikuyu cattle. (Percox, 83)” [fix]
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agricultural reform and rejected the request to expand African education, believing that the
Africans that they had already educated the best were the leaders of the KAU and Mau Mau
(Percox, 66). A second reason why Baring wanted the Emergency over as quickly as possible
was to save the lives of loyalist Kikuyu, who were the Mau Mau’s first targets.32 Baring
understood that British commitments were stretched thin and economic, military, and political
support from London would be quite modest, so it was necessary to create a sizeable domestic
constituency that was anti-Mau Mau. Non-Kikuyu tribes could and did partially fill this role, but
the Kikuyu were the largest tribe in Kenya and it was imperative that the whole tribe not rebel
against the British.
The two groups that suffered the most casualties during the Emergency were the Mau Mau
and the loyalists (Footnote 6 in Branch, 2007). The loyalists were organized into Home Guard
units that were essential to providing security for Kikuyu resettled as part of the British project of
“villagization” that was supposed to separate the non-Mau Mau Kikuyu population from the Mau
Mau to deprive the Mau Mau of supplies and recruits. While the British welcomed fighting the
Mau Mau with loyalist Kikuyu because it conserved British resources, the loyalist Home Guards
were a troublesome partner for the British. The Home Guards’ lack of discipline contributed to
beating captured Mau Mau, abducting and raping women in the new villages, murder, and cattle
rustling (Branch, 303). The unpaid Home Guards were subsequently disbanded in 1955 and
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Percox relates that by the end of 1952 (a little more than two months into the Emergency), 121 loyal
Africans were found dead, as well as three European settlers and an Asian woman. Three more European
settlers would be killed on January 24th, 1953, prompting 1,500 settlers to march on Government House to
demand greater protection (70). The racial hierarchy in Kenya would continue throughout the Emergency
with white ‘Europeans’[why single quotation marks?] at the top, Asians a step below, and black Africans
at the bottom. The European settlers could safely demonstrate in mass without fear of massive violence
from counterinsurgent forces, even though [even though? confusing sentence] their losses were much
lighter than among loyalist Africans. Furthermore, it would take years before the first European settler
was hanged for murdering a black African, while thousands of black Africans were hanged for violence
against settlers, other black Africans, and counterinsurgent forces.
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replaced with a more professional Tribal Police Force (Branch, 304). Even though the Home
Guards were disbanded, the British made sure to buy the loyalty of former Home Guard
members and other Loyalists by restricting certain economic, social, and political privileges to
those who had not joined Mau Mau. Benefits of loyalty included the ability to obtain licenses to
grow coffee, obtain title to newly consolidated landholdings, vote, and run for office in the 195758 elections.
Importance of internal sanctuary
The first significant military operations by the Mau Mau began on March 26th, 1953, when
300 Mau Mau killed 97 men, women, and children in Kiambu District, and another 80 attacked a
police station in Naivasha, killing three, releasing prisoners, and raiding the armory (Percox, 73).
The British responded with incursions against the Mau Mau in the forests, and also imposed a
one-mile cordon sanitaire around the Aberdare Forest to try and deprive the Mau Mau of access
to the population, crops, and livestock that they needed to sustain themselves in the forests
(Percox, 75-6). However, further action was constrained throughout the first five months of 1953
because most of the available counterinsurgent forces were defending areas from attack and there
was nothing left over for offensive operations against Mau Mau internal sanctuaries (Percox, 76).
The British began moving the army into areas adjacent to the internal sanctuaries in the
forests following a gradual buildup of forces throughout the first half of 1953.33 Once the

Percox points out that one of the ways that Kenya’s military forces were augmented was by delaying
their deployment to another emergency, in Malaya, at the same time. Britain’s competing interests for
scarce economic, military, political, and diplomatic resources contributed to their desire to end the
Emergency as quickly as possible. Military personnel were also becoming more scarce as the British were
in the process of reducing their standing army from 435,000 to 400,000, during the Mau Mau Emergency.
General Sir George Erskine became the military commander in Kenya during this period as well (Evelyn
Baring remained Governor).
33
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military cleared an area it was turned over to the police to keep Mau Mau influence from
returning. The security forces engaged a group of approximately 100 Mau Mau in the forests in
early June 1953, and killed over 100 Mau Mau by the end of the month (Percox, 74). The British
commander, Erskine, issued a call for mass surrender of the Mau Mau in August 1953, while he
waited for the War Office to approve his request for additional troops. It was an ill-timed call
because the security forces had yet to seriously threaten the Mau Mau’s existence; not
surprisingly, just 66 individuals availed themselves of the offer in its first month (Percox, 80).
Erskine estimated that he was hopeful that military operations could be over by October
1953, which would have meant the Emergency would have been brought to a close within a year
(Percox, 77). However, the operations against the Mau Mau in the forests throughout the summer
of 1953 demonstrated the difficulty of destroying the Mau Mau in their sanctuaries deep in the
forests. The British commander in charge of military operations in Kenya described the futility
of finding and engaging the Mau Mau in the forests:
The large gangs do not show themselves because I think they realize they would be
cracked on the head if they did so. We are by no means certain what has happened to
these gangs. We have pushed into the forest to find them, but we have only found the
places where they have been in the past (Quoted in Percox, 78).
The difficulty of finding and rooting out the Mau Mau in their internal sanctuaries, coupled
with their continued support in the Kikuyu Reserve, and the Mau Mau’s increased ability to
adapt to security forces’ tactics, led Erskine to request more troops towards the end of July
1953.34 The additional troops arrived by late September 1953, and were deployed around the
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The British desire to end the Emergency quickly was used to justify requests for more immediate
measures that were believed to be able to end the war more quickly, even if it meant higher costs in the
short term.
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forests where the Mau Mau were believed to be operating and in the Kikuyu districts (Percox,
79).
The changing center of the insurgency from rural to urban areas in Kenya began in late
1953 and continued into early 1954. The increase in security forces personnel from Britain, as
well as the ongoing buildup of local forces, including police, who focused on the sanctuaries in
the forests, led to gaps in security in Nairobi that allowed Mau Mau to increase their presence
there. Nairobi was used as an alternative internal sanctuary as the rural sanctuaries were
increasingly isolated and under pressure from the government. Thousands of Kikuyu fled to
Nairboi because they were displaced by the fighting or because they had been forcibly evicted by
European settlers, or a combination of the two. Nairobi became a source of “funds, firearms,
supplies, and recruits” for the Mau Mau, and law and order continued to break down in Nairobi
as armed robbery and political assassinations became more frequent. The Nairobi police
appeared to be losing control of a city with 45,000 Kikuyu males and insufficient means to
separate the Mau Mau from the non-Mau Mau Kikuyu (Percox, 80).
The limits of internal sanctuary
The security forces possessed insufficient strength to tackle the problems of the Mau Mau
in the rural areas and in Nairobi simultaneously, and decided on concluding an operation against
Mau Mau supporters in the Kikuyu Reserve before launching Operation Anvil in Nairboi.
Operation Anvil began on April 24th, 1954, and proved to be the operation that broke the back of
the Mau Mau insurgency. The operation itself was massive; by May 9th, 1954, the British had
detained 19,000 adult males, sent 6,000 of their dependents back to the reserves, and arrested
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206 key Mau Mau, including Mau Mau intelligence officers, treasurers, lookouts, and gunmen
(Percox, 82).
Operation Anvil produced positive developments for counterinsurgents in rural areas in
addition to significantly curtailing Mau Mau influence in Nairobi. Mau Mau forces in the forests
withered from 15,000 fighters at the end of 1953 to about 2,000 fighters by the end of 1955, and
just 500 by September 1956 (Newsinger, 176). Cutting off Nairobi as a source of food meant that
the Mau Mau in the forests could provision fewer fighters and the dwindling supply of weapons
meant that the Mau Mau were destined for a long term decline in military effectiveness unless
they could find alternative sources of arms. It appears that it was the loss of food that had more
significant effects on the long term decline of the Mau Mau. Many of the fighters now turned
their attention to scrounging for food rather than carrying out operations against loyalist Kikuyu
or the security forces. Many Mau Mau turned to forcefully requisitioning food from their native
Kikuyu, already dealing with economic hardships from the punitive measures placed on them by
the British, and this drained support for the Mau Mau against the only population sympathetic to
them (Newsinger, 177).
The British employed both conventional and nonconventional means of fighting the Mau
Mau in the forests. The British practice of sending hundreds or thousands of troops into an area
to search for Mau Mau rarely produced success commensurate with the cost. The British turned
to using irregular forces, or “pseudo-gangs” of loyalists posing as Mau Mau, or captured rebels
who had switched to the government’s side, to make contact with the Mau Mau in the forest and
then attack them. This tactic led to the killing and capturing of a number of Mau Mau, including
one of the Mau Mau’s best leaders, Dedan Kimathi (Newsinger, 177).
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Airpower aided the British counterinsurgency effort. British airpower was used against
Mau Mau internal sanctuaries in the forests beginning in early 1953 and continued through the
end of the Emergency (Percox, 73). Bombers allowed the British to conduct bombing raids
against suspected Mau Mau supply depots and guerrilla bands operating deep in the Aberdare
forests and the forests around Mount Kenya. In addition to directly bombing the Mau Mau,
airpower also allowed the British to drop supplies to small groups of British soldiers who were
pursuing the Mau Mau in the forests. These supply drops allowed these groups to operate longer
and go farther into the forests (Chappell 2011). Surrendered Mau Mau told their British
interrogators that the threat of aerial bombardment kept the guerrillas on the move and some
strikes were so terrifying that they led survivors to surrender to the British.35 British airpower
was also employed in psychological operations again the Mau Mau in the forests, dropping
millions of leaflets urging them to surrender and directly calling on Mau Mau to surrender
through sky-broadcasts (Chappell, 505). For the most part, the British avoided killing civilians
while employing airpower.36 Pilots were restricted to bombing forested areas prohibited to
civilians until late May 1954, at which time they were only allowed to carry out airstrikes outside
of the prohibited zone so long as there was a minimal risk of harm to civilians.37 Airpower
reinforced many trends underway during the Emergency: it made food and other supplies more
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A Mau Mau guerrilla leader, Gitonga Karame, surrendered along with the rest of his unit following an
airstrike that killed twenty of their fellow fighters (Chappell, 506).
36
Airpower is potentially counterproductive for counterinsurgents if it is used indiscriminately, and it can
provoke a backlash among the target population that they seek to win over. Used discriminately though,
airpower can be important for rapidly moving troops, locating insurgents, attacking them, resupplying
allied forces, and serving as a symbol of the counterinsurgent’s power. The discriminant use of airpower
in Kenya is notable given the heavy handed and often far less discriminant repression that security forces
employed against the Kikuyu (Chappell, 504).
37
Chappell explains that the British viewed the change in policy as necessary because the Mau Mau took
advantage of the British policy and they operated quite openly in the reserves where British pilots had
been prohibited from attacking (pp.502-3).
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difficult to obtain, kept the Mau Mau on the move, inflicted casualties, and demoralized the
survivors (Chappell, 506).
Causal Mechanisms
This was one of the case studies where the insurgents’ target was an external intervener,
and one of my four causal mechanisms predicted that insurgents may try to wait out external
interveners in neighboring sanctuaries. That mechanism cannot be fully tested in this case
because there were no transnational sanctuaries to wait out the British, but it is worth noting that
the Mau Mau did not rely on a “waiting game” strategy. The Mau Mau pursued armed
engagement against the colonial state and its supporters to bring about the land reform that they
sought.
This case provides little support to the causal mechanism that predicts an organizational
inflection point, although British airpower, discussed in the last section, increased the costs to the
Mau Mau of being detected. Smaller bands of insurgents were easier to hide in Kenya’s forests
than larger bands of insurgents, but even the smaller bands could and did fall victim to British
patrols in the forests. It is also difficult to assess the possibility of any organizational inflection
point because the Mau Mau’s estimated support appeared to have peaked early in the insurgency
and then declined over the course of the conflict to the point where the British felt they could
declare victory. Therefore, there was no long-term buildup of forces that led to a significant
reversal of fortune for the Mau Mau.
This evidence collected in this case strongly supports the causal mechanism that predicts
external interveners will fail to create enduring regimes in the country in which they intervene.
This case demonstrates how difficult it is for external interveners to hold onto overseas
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possessions in the post-1945 era, even when they succeed militarily. The British were able to
successfully dismantle the Mau Mau Movement, jailing or killing many of its members, while
the British authorities were always concerned that the movement could resurface with greater
force. With the insurgency defeated for the time, the British set out to turn over authority to
Kenyans quickly, hoping that doing so would avoid a fresh insurgency, and making a deal with
more moderate politicians would only be more easily done after having stamped out the first
insurgency. The British were unable to retain their colony in Kenya, although the relations
between the post-colonial Kenyan government and the United Kingdom are often described
positively. For example, Kenya decided to join the Commonwealth, and Kenya protected most of
the white Europeans’ property from confiscation after independence.
Counterfactual analysis: Would Transnational Sanctuary have helped the Mau Mau? If so,
how?
The Mau Mau case, and all cases that fall into this typology, are missing one of the four
mechanisms that I believe explain how sanctuary may be of only limited use to insurgents, and,
generally, not decisive in determining a conflict’s outcome. Because the Mau Mau did not use
sanctuaries, I cannot examine whether there were limitations on counterinsurgents’ use of force
outside Kenya’s borders. The Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya against the British is a good case
for examining what happens to insurgents when they do not have access to transnational
sanctuary. It appears that the Mau Mau would have significantly benefitted from transnational
sanctuary as it would have allowed them time to increase their training and, by extension, their
effectiveness as a fighting force, cache supplies and munitions that were relatively immune from
attack, survive counterinsurgent attacks, and raise the costs of the counterinsurgency to the
British. Given the British desire to limit the economic and diplomatic costs of the
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counterinsurgency in Kenya, it is likely that prolonging the conflict by stationing significant
numbers of troops in a transnational sanctuary would have pressured the British to quit Kenya
earlier than they did.
What would limit a British attack against a neighboring sanctuary? States that attack
sanctuaries usually incur some sort of cost for doing so. The costs of attacking sanctuaries and
the forms of that cost (diplomatic, economic, military) vary from case to case, but some penalty
is almost always paid when the attack happens without the sanctuary host’s consent. British
commitments were increasingly under strain as a result of growing global discontent with
colonialism and new nationalist demands for independence. The British were particularly
concerned that the United States would pressure them to quit Kenya if the conflict dragged on,
and the British did not want to open up a rift between themselves and the Americans since they
wanted to maintain close relations with the US in the midst of the Cold War.38 The British had
already let India go before the onset of the Mau Mau rebellion, and so it was less important for
them to maintain colonies and outposts around the world that facilitated British access to India.
Kenya was important to the British because it controls one of the two significant tributaries to the
Nile, which was important for controlling Egypt, which was important to the British because the
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British concern that American opinion may turn against them was not without merit. British activity in
Kenya looked a lot like French action in Algeria. President Kennedy denounced the continued French
presence in Algeria and cut a significant amount of American aid to France. The British grew concerned
about changing American perceptions of them throughout the 1950s, and were concerned that the
Americans might distance themselves from the British. A top leader of KANU, Tom Mboya, visited both
Vice President Nixon and Senator Kennedy in 1959 during his trip to the United States and seemed to
have had good meetings with both men. American opposition to colonialism came from a number of
sources. Under Kennedy, the United States wanted Africa to emerge as a solidly pro-Western block of
countries and the United States was concerned that the perception that America was not doing enough to
end colonialism would create an opening for the Soviet Union to increase its influence on the continent.
See pages 20-24 in Nissimi (2006). The Hola Massacre in 1959 was an attack on inmates at a special
detention facility for Mau Mau. Eleven detainees were clubbed to death by guards and another 77 were
seriously injured. This is widely viewed in the literature as an event that precipitated the expedited
Kenyan independence.
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Suez Canal reduced the time it took ships to sail to India. Maintaining control over the
headwaters of the Nile mattered less to the British, who experienced a significant decline in
influence in Egypt with the rise of Gamel Abdel Nasser and the Suez Crisis of 1956. Not only
was the cost of the conflict important, but an economy of force was necessary because British
forces were simultaneously carrying out a counterinsurgency in Malaya (1948-1960), which was
a competing draw on limited British resources.
The casualty figures reported earlier demonstrate, among other things, that Mau Mau
were not a very sophisticated fighting force, and they took tens of casualties for each loyalist
they killed and several hundred died for each European combatant killed. They were further
deprived of their senior political leadership because of Operation Jock Stock at the outset of the
Emergency. A reasonably secure sanctuary outside of British control may have allowed some of
the leadership to escape capture. The Mau Mau launched their first attacks less than six months
after the Emergency began, which means that the Mau Mau had very little time for formal
military training. Sanctuary in a neighboring state would not necessarily have affected the timing
of the Mau Mau’s first actions, but it would have provided a reasonably secure base to train
recruits. A second constraint on the Mau Mau’s fighting prowess was their vulnerable supply of
arms. They did not have their own capacity to produce high quality firearms and usually had to
make due with whatever could be smuggled in from Nairobi, or with whatever could be taken
from police stations or loyalists they killed. A sanctuary in a neighboring state would have made
it easier for the Mau Mau to cache arms, and also could have made it easier to procure arms from
sympathizers abroad.
As it happened, the Mau Mau were dependent on flows of recruits from Nairobi and the
Kikuyu Reserve to replace their losses. Nairobi was largely eliminated as a source of recruits
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following Operation Anvil. Recruits from the reserves became less common over time as the
security forces were built up and police activity increased around the reserves. Attracting new
recruits became more difficult because the security forces appeared to be gaining the upper hand
and prospective recruits did not want to join a losing cause. The difficulty of gaining new
recruits was further compounded over time as the Mau Mau increasingly prayed on the Kikuyu
population for any supplies that they could find. The Mau Mau would likely have benefitted
from both receiving recruits from neighboring countries and being able to train them in
neighboring sanctuaries where they would be relatively safe from British interdiction. Many of
the problems with obtaining new recruits paralleled the problems with obtaining more food,
medicine, and other supplies.
Sanctuary in a neighboring state would have allowed the Mau Mau time to train and
collect arms and then gradually infiltrate its fighters into Kenya, while keeping a reserve force
safe in their transnational sanctuary. The best the British could have hoped for in this case was to
interdict the insurgents as they neared the Kenyan border, but detection would be difficult
because the Mau Mau knew to move at night.39 The British could have elected to improve
Kenya’s border security with neighboring sanctuary hosts, but walls and fortifications of that sort
require substantial resources and manpower, which would be unavailable for protecting the
population or attacking the Mau Mau.40 Whichever tactic the British chose, none would likely
have had the psychological consequences that led so many Mau Mau to surrender during the
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Armies with far greater technological capacity than the British army in the mid-1950s had great
difficulty in interdicting insurgents coming into one country from another. In the Soviet's best year
(militarily) in Afghanistan, they were only able to interdict one-third of the fighters and supplies coming
into the country, and that was in the 1980s.
40
It should be noted that all of the territory, Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland excepted, surrounding the
Protectorate of Kenya was also part of the British Empire, so it is unlikely that the British would have
allowed the Mau Mau to have a transnational sanctuary in any of its neighboring colonies.
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actual conflict. British bombing and clandestine raids against the Mau Mau would be far fewer
than they were because of international condemnation of carrying out attacks on neighboring soil
in pursuit of maintaining its colony. This condemnation would not likely have been too great
from Kenya’s neighbors at the time because most of the territory surrounding Kenya was part of
the British Empire throughout the height of the Emergency, and would likely have not protested
incursions of counterinsurgents aligned with the British. If, somehow, the Mau Mau had been
able to establish transnational sanctuary in neighboring territory, perhaps in remote regions in
neighboring Uganda and Tanzania, which both had small Kikuyu populations under British rule,
who may have been sympathetic to Kenya’s Kikuyu, then the relative protection from attack
would allow the Mau Mau to survive as an organization and raise the cost of continuing the
counterinsurgency and the maintenance of the colony. Given that the British relied far more on
direct rule in Uganda than Kenya, it is conceivable that the British may not have been able to
prevent all uses of sanctuary in a neighboring state, even if it was one of their colonies.
It is not likely that the British would have been able to disrupt a Mau Mau sanctuary in a
neighboring country to the same degree that they did to their actual sanctuaries in the Aberdares
and around Mount Kenya.41 The dense forests shielded the Mau Mau in them from some attacks
early on in the Emergency, but this protection relatively declined as the British increased the
number of security forces and deployed them to the forests, more aircraft began patrolling and
attacking the forests, and new tactics like the “pseudo gangs” encroached on the Mau Mau’s
sanctuary. While the internal sanctuaries the Mau Mau used certainly conferred certain
advantages to them, they were stuck in the center of the country without an international border
to flee across when they were attacked. While counterinsurgents often attack insurgent
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sanctuaries in neighboring states, because of the relative protection from attack that international
borders confer to sanctuary hosts, they almost never carry out prolonged operations and must be
satisfied with the occasional bombing raid or quick incursions over the border. This would likely
have limited the use of “pseudo gangs” and small British units that tracked and identified Mau
Mau for British aircraft. The British would have been able to impose constraints on recruits and
supplies traveling from Kenya to a sanctuary in a neighboring state, but would be limited in their
ability to interdict supplies and recruits moving through territories they did not control.
Sanctuary in a neighboring state would almost certainly have increased the duration and
costs of the counterinsurgency.42 The British would likely be constrained in attacking these
sanctuaries out of fear of drawing condemnation from the United States, who were eager to end
formal colonialism, and whose friendship the British sought to maintain. Attacking sanctuaries in
other countries constitutes a use of force that is likely to be interpreted as illegal if the target state
is not at war with the sanctuary host and if the target state was not authorized by the Security
Council to do so. This may not have been as significant an issue during the period of the Mau
Mau Emergency because Uganda was part of the British Empire and Tanzania was a British trust
territory under the United Nations. Ethiopia is the only plausible neighbor where the Mau Mau
might have established a sanctuary that was outside British control, but it would have been
difficult given the dearth of Kikuyu in Ethiopia and its distance from Kikuyu populations in
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The difficulties associated with establishing a base in a neighboring country, identifying which country
or territory would host such a sanctuary, duration of such a hypothetical conflict, or different military
challenges to operating in any of the neighboring countries are beyond the scope of this paper. It was
unlikely that a sanctuary would have been able to open up on Kenya’s border in 1952, due to the fact that
many Kikuyu came from Central Province, but also because independence had not yet come to most of
Kenya’s neighbors. Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland would have been the easiest territories on which the
Mau Mau could set up bases because the British held the neighboring territories on Kenya’s south and
western borders. Bases in those countries could not easily link up with Kikuyu internal sanctuaries, which
were in the center and southwest of the country.
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Kenya. While domestically constituted regimes might be able to offer a competing value to
justify the use of force, such as national defense, the British would only be able to offer up
defense of colonialism as its justification for violating a neighboring state’s sovereignty. This
would be a tough sell to their American allies and would invite condemnation from the Soviet
Union.
The British held national elections where loyalist Africans voted for representatives in
Kenya’s Legislative Council in 1957-58, beginning the process that culminated with Kenya’s
independence in 1963 and the election of Jomo Kenyatta (first as Prime Minister and later as
President). Would transnational sanctuary have changed any of that? It is not clear that it would.
Building on some of the economic development that was undertaken during the Emergency, the
British extended voting rights and African representation to loyalists almost as soon as the
Emergency ended, thereby sapping any potential residual support for the Mau Mau.43
Additionally, it is not clear that transnational sanctuary would have solved one of the Mau Mau’s
chief deficiencies– it largely drew its supporters from the Kikuyu tribe, although some Embu and
Meru served in their forces. Going transnational in and of itself would not have helped the Mau
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Coding the outcome of this conflict was difficult. Throughout this case study the conflict has been
presented as a military loss for the insurgents, which it certainly was, but at least some of the group’s
aims were at least partially achieved. The Mau Mau were fighting for an equitable redistribution of land,
chiefly by appropriating the vast tracks that European settlers had acquired from black African Kenyans
over decades of colonialism. There was land reform in independent Kenya, but it was largely land
consolidation for the elite, not redistribution to landless and unemployed Kenyans (Harbeson 1971). It is
interesting that the Mau Mau Emergency was a much more difficult affair in the British memory than the
conflict warranted. [re. this past part of the sentence, what do you mean? this seems very important, but
there is no information in the text or footnote to tell us] The British took very few casualties relative to the
Mau Mau, but they pressed through reforms during and after the Emergency to stamp out any chance of
the Mau Mau returning. The 1959 Hola Massacre could have mobilized the Kikuyu, and other tribes, to
make common cause against the British, and this concern likely was one of the factors that figured into
the British decision to grant Kenya independence much earlier than it had planned in the past.
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Mau appeal to the other tribes and carry out a more coordinated, national struggle against the
British.
Conclusion
Insurgents without transnational sanctuary potentially face great difficulty in defeating
their targets. Insurgents tend to start out with few weapons, little military training, and logistical
difficulties at the outset of an insurgency. They often need time and the support of a substantial
part of the population. If groups cannot obtain sanctuary in neighboring states, they need to
evolve quickly into a fighting force that can seize and hold territory within their respective target
states. These internal sanctuaries can afford insurgents the time to develop the necessary military
skills, provisions, and recruits to carry out successful attacks against their target state.
The Mau Mau had the odds stacked against them from the outset of the Emergency. Kenya
was a country comprised of many tribes, and uniting them would be difficult for a movement
that was overwhelmingly Kikuyu. While many other Kenyans may have welcomed the end of
British rule, they were not eager to replace it with a Kikuyu-dominated government. The Mau
Mau insurgents remained at a distinct military disadvantage relative to the far superior British
and all their local allies. The Mau Mau did not operate far from the heavily Kikuyu areas of the
country around Central Province. Internal sanctuary in the Aberdare forests served, for a time, as
a sufficient guard against the superior firepower of the British. However, the British and loyalist
Kenyans were able to eventually isolate these sanctuaries and then gradually deprive the Mau
Mau of their forest hideouts.
Transnational sanctuary would have solved some of the most serious problems that the
Mau Mau faced. They likely would have avoided physical destruction as states are limited in the
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power they can project into other countries. Recruits, provisions, medical care, and rest and
relaxation would have been relatively more abundant in a transnational sanctuary, and the war
almost certainly would have lasted longer. It is not clear that sanctuary in a neighboring country
would have allowed the Mau Mau to forge bonds that transcended tribal identities. It is also not
clear that the ultimate outcome would have been different. Waiting for the British to withdraw
could have been a viable strategy for the Mau Mau, as the British were foreign colonizers, but
that would not necessarily have solved the question of what to do with the Europeans who made
Kenya their home and who had taken vast tracks of the best farmland for themselves. It is
possible that the Mau Mau may have been able to stay in the fight until the British decided to
grant Kenya its independence, but that only would mean that the Mau Mau would have been
stronger actors in a new and independent Kenya. There is no reason to believe that transnational
sanctuary, if one could have even been constructed, would have enabled the Mau Mau to become
so powerful that they could defeat the British-aligned counterinsurgent forces. As it actually
happened, the British were quite good at manipulating the franchise so as to ensure that a
moderate government, friendly to the British, came to power at independence.

.
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Map 4.2 Mau Mau Internal Sanctuaries in Aberdares, Kenya (Anderson 2005)
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Chapter Five
El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN): No External Intervention and the
Presence of Transnational Sanctuary

Map 5.1 El Salvador (Central Intelligency Agency Factbook 2017)

Introduction

The case of El Salvador is an example of an insurgent group with transnational sanctuary
facing a domestically constituted regime. My refined version of the conventional wisdom would
predict that it should be difficult for the insurgents to seize power because the regime they are
challenging does not have the option to withdraw and must endure the costs of insurgency.
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The following case has three parts. The first part is a brief background about the origins
and causes of the conflict in El Salvador, and the second section is a brief overview of the
insurgency. The third section assesses the relative strengths of the causal mechanisms that can be
tested in this case. I conclude that transnational sanctuary provided crucial support to the FMLN,
and they benefitted from sanctuary in many of the ways that the conventional wisdom predicts
that they would. However, the FMLN failed to achieve its primary objective of seizing power in
El Salvador through the use of force, and I show some of the ways that using transnational
sanctuary in Nicaragua actually made it more difficult for the FMLN to win.
Overview of the Conflict

The economic and political exclusion of a growing number of Salvadorans contributed to
the onset of the crisis in El Salvador. The introduction of coffee in the mid-nineteenth century
followed by a series of laws passed between 1879 and 1882 led to the transferring of nearly onequarter of that country’s cultivatable land that was previously held collectively to private hands
(Byrne 18). Economically, many Salvadorans faced severe land shortages due to a growing
population and the continued concentration of land in the hands of the country’s elites. The
country’s population in the 1960s was just three and a half million, but it was growing by
157,000 per year, and this relative population surge was augmented by the return of 100,000 to
300,000 Salvadorans from Honduras following the 1969 war with Honduras (Byrne, 19-20). The
land shortage produced by the expansion of export-led crops such as coffee, cotton, and sugar
cane forced many Salvadorans to become seasonal wage laborers or subsistence farmers living
on very small plots of land. El Salvador experienced rising wealth and land inequality throughout
the 1960s and 1970s that produced calls from the country’s peasants for significant economic
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changes.44 However, the overwhelming majority of Salvadorans lacked any meaningful way to
address their economic problems through the political process. The Salvadoran military regime
of the 1970s was highly exclusionary and largely served the interests of the military and the
agrarian elite. The country’s growing industrial sector was unable to absorb the landless peasants
as Salvadoran industry was capital-intensive, and the industrial elites lacked an interest in
political reform because they depended on the agricultural elites for the majority of their
capital.45
Attempts at reform throughout the 1970s failed to make the political or economic system
more inclusive. The military manipulated election results throughout the 1970s to ensure that a
civilian government friendly to the military came to power. The prevailing political order was
challenged by the coup of 1979, which was the proximate cause of the onset of civil war in El
Salvador. The junta that was initially installed was led by a relatively moderate, reformist group
of military officers. However, it did not last long and they were subsequently ousted by a very
conservative coalition of landowners and military officers. This second coup signaled to left
wing parties that economic reform, particularly land reform, was impossible to achieve by
working within the existing order, and the ensuing massive violence against civilians convinced
many Salvadorans that they needed to prepare themselves for war. The ultraconservative junta
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A number of indicators reported by Byrne highlight the increasing impoverishment of El
Salvador’s poor in the 1960s and 1970s: the percentage of landless families rose from 19.8% in
1961 to 41.1% in 1971; in 1966 the top 3,000 families held 43% of the land; the bottom 20% of
the population experienced a decline in their share of the national wealth from 3.7% in 1970 to
2% in 1980, while the top fifth’s share of national income rose from 50.8% in 1970 to 66% in
1980 (p.20).
45
U.S. Declassified Documents II, Department of State, Part 2, “Meeting with New
Civilian/Military Junta of El Salvador on the Continuation of Relations,” telegram #06150, from
U.S. Embassy, San Salvador, to Secretary of State, 25 October 1979, cited in Byrne, 20.
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unleashed a massive wave of violence against real and suspected members of El Salvador’s left
that left an estimated 15,000 dead in 1980 alone (Byrne, 68).
The FMLN was the umbrella name for five different organizations: the PCS, FPL, ERP,
RN, and PRTC. Although the five organizations agreed to undertake actions collectively to
defeat the government, they maintained their own independent leaderships, financing, recruiting,
and provisioning. The FMLN represented the armed resistance to the government and it was
affiliated with the FDR, which was the collection of left wing organizations that sought
nonviolent change in El Salvador. The relationship between the FMLN and FDR grew more
distant as the war progressed, with the FDR occasionally criticizing human rights violations by
the FMLN before the FDR effectively disbanded in 1987 to create a new political organization,
the Democratic Convergence (McClintock, 53).
The FMLN hoped to repeat the Sandinistas’ success in Nicaragua by toppling the regime
in an all-out offensive for the capital, which they launched in January 1981. The FMLN had
pinned their hopes for a successful revolution with insurrections in the cities to coincide with the
military push. When those insurrections failed to materialize and the “final offensive” of 1981
petered out, the FMLN regrouped between mid-1981 and mid-1982 to consolidate its internal
sanctuaries in preparation for the next confrontation with the armed forces (Byrne, 84). The
“final offensive” succeeded in carving out the government and insurgent areas of influence that
would last until the end of the war. The FMLN’s presence (sometimes measured by the lack of a
government presence) encompassed between one-quarter and one-third of the country and was
primarily located in rural areas in the north and the east of the country, while the government
remained in control of most large population centers and the west of the country (Byrne, 80, 84).
The FMLN began constructing alternative governance systems complete with “installations,
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workshops, hospitals, schools of instruction” in areas where it had expelled the government’s
presence (Harnecker, quoted in Byrne, 83, endnote 29).
While the FMLN tried to consolidate its control in the countryside, the government, on
the advice and with the funding of the U.S., began increasing the size of its armed forces to
address the military threat posed by the insurgency, and held elections in March 1982 to try to
build support for the government to undermine the FMLN’s claim that revolutionary warfare was
the best way to bring about change in El Salvador (Byrne, 83). The elections largely achieved the
purpose the United States intended, but the armed forces were not able to capitalize on their
increased strength because they failed to focus on the small unit tactics that the U.S. advised
them to adopt. The El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) continued employing large unit operations
that played to the FMLN’s strengths, allowing the FMLN to consolidate its presence in the rural
areas of the country’s north and east. ESAF’s extensive sweeps were easily avoided by the
FMLN, and ESAF eventually fell back on defensive positions around population and economic
centers (Byrne 83-84).
Despite the political setback for the FMLN in March 1982 caused by the relatively
successful election, they launched what was probably their most successful military phase of the
war between mid-1982 and late 1983. The FMLN began capturing small military outposts, then
villages and towns before finally laying siege to some of El Salvador’s cities, even capturing the
Fourth Brigade Headquarters in 1983. These advances allowed the FMLN to capture weapons,
gain military experience, and put larger segments of the population under their control, from
which they could later recruit new members and extract resources to further future operations
(Byrne, 85-7).
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The first phase of the war, characterized by FMLN and ESAF attempts to destroy one
another’s arrayed forces and control the capital, gave way to a longer phase of the war in which
both sides sought to grind down the other in a war of attrition. This second phase of the conflict
was not a fundamental change of means and ends—both sides continued to believe that they
could prevail over the other in a drawn-out military contest, as hopes of a quick victory faded.
Firefights would continue to take place during this second phase, but the primary focus turned
toward winning the population, a key component in a war of attrition.
The FMLN’s successful offensives through 1983 eventually gave way to military and
political setbacks beginning in 1984. The March and May elections in 1984 led to the election of
President Jose Duarte. The elections constituted a political setback for the FMLN, who tried to
prevent the election, and the elections led to more reliable foreign assistance from the U.S. to the
government. Furthermore, the elections led West Germany to restore aid because they appeared
to have been relatively free and fair (Byrne, 95). At the insistence of the U.S., the government of
El Salvador began concentrating on a series of reforms to win over the people through a “hearts
and minds” campaign, which included the restoration or extension of services such as healthcare,
education, and infrastructure, the subordination of the military to civilian forces, the curbing of
human rights abuses, the continuation of elections to condition Salvadorans to resolve disputes at
the polls, increased efforts to go after FMLN internal sanctuaries, and the establishment of civil
defense units in the countryside (Byrne, 127 and 130-1). As an additional component of the
counterinsurgency strategy, the governments of the United States and El Salvador continued to
press Nicaragua to close the FMLN’s sanctuaries, although the central aim of the
counterinsurgency strategy remained winning the Salvadoran population to the government’s
side.
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The FMLN’s response to the changing circumstances was to fall back on a classical,
prolonged “people’s war” strategy characterized by: the dispersion of their forces across the
countryside to force the government to follow suit; more hit-and-run attacks to degrade and
demoralize the army and force it to assume a defensive position; and continued economic
warfare against El Salvador’s infrastructure to increase the strain on government coffers while
increasing the population’s discontent with the government due to poor economic conditions.
The government and FMLN strategies during this period effectively checked one another
and neither was successful in achieving what it set out to do. The government was unable to
dislodge the FMLN from its internal sanctuaries in the countryside. While the military could
usually go into FMLN areas for short periods of time, it was rarely ever able to execute the kind
of clear-hold-build strategy that would have won hearts and minds and prevented the return of
the FMLN once government forces left. The government’s hope of building civil defense patrols
in villages similarly failed to materialize in part because the FMLN made it a priority to prevent
their creation, and because the government found it difficult to convince rural Salvadorans to risk
their lives for the government. The government’s attempt at winning the people’s hearts and
minds through civilian development projects was largely a failure because most of the projects
failed to address the land reform issue, which was important to Salvadorans, and because the
FMLN’s economic warfare hindered any government attempt to grow the economy. The
government was more successful at conditioning its population to accept the outcome of
elections than most of its other goals in this period, but that acceptance of elections did not
translate to an embrace of President Duarte or his policies.
The FMLN fared little better than the government at achieving its objectives in this
period. The FMLN recovered from its decline brought about by the change in government
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policies in 1984 and 1985 through forging new ties with the population in its areas of influence,
which produced more committed recruits. The FMLN continued bringing in supplies from
Nicaragua through Honduras and Guatemala, and it continued its economic warfare against the
state, and it successfully prevented the reestablishment of government authority in much of the
countryside. It launched another final offensive in 1989, but again did not receive the massive
urban insurrection it needed to complement its military offensive, and the stalemate appeared
likely to continue.
Access to transnational sanctuary in this period helped the FMLN solidify control over
the areas where it already had influence, thus hindering the government’s strategy of denying the
insurgents their internal base of support. The arms provided via transnational sanctuary had a
significant positive impact for the FMLN. The deployment of mines in the mid-1980s
contributed to a marked increase in government military deaths in 1986 and further solidified the
FMLN’s hold on its territory as it became more dangerous for government forces to disrupt the
FMLN’s presence in the countryside in the El Salvador’s north and east.
Several events transpired in late 1989 that set the conflict in El Salvador on the path to
resolution. The most important event was the FMLN’s November offensive that had the goal of
capturing the capital and bringing the war to an end. The FMLN was unable to capture the
capital, but the balance of forces in El Salvador change favorably for the FMLN as a result of
gains made during the offensive. This brought the balance of forces closer to parity, undermined
Salvadoran elite beliefs that the military could protect them, and raised questions in the U.S.
Congress about the wisdom of continuing to provide assistance to a government that proved
incapable of stopping new insurgent gains despite considerable U.S. assistance. The murder of a
number of Jesuit priests by the Salvadoran armed forces during the FMLN offensive led the U.S.
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Congress to question continued aid to the Salvadoran government and undermined officials’
claims that the Salvadoran military would protect human rights.
Continued external support for both sides in El Salvador was brought into question in
1989 and 1990. Events outside of El Salvador raised new uncertainties for the two belligerent
parties in El Salvador and pushed them toward the negotiating table. The Berlin Wall came down
the weekend the FMLN launched its offensive, signaling to many the end of the Cold War. The
end of the Cold War meant that Central America would not be as an important a region as it has
been throughout the 1980s, and the FMLN should have expected less support from the Eastern
bloc. Additionally, the Sandinista defeat in the 1990 election in Nicaragua decreased the need for
aid to both sides. This certainly hurt the FMLN relatively more than the Salvadoran government
because Nicaragua was the important transnational sanctuary and transshipment country for the
FMLN. Yet, the defeat of the Sandinistas coupled with the end of the Cold War also meant that
Washington had less interest in continuing to assist a military that seemed unable to check to the
growth of the FMLN.
The approaching parity of forces in El Salvador and uncertainty on both sides about
future external support created an opening in which both sides came to view a negotiated
settlement as preferable to a military settlement. Although negotiations had taken place prior to
the 1989 offensive, both the government and the FMLN had focused on strategies that would
allow them to win the war outright. The 1989 offensive and subsequent FMLN offensives
throughout 1990 demonstrated to the Salvadoran government and the country’s economic elites
that the war was far from over and that the military had either been lying about the prospects for
victory or did not understand the nature of the threat the FMLN posed. The FMLN, while
generally in a stronger position after the 1989 offensive, realized that it still did not have the
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popular support that was necessary, especially in urban areas, to defeat the government quickly.
It could prolong the war and raise the costs for the government, but the FMLN did not think it
could credibly threaten to defeat the military. The United Nations assisted in brokering a deal
between the FMLN and the government of El Salvador that ended the war. The FMLN won
some concessions, but it was far short of what the group wanted to do at the outset of the
conflict.46 Twenty percent of the new armed forces were to be comprised of FMLN, many of the
government’s special counterinsurgency security forces were to be disbanded, and the effect of
the peace deal was to finally include the left in future El Salvadoran elections.
The FMLN’s acquisition of surface to air missiles sometime in the late 1980s or 1990 led
to the downing of numerous government military aircraft and reduced the government’s ability
to project power into the FMLN’s internal sanctuaries. Nicaragua, who had earlier denied FMLN
requests for these surface to air missiles, now provided them to the FMLN when it became clear
to the Sandinistas that they would lose the 1990 election.
Transnational sanctuary

The FMLN benefitted from extensive transnational sanctuary in neighboring Nicaragua.
They were given access to training facilities, arms, and access to the means necessary to spread
propaganda. The impetus for Nicaraguan support to the FMLN began with the Sandinistas’
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The overarching goal of the FMLN/ FDR as laid out in its Platform of the Revolutionary Democratic
Government:
The decisive task of the revolution on which completion of all its tasks and objectives depends is
the conquest of power and the installation of a revolutionary democratic government, which as the
head of the people will undertake the construction of a new society” (quoted in Byrne, 76).
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overthrow of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979, and their subsequent declaration of intent
to spread “revolutionary internationalism” in Central America. The Sandinistas hosted the
FMLN on their territory because they believed it was in their interest to support other leftist
movements in Central America that would hopefully produce more leftist governments.47 The
Sandinistas created the Department of International Relations (DRI) and Fifth Directorate of
Intelligence, which was “associated with the government’s General Directorate of State Security
(DGSE)” to facilitate the expansion of revolutionary activity throughout Central America
(Revolution Beyond Our Borders, 464-5). The FMLN were eager to establish sanctuaries in
Nicaragua because they believed that it would be difficult for ESAF to attack those rearguard
bases in Nicaragua.
The FMLN underwent a qualitative leap in firepower from mid-1980 through the first
half of 1981. The insurgents, originally armed with hunting rifles, shotguns, and handguns,
ended up with many of the more powerful weapons available as a result of the extensive arming
effort on behalf of the Communist countries.48 Arms provided by Cuba were flown from Costa
Rica, by arms traffickers who also sold arms in Honduras and Guatemala, to the FMLN very
early in the conflict until Nicaragua was established as the hub for arms transfers in the second
half of 1980. Nicaragua became the vital transshipment point for arms from other Communist
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Moore relays that the Sandinistas had provided training to the FMLN since the mid-1980s. He
identified at least four facilities that were used to train FMLN and writes that several hundred
guerrillas could be trained at these four bases. The bases he identifies are “Ostional in the
southern province of Rivas, a former National Guard camp in northwestern Nicaragua close to
the River Tamarindo, Tamagas outside Managua, and a new camp that opened in 1984 near
Santa Julia on the Consiguina Peninsula” (82).
48
A defector claimed that Nicaragua supposedly supplied “2,200 rifles (FAL’s [sic], M-1s, M2s), two radio transmitters, ammunition, grenades, more than 15 rocket launchers, at least three
.50 caliber and one .30 caliber machine guns, 125 boxes of TNT, and ten M-79 grenade
launchers” (Revolution Beyond Our Borders).
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countries to El Salvador, as well as the transit hub of fighters into and out of El Salvador.49
Nicaragua was a very reliable, though not completely reliable sanctuary host. The transshipment
of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador was suspended for about a month beginning in late
September 1980 because the Nicaraguan government was concerned that the US would freeze
$75 million in aid as a result of the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador (Revolution
Beyond Our Borders, 468-69). President Ronald Reagan cut off all U.S. aid to the Sandinistas in
1981 because, he argued, they were fomenting leftist insurgencies throughout Central America.
The Communist countries were eager to get aid to the FMLN in time for the offensive
planned for early 1981. The arms shipments resumed via air, land, and sea in October, 1980, and
the insurgents quickly found themselves awash in arms and struggled to absorb everything that
was being sent their way. Nicaragua outfitted an airfield at Papalonal in Nicaragua to ferry the
aid to be delivered to El Salvador in much greater quantities than what could be shipped over
land, and put the Commander of the Nicaraguan Air Force in command of the operation to aid
the FMLN. In January and February 1981, C-47s from Papalonal reportedly dropped supplies in
southeastern El Salvador near routes that were known to be used by the guerrillas to infiltrate
into El Salvador (Revolution Beyond Our Borders, 470-1). The Nicaraguans also moved
weapons and supplies over land routes through Honduras into El Salvador.
Weapons, ammunition, and individuals were moved across the Gulf of Fonseca via naval
craft from Nicaraguan ports to El Salvador, or were transferred to FMLN boats or canoes in the
Gulf of Fonseca that ferried the supplies to land in El Salvador (Revolution Beyond Our Borders,
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Vietnam was especially obliging for the Salvadoran insurgents at the outset of the conflict
promising them 60 tons of arms, including 1620 M-16 rifles and 1.5 million rounds of
ammunition (468-9).
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471). Greater quantities of arms and other supplies were trafficked over water between
Nicaraguan and El Salvador than over land through Honduras or Guatemala. Many of the arms
would be loaded onto craft in the Nicaraguan department of Chinandega and ferried to the
Salvadoran province of Usulutan across the Gulf of Fonseca. From there they could be shipped
and transported to any front in El Salvador (Revolution Beyond Our Border,477). “These routes
lead west out of Jiquilisco-Tres Calles, northwest via Tapesquillo Alto, north to El Brazo and
northeast to Tierra Blanca-Bolivar. All major guerrilla fronts receive supplies through the
Usulutan logistics network” (Footnote 1, Revolution Beyond Our Border,477). The Salvadoran
government reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that a ship left Punta Nata,
Nicaragua, to go to La Criba, El Salvador, to offload its supply of machine guns and submachine guns to a band of 70 FMLN insurgents (Sandinista Aid to FMLN).
While the Nicaraguans scaled back their arms deliveries to the FMLN in late 1981
following the floundering of the “Final Offensive,” they soon resumed shipments in 1982 as part
of a ploy to disrupt the elections scheduled for that year. This rearming of the FMLN is notable
because it represented another qualitative leap over the previous effort in the run-up to the 1981
offensive. The FMLN gained access to heavier weaponry like 57mm recoilless rifles and M-72
antitank weapons. The arming was successful, but the elections were well attended enough to
lead most to the conclusion that the FMLN effort to disrupt the election was a failure (Revolution
Beyond Our Borders, 474-5).
The offices of the FMLN Radio Venceremos were in a two-story house in Las Palma,
Managua, and its transmitters were at Cerro Cosiguina, also in Nicaragua, and the FMLN’s
printing office was in Managua (Sandinista Aid to FMLN). Radio Liberacion began broadcasting
in Nicaragua on December 15th, 1980, and Radio Venceremos was established near the
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Honduran-El Salvadoran border following Radio Liberacion. A secret radio station in Nicaragua
announced the beginning of the ill-fated “Final Offensive” against the government on January
10th, 1981. Yet, despite the extensive arming process that had been underway since the summer
of 1980, the FMLN were unable to bring down the government in El Salvador as very few of
their countrymen joined them during their offensive (Revolution Beyond Our Borders, 473).
Nicaragua served as a point of training for FMLN guerrillas, and also an access point to
military training in other countries, namely Cuba. The training was comprehensive, including
courses in “military tactics, weapons use, communications, and explosives” at Nicaraguan
military bases or locations the Nicaraguan government set up for these purposes. The training
received at these bases facilitated some of the biggest military victories for the FMLN up
through 1983. Specifically, FMLN trainees rehearsed their October 1981 attack on the Puente de
Oro Bridge, the Ilopango Air Base in January 1982, and the 4th Brigade Headquarters in
December 1983. The trainers constructed a model 4th Brigade Headquarters in Cuba that they
used to rehearse the attack (Revolution Beyond Our Borders, 476).
A former member of the FMLN who spent considerable time in Nicaragua and Cuba
explained the kinds of ways that transnational sanctuary aided the FMLN. This individual did not
seek out the FMLN, but was a Salvadoran who had gone to find work in Nicaragua and was
promised that he could return to El Salvador if he joined the FMLN. He was sent to a semibattalion comprised of recruits from Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Chile, Argentina, and
Nicaragua, which operated near the mountains of Esteli. He was then sent to Cuba for a year to
receive instruction on military training and historical materialism before being sent back to
Nicaragua where they waited at a large base at Villa Fontana to enter El Salvador. While other
guerrillas left for El Salvador, this individual’s turn did not come up because the FMLN
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suspended some of its infiltration after the intercepting of some transiting FMLN by Honduras.
While in Nicaragua, this individual claims to have helped pack arms destined for El Salvador,
including RPG 7s, M50, M30, M16, FAL, and GALILs. Furthermore, he corroborated a
Salvadoran naval intelligence officer’s story that these arms used to be shipped via naval craft
until one was sunk, after which these arms were moved into El Salvador via light plane. In
response to a question about what the Nicaraguans contributed to the war in El Salvador, he said
that they helped train FMLN and that some Nicaraguans went to fight in El Salvador
(Information on FMLN-GON Collaboration). One former FMLN who later defected to
Honduras, Santo Salomone Morales, describes how he and a dozen others went from El Salvador
to Nicaragua via naval craft across the Gulf of Fonseca, and they went from Nicaragua to Cuba
for training with 900 other Salvadorans (Revolution Beyond Our Borders, Footnote 2).
Many of the leaders of the various factions of the FMLN were allowed to stay in
Nicaragua and were able to plan and coordinate actions in El Salvador from their centers in
Nicaragua. The Headquarters of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate was in Managua and had
the ability to transmit orders to combatants in El Salvador via radio communications. Other
command and control elements of the FMLN resided in safe houses in Managua (Sandinista Aid
to FMLN).
The FMLN experienced a number of military victories against government forces up
through 1983, but were unable to translate military successes into a larger victory because of the
massive assistance the U.S. provided to the government’s armed forces, and the doubling in size
of the Salvadoran armed forces between 1981 and 1984 (Byrne, 79). While the FMLN
successfully established a presence in the countryside and in neighboring Nicaragua, its urban
network was eviscerated by right-wing death squads. Those attacks caused the FMLN to move
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away from its method of direct confrontation with the military to more hit-and-run attacks,
economic sabotage, assassination of political leaders, and efforts to re-establish their presence in
urban areas (Byrne, 78). By the end of 1983, the FMLN’s victories led it to concentrate its forces
in preparation for larger fights, but this made them more vulnerable to the government’s
substantial edge in firepower. The FMLN’s military successes set the stage for its reversal of
fortune.
The FMLN continued to benefit from transnational sanctuary, primarily in Nicaragua, in
many of the same ways that it had during the first phase, although the extent of aid from
Nicaragua was scaled back following the US-led invasion of Grenada in 1983. The Nicaraguans
were concerned that appearing to support the FMLN too openly would risk an intervention in
Nicaragua similar to the one launched against Grenada, and adopted a lower profile so as to not
give the US an excuse to intervene in Nicaragua. The scaling back of Sandinista support was not
all that deleterious for the FMLN because it coincided with a shift in strategy away from direct
military confrontation with the state toward winning greater support in rural areas and economic
sabotage to sap support for the government. The FMLN General Command’s relocation from
Managua to the departments of Morazan and Chalatenango in El Salvador following the U.S.
invasion of Grenada in 1983 was not all that hard for the FMLN because they had achieved
relatively secure zones of control in El Salvador by this time. The decline in the quantity of
supplies and weapons from Nicaragua was partially made up for by the continued increase in
quality of weapons. Specifically, the FMLN got access to contact- and remote-detonated mines,
likely from either the Cubans or Sandinistas, which enhanced the lethality of FMLN attacks
(Revolution Beyond Our Border,477). Despite moving some operations out of Nicaragua, it
continued to be the important transnational sanctuary for the FMLN throughout the war. The
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U.S., and presumably the Salvadoran government, were aware of some of the other transit routes
used to bring in weapons from Nicaragua to El Salvador.50 In July 1989, the Honduran military
intercepted a shipment of 60 Soviet-made AK-47s that were being shipped from Nicaragua to El
Salvador, indicating that the land routes from Nicaragua through Honduras were still active
(Sandinista Aid to FMLN).
The FMLN continued to benefit from training in Nicaragua and elsewhere during the
period 1984 to 1989. FMLN military commanders continued receiving training at the
headquarters of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) Mercenary Battalion No.
30-11, and the FMLN also received training at the headquarters of the Sandinista People’s
Militia. Nicaragua provided two years of political and military training to members of Fuerzas
Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional (FARN), one of the parties in the FMLN, who then returned
to El Salvador to recruit and indoctrinate Salvadorans, particularly at El Salvador’s National
University in the capital San Salvador (Sandinista Aid to FMLN). Documents and the
interrogation of a captured FMLN finance officer revealed that the FMLN allocated some of its
funds to pay to send recruits to Nicaragua for training. Guerrillas captured by ESAF in 1988
admitted that they received sabotage and guerrilla training in Nicaragua and Cuba intermittently
between 1983 and 1987 (Data on Sandinista Support for the FMLN).
US intelligence indicated that 15 FMLN guerrillas received training in the use of surface
to air missiles in Managua. Several FMLN guerrillas captured by ESAF in El Salvador in 1988

“In late 1987 there were indications of a notable surge in logistics resupply activity collected
by the Salvadoran insurgents. Two major routes were used. One consists of an entry point at the
mouth of the Rio Lempa or Isla Montecristo northward, el Espino Beach, Usulutan: and El Cuco
Beach, San Miguel. The second route begins in the Jucuaran coastal area, extending northward to
the war fronts, sometimes paralleling the routes originating from the Rio Lempa area”
(Sandinista Aid to FMLN).
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told their captors that they had spent time training in Nicaragua or Cuba, and detailed how Cuba
went to great lengths to try to conceal the identities of FMLN traveling to Cuba (Sandinista Aid
to FMLN).
Surface to air missiles were smuggled into El Salvador from Nicaragua late in the war.
Six Nicaraguans were arrested in September, 1991, trying to transit 20 SAMs into El Salvador.
The SAMs were part of the FMLN strategy late in the war to secure their liberated zones within
El Salvador by denying the government of El Salvador’s air force from striking at rebel-held
zones. Following the downing of a number of government aircraft in 1990 and 1991, ESAF
responded by dispatching more infantry patrols into rebel-held areas to limit that ability of
FMLN to harass flights and flying fewer daytime missions to mitigate the effect of the SAMs
(U.S. Department of State 1991). Following a change in leadership in Nicaragua that led to the
Sandinistas being ousted following their defeat in the 1990 election, the FMLN began to develop
its sanctuary in Mexico, but that move did not have a great effect on the outcome of the war (US
Diplomatic Cable 1990). The FMLN still retained access to transnational sanctuaries besides
Mexico. According to a U.S. diplomatic cable, an April-1990 raid by Honduran security officials
uncovered a safe house that served as a hospital to treat wounded FMLN (More Arms
Traffickers Arrested).
Transnational sanctuary provided all of the benefits that the conventional wisdom
predicted that it would, but those benefits were not enough to propel the FMLN to victory. There
can be little doubt that the quantity and quality of the arms available to the FMLN improved
because of Nicaragua’s position as an active sanctuary. The FMLN, though it decreased in
absolute size in the years immediately following 1983, continued to be a very potent military
threat in El Salvador, inflicting significant casualties on government forces through the end of
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the war. This increased lethality made it easier for the FMLN to create zones of influence in El
Salvador where government forces would not hazard to venture long in small numbers. Despite
the qualitative and quantitative benefits of transnational sanctuary that accrued to the FMLN as a
military organization, those benefits did not lead to achieving the FMLN’s stated goal of seizing
power through military force.
There is little evidence to suggest that either the propaganda campaign directed from
Nicaragua or the relative protection from attack had a significant effect on the outcome of the
conflict. Access to radios was rare, and the radio propaganda proved to be insufficient in winning
over the population in urban areas throughout the war, and in the countryside during the first
phase of the war. The FMLN was only able to build a relatively broad and deep social base in the
countryside following its decision to focus on political work and years of cultivating relations
with the rural peasantry. The FMLN were certainly well protected in Nicaragua because ESAF
did not want to carry out direct attacks in Nicaragua out of fear that it would lead to reprisals and
escalation with the armed forces of Nicaragua. Despite this relative security, the FMLN
remained relatively secure in their internal sanctuaries in EL Salvador where the majority of their
fighters were found.
The FMLN’s access to transnational sanctuary provoked responses that made it more
difficult for them to win in the long term. Increased FMLN arming often justified greater U.S.
funding to El Salvador, allowing the government to also build up its arms, negating some of the
qualitative and quantitative effects of arms from sanctuary. The U.S. got involved in part because
it viewed Nicaragua, along with Cuba, as some of the most significant threats in America’s
backyard. The FMLN’s sanctuary in Nicaragua nearly assured that the Americans would view
the FMLN as a tool of Nicaraguan influence and part of a larger Communist plot to expand their
104

influence in the Western hemisphere. One of the other pitfalls of U.S. aid from the FMLN’s
perspective is that the aid held the fractured regime together longer than it may have otherwise
lasted. The United States also began sending arms to Nicaraguans who opposed the Sandinista
regime in an attempt to deflect Nicaragua’s attention and energy from El Salvador to Nicaragua.
Additionally, the El Salvadoran government had such an enormous advantage in resources that it
was going to be very difficult for the FMLN to win a contest decided largely by material
factors.51
An unforeseen negative consequence of transnational sanctuary is that desertion rates
appeared to be higher in them than in internal sanctuaries. More data are needed, but a combatant
for one of the FMLN factions, the ERP, reported that he received training in Nicaragua from
1981 until 1985, and that half of the other ERP members in Nicaragua (75 out of 150) left the
group because they perceived they were being treated poorly (Revolution Beyond Our Border,
478, Footnote 2). This appears somewhat higher than the overall decline that the FMLN
experienced from its membership high in late 1983 through 1985, when it was estimated that the
FMLN was at about two-thirds of its peak members (Revolution Beyond Our Border, 478).
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Byrne relays estimates that the government forces exceeded the capacity of the insurgents by
factors ranging from 10:1 to 27:1. Many of the sources used to make that prediction came from
some of the top officers in the FMLN during about the midpoint of the conflict or in interviews
after it was over, indicating that this was not just a deficit at the outset, when one would expect
the guerrillas to be relatively weaker, but something that persisted throughout the conflict. The
gap appears even larger if one looks at just the amount of spending. Byrne states that an FPL
(part of the FMLN) commander reported to him in 1995 that the largest of the five FMLN parties
spent a million dollars a year, which means the high estimate for the entire organization would
have to be under five million dollars annually. Total U.S. assistance to El Salvador averaged
more than $400 million a year during the 1980s and that would have been supplemented by the
Government of El Salvador’s own spending and the contribution from the counter-revolutionary
paramilitary units (Byrne, footnote 5, p. 116).
105

Causal Mechanisms
This case allows for a test of all the causal mechanisms proposed in my argument except
the one that examines external interveners’ attempt to construct viable states in other countries.
There was strong support for the mechanism that predicted transnational sanctuary would
provide relative protection from attack and the one that predicts an organizational inflection
point for insurgents. There was little evidence that the FMLN tried to wait out the regime, which
is understandable given that the regime was domestically constituted. Massive U.S. assistance to
the government was vital to keeping the regime in the fight against the FMLN, but the regime
predated such massive external assistance, and so it is still counted as a domestically constituted
regime, albeit one under strain during the insurgency.
The FMLN received relative protection from attack by using its sanctuaries in neighboring
states. The Salvadoran military did not conduct extensive cross-border attacks to go after the
FMLN sanctuaries in neighboring states, but it did try to interdict FMLN forces attempting to
enter El Salvador. Interviews with FMLN insurgents revealed no concern on their part that they
felt likely to be attacked in their foreign bases. The FMLN leadership often availed themselves of
the relative security of sanctuaries, indicating that it was often viewed as safer than being in El
Salvador.
This case strongly suggests that insurgents face an organizational inflection point that
produces diminished or even negative returns beyond a certain level. The FMLN’s successes in
1982-3 positioned them for their own coming reversal. Successes on the battlefield were
changing the FMLN from a dispersed insurgent force to a conventional army as they moved
away from small unit tactics to larger units of organization to undertake operations against larger
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military targets. By assuming the characteristics of a conventional army, the FMLN made
themselves more vulnerable to the conventional armaments of the Salvadoran armed forces. This
is a conundrum with which all potential insurgents must wrestle. Insurgent tactics tend to work
best when their forces are dispersed. Guerrilla victories against isolated targets that are possible
to achieve with dispersed forces often give way to a greater concentration of forces that focus on
larger targets that cannot be taken by smaller, dispersed forces. The firepower made possible by
conventional armed forces cannot achieve much for government forces if they cannot know
where to employ it. Small, dispersed forces make it difficult for government forces to employ
that massive firepower, and directing it indiscriminately against the population can produce
dangerous internal and external repercussions. Therefore, massive conventional firepower is of
limited use against guerrilla tactics, but that firepower becomes more effective as guerrilla
armies concentrate. This is particularly true in an era of armed aircraft that require relatively little
manpower to deliver a lot of firepower rapidly and accurately over long distances. This tends to
be a one-sided advantage as insurgents rarely acquire combat aircraft.
The concentration of forces that is necessary for guerrillas to take well-defended
positions saps manpower and resources from other areas of control, in turn making their internal
sanctuaries more precarious and likely to be disrupted. A greater concentration of forces in a
geographic area makes scavenging more difficult and usually requires more personnel to be
taken off the front lines and turned toward provisioning the assembled force (Byrne, 87). And
specifically in the case of the FMLN, although this could be true for other groups as well, the
focus on turning recruits into effective combatants led to the neglect of cultivating political ties
with the people (Byrne, 87). The FMLN’s drive to field larger forces also led them to undertake
forced recruitment in some instances which proved to be a liability because forced recruits who
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deserted became some of the best sources of intelligence for the Salvadoran government (Byrne,
86). Having access to sophisticated conventional weapons and lots of combatants may be
advantages for conventional armies, but these are not the most important factors for insurgents,
and access to these weapons may tempt guerrillas to attempt to mimic conventional warfare
tactics when they would be better served by guerrilla style attacks.
There was not a lot of support for the mechanism that predicted insurgents would seek to
wait out their target state. As previously detailed, the FMLN’s original strategy was to quickly
defeat the government early in the conflict with a significant military drive toward the capital
that was supposed to be supported by ordinary Salvadorans. Following that defeat, the FMLN
sought to reorganize itself to continue the military struggle against the government. Lulls in the
intensity of fighting during the conflict generally reflected the FMLN’s desire to prepare for the
next assault on government forces, and it does not appear that the FMLN adopted a strategy of
strategically waiting for the Salvadoran government to crumble.
Conclusion
The proposition that transnational sanctuaries make insurgent groups much more likely to
succeed is difficult to defend in light of the case of El Salvador. The primary transnational
sanctuary in Nicaragua provided all of the purported benefits of sanctuary to a very capable
fighting force who was opposed by a deeply divided regime whose external support was often a
congressional vote away from being curtailed or cut off. The conventional account of
transnational sanctuary would posit that the presence of a transnational sanctuary should be
correlated with FMLN victory, and, the extensive benefits of the sanctuary in Nicaragua should
indicate that the FMLN were all the more likely to win. It is tempting to consider that the
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decision to scale back the extent of sanctuary in Nicaragua explains the FMLN’s inability to
seize power through military force. Yet, that conclusion is not supported by the facts. The
FMLN’s period of greatest relative strength vis-à-vis ESAF was at the outset of the conflict, after
which it declined in the face of massive US assistance to the Salvadoran government. US
assistance to ESAF appeared to outstrip whatever additional qualitative and quantitative gains
could be had via transnational sanctuary. It also appears that in the early years of the conflict
when aid was being given in very large quantities that the pressure from outside supporters of the
FMLN to overthrow the regime early led to an early and costly loss in the FMLN’s first “Final
Offensive.”
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Chapter Six
The War in Vietnam: Sanctuary and External Intervention

Map 6.1 Infiltration Routes into Vietnam and U.S. Air Bases in Southeast Asia (Whitcomb 1997)

The case study in this chapter about Vietnam demonstrates how sanctuary aids insurgents
fighting against an external intervener. This is not a crucial case for testing the predictive power
of my refined version of the conventional wisdom; both my refined version and the conventional
wisdom predict that the challengers with sanctuary should win. While my refined version of the
conventional wisdom does not diverge from the conventional wisdom on how this case should
110

end, my causal argument differs from that of the conventional wisdom. The conventional
wisdom’s explanation focuses on the ways in which sanctuary allows insurgents and rebels to
increase their fighting power on the way to defeating incumbent military forces. In Chapter One,
I presented four causal mechanisms: the stopping power of international borders and the relative
protection from attack for insurgents and rebels in sanctuaries; the “waiting game” that
challengers may play out in sanctuaries; an organizational inflection point that limits insurgent
and rebel organizations from concentrating too large a conventional military force against
incumbent forces with superior firepower; and the inability of external interveners to create
lasting governments in the countries in which they intervene. All four mechanisms will be
analyzed in this case.
I find that all four of these mechanisms are present in this case as is the conventional
wisdom’s prediction that sanctuary enhances the fighting power of insurgents and rebels.
However, the conventional wisdom’s explanation of relatively enhancing the fighting power of
insurgents does not provide a satisfactory explanation of how the war ended and why the
government in South Vietnam eventually fell in April 1975. Rather than turning the National
Liberation Front (NLF) forces into a military machine that could run over the combined U.S.South Vietnamese forces, sanctuary in neighboring states allowed the NLF and North
Vietnamese forces to maintain a presence in the south until American ground forces withdrew.
The U.S. commitment to negotiating an end to the war beginning in 1968 coupled with the
generally perceived poor performance of the South Vietnamese government kept many South
Vietnamese citizens from supporting the government in Saigon (the capital of South Vietnam).
With little risk of facing a do-or-die situation where the NLF and North Vietnamese would have
to commit most of their forces to prevent a mass defection of the South Vietnamese peasantry to
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the government’s side, the communist forces opposing the government could choose how
intensely they wished to fight because of the relative security of their external sanctuaries. This
evidence from this case strongly supports the contention set out in Mechanism Four that
insurgencies face upper limits on how large a conventional force they can amass. Insurgencies
that attempt to operate like conventional armies run the risk of exposing themselves to the
greater firepower of the incumbent forces. On three occasions—1964, 1967-68, 1972—
communist forces jettisoned guerrilla tactics and undertook conventional offensives. All three
failed to achieve their ultimate goal of toppling the Saigon government, and the attackers
suffered staggering casualties each time. The final offensive launched by the north in 1975, and
the offensive that succeeded, occurred once the U.S. had decided that it would not massively
intervene with air power to save the South Vietnamese armed forces.
The choice to include Vietnam in a dissertation that largely focuses on insurgency,
rebellion, and internal war may be considered inappropriate by those who are of the view that the
war in Vietnam was largely a conventional interstate war, and the insurgency in the south was an
unimportant sideshow to the larger conflict.52 To be sure, the war in Vietnam is different than
many of the other civil wars and insurgencies included in this dissertation’s list of post-1945
insurgencies and civil wars. The Vietnamese were divided as a result of the end of France’s
Indochina War, and North Vietnam was actively aiding the resistance in the south, including
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There are others who argue the opposing position: namely, that the U.S. lost because it did not
pay enough attention to unconventional or irregular war and incorrectly tried to adapt
conventional strategy and tactics to an unconventional conflict. There are several different ways
of viewing the war in Vietnam: an interstate war between North and South Vietnam with
significant external intervention on both sides; a communist insurgency against the South
Vietnamese government; and an interstate war between the U.S. and North Vietnam are
additional ways of looking at the U.S. war in Vietnam beyond the approach here, which analyzes
the fight between the U.S. and communist insurgents in South Vietnam.
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sending in North Vietnamese troops to fight in the south. That kind and degree of support from
transnational sanctuary is rare.53 Once the U.S. withdrew, it was not the insurgency that was
primarily responsible for toppling the government in South Vietnam, but the conventional forces
of the north.54 How the war ended cannot be debated, but it is wrong to dismiss the power that
the insurgency had, and may have regained, given more time. The insurgency in the south was so
potent by 1964 that America felt that it had to significantly increase the numbers of American
soldiers in South Vietnam to keep the government from collapsing. Furthermore, the insurgency
in the south should be studied because combating it was a significant focus of the external
intervener and the regime in power in the south.
This chapter presents a brief overview of the conflict, a description of the sanctuaries in
neighboring states and the efforts by the U.S. and South Vietnam to degrade those sanctuaries in
neighboring states, and analyses of the four causal mechanisms. Finally, I assess the logic of the
conventional explanation about how sanctuary aids insurgent groups against my refined version
with the four causal mechanisms to see if the refined version has any greater explanatory power
than the conventional wisdom.

53

Unlike in just about every other case of transnational sanctuary, in Vietnam, the primary
responsibility for building and maintaining the insurgent group’s transnational sanctuary was a
state government. The NLF and their military arm, the NLAF, did not view the Ho Chi Minh
Trail as existentially important and did not have the resources to construct and maintain such an
elaborate logistical system by themselves. [I am not sure I understand this; can you say more?]
54
One of the two main sources of opposition to the Saigon government were from South
Vietnamese insurgents, who were part of the NLF, or its military arm, the NLAF. These forces
are sometimes referred to as the Viet Cong in the literature. The other source came from North
Vietnam. Those units and soldiers are referred to as being part of the North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) or the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN).
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Overview of the Conflict
The causes of the onset of the war in Vietnam stemmed from the previous 1954 Geneva
Accords, which dealt with the end of the French Indochina War. The Geneva Accords called for
the holding of national democratic elections in Vietnam in 1956, but neither the U.S. nor South
Vietnam signed the Accords. The NLF formed in 1960 and began its insurgency against South
Vietnam (Dembowski 2009). The NLF won a number of early engagements against the South
Vietnamese Armed Forces (ARVN) in some of the areas surrounding Saigon. Those victories
coupled with the NLAF’s transition to more conventional operations in the hopes of defeating
the armed forces of South Vietnam led the U.S. to significantly increase the number of ground
troops it had in South Vietnam and to increase its bombing of communist supply lines through
Laos. The U.S. buildup resulted in 184,000 American soldiers in Vietnam by the end of 1965 and
385,000 by the end of 1966 (Brush 1996; Dembowski 2009).
U.S. troops in South Vietnam performed a variety of roles, from training ARVN forces
and providing defense for civilian development, to seeking out and fighting insurgents. It was
becoming clear to American leaders by 1966 that the bombing campaign was not sufficiently
stemming the supply of recruits and provisions south and that more soldiers were needed to
effectively combat the growing insurgency. The NLF believed their position to be sufficiently
strong by 1967 to launch their “General Offensive, General Uprising,” which was supposed to be
the start of the final military operations necessary to defeat the ARVN forces and force the fall of
the government in South Vietnam. The culmination of this big push to topple the government in
Saigon was the Tet Offensive of 1968; however, it failed in its ultimate objective of toppling the
Saigon government and bringing the war to a close. It did, however, greatly impact the dynamics
of the conflict. The NLF forces absorbed staggering casualties that forced the organization to
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return to guerrilla warfare for an extended period of time, and caused it to rely much more
heavily on recruits from the north to replace the losses among southerners. It appears that the Tet
Offensive convinced President Johnson not to seek an additional term as U.S. President. He
called for a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and pledged to work to end the war. The U.S.
strategy from the time it introduced combat troops in Vietnam in 1965 until 1968 was an attrition
strategy (Dembowski 2009); the U.S. sought to kill or capture the communists in the south who
would take up arms until there were so few left that it would not seriously endanger the existence
of the South Vietnamese regime. Johnson’s successor would attempt a policy named
Vietnamization.
U.S. President Richard Nixon claimed to seek “honorable peace” for the United States in
Vietnam (the phrase “peace with honor” was not used by Nixon until 1973). Operationalized,
honorable peace meant that the U.S. was going to turn over greater responsibility for South
Vietnam’s future to the South Vietnamese, particularly when it came to security, bombing the
NLAF sanctuaries in neutral Cambodia, and trying to get the Soviet Union and the Chinese to
pressure the North Vietnamese to accept a ceasefire that would allow South Vietnam to remain
an independent country. The insurgency in the south continued through Nixon’s first term, while
the war for the Ho Chi Minh Trail escalated. North Vietnam, perhaps believing that the
drawdown in U.S. soldiers in the south made it vulnerable to attack, launched its next “final
offensive” against the south while the U.S. was actively and substantially fighting in Vietnam.
Nixon responded to the 1972 offensive with a resumption of massive bombing of North Vietnam
dubbed Operation Linebacker I and II that led to what is generally perceived as yet another
unsuccessful conventional attack on the south (Banner 1993).
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Sanctuaries in Neighboring States
Infiltration routes, the routes that were used to transit fighters and supplies to South
Vietnam, were closely related to the presence of transnational sanctuaries. North Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia were the three states in which communist forces in the south had sanctuaries. The
sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia were, for the most part, adjuncts to the Ho Chi Minh Trail that
served many logistical functions—fueling stations, barracks, ammunition storage sites, and
stockpiles of food. These bases were also spaces where soldiers could receive medical treatment
and training and gain some relative respite from the conflict. Occasionally, the sanctuary sites
directly participated in support of offensives into the south, such as the artillery support for the
attack on the American base at Khe Sanh. The sanctuaries in neighboring Cambodia and Laos
were used by NLAF and PAVN forces to escape pursuit by American and ARVN forces, and
because of the bases’ proximity to South Vietnam, allowed the NLAF to quickly regain its
influence (Dembowski 2009).
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Map 6.2 Insurgent Bases in Laos. This map shows the approximation of insurgent base areas
(numbered) in Laos (Vongsavanh 1981).

117

Map 6.3 The 1970 Operations into Camodia. The map in the bottom right hand corner below
shows the position of a number of base areas in Cambodia around 1970 (Map produced by U.S.
Army).
There were four infiltration routes that were available to communist forces at the outset
of the conflict: from North Vietnam through the demilitarized zone to the South;55 the Ho Chi
Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia; infiltration of land forces via the Cambodian port at
Sihanoukville; and infiltration along South Vietnam’s coast via the sea. The infiltration routes
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail are the most directly related to sanctuary—the roads allowed
greater volumes of provisions to be moved south and supplied the bases along the Trail, which in
turn provisioned the fighters in the south. The infiltration along Vietnam’s coast is related to the
sanctuaries in North Vietnam, from which fighters heading south embarked. Over time the

The demilitarized zone (DMZ) ran roughly along the 17th parallel, on South Vietnam’s side of
the border.
55
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communist forces found it very difficult to infiltrate along the coast of South Vietnam, and they
lost the port of Sihanoukville with the successful 1970 military coup that brought Lon Nol to
power in Cambodia. This section will deal primarily with the Ho Chi Minh Trail since it was the
most important infiltration route for insurgent forces, and it survived the entire war.
The North Vietnamese decided to start work on what would become the Ho Chi Minh
Trail in 1959 with the creation of a military unit, designated Unit 559, that was responsible for
the construction of the Trail. The Trail itself was not actually a single trail, but a network of trails
that ran primarily north-south, but also has several routes east to South Vietnam.
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Map 6.4 The Ho Chi Minh Trail (Vongsavanh 1981)

By 1975 the Trail totaled over 10,000 miles, comprised of hundreds of roads connecting
important areas of supply, such as the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong and roads out of
southern China, with fighters in sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, as well as those in the field
in South Vietnam (Whitcomb 1997). Bad weather, chiefly the monsoons, and rough terrain
(high elevations and dense jungle) initially limited the times of the year during which the Trail
could be opened. However, the constant improvement of the roads allowed trucks, and later,
tanks, to drive on them, and many roads were improved so that they could be used in all types of
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weather. The personnel requirements for building and maintaining the Trail were significant
logistical challenges themselves. It is estimated that 50,000 Vietnamese were working on the
Trail, or sites situated along the Trail, at the height of its construction.

Map 6.5 The Ho Chi Minh Trail after 1970 (Vongsavanh 1981)

The Trail became more important to the insurgents as the war continued. Brush (1996)
notes how the composition of the fighters in the south changed as the war changed over time. He
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argues that the war in South Vietnam was primarily a guerrilla conflict before 1968. He cites as
evidence that five-sixths of the insurgent army in the south were members of the NLAF, not
North Vietnamese regular soldiers, and they fought infrequently on the order of about one day a
month. These forces needed very little provisioning, on the order of about thirty tons a day,
which was too little to be able to prevent (Clodfelter 1989, cited in Brush 1996). By 1972, it is
estimated that 90% of the insurgents in the south were in PAVN units. The cause for the
changing composition of the southern insurgency was a result of the massive losses suffered by
NLF/NLAF in the 1967-1968 “General Offensive, General Uprising” and the 1968 Tet
Offensive. The North Vietnamese PAVN units that eventually replaced the decimated NLF/
NLAF units had much greater logistical demands, and so the infiltration routes became relatively
more important to communist forces from 1968 until the end of the war (Brush 1996).
Because the U.S. was not willing to send ground forces into the north to destroy the
sources of soldiers and material that transited south, they focused on disrupting that flow as
much as they could. This goal produced two lines of thinking about how best to disrupt the flow
of soldiers and material from north to south through neighboring states and sanctuaries: the
erection of physical barriers to sever the lines of transit and interdiction efforts, largely using air
power, to minimize the numbers of soldiers and amounts of supply reaching the insurgency in
the south.
The idea of large physical barriers to separate the north and south was not new. The
Nguyen dynasty in the south built two large walls to keep the Trinh armies from the north out of
the south as part of a struggle that lasted a century and a half beginning in 1620. The French
considered repeating the Nguyen’s barrier concept to try to contain the insurgency in the north,
but were defeated at Dien Bien Phu before the idea moved into action (Brush 1996).
122

American concern about infiltration into South Vietnam by Vietnamese living in the
north appears to precede the decision by the North Vietnamese to construct what would become
known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail by a year (Brush 1996). Following the Americans’ initial
interest in a physical barrier in 1958, two proposals came up in 1961 for preventing the
infiltration into the south (Brush 1995; Whitcomb 1997). The first was a proposal from the U.S.
military to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, to create a cordon sanitaire along the
Laos-South Vietnam border. The other proposal was for an international force authorized under
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization to be stationed along the DMZ on the north-south border
in Vietnam and across the panhandle in Laos (Brush 1996). Neither of these plans came to
fruition. The U.S. military tried again to get decision-makers to seal the border in Laos in 1964
when General William Westmoreland recommended a regional development project that would
have happened to cross the infiltration routes through Laos. The idea was that an international
force could provide protection, ending the infiltration and allowing the engineers and others to
carry out the development work in Laos (Brush 1996). Rather than institute a barrier, the United
States opted to begin bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1964 (Dommen 1972).
Air power was used against the Trail by the U.S. as early as 1961 in Operations Steel
Tiger and Tiger Hunt (Whitcomb 1997). The ground forces buildup and the initiation of
Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965 failed to stem the flow of fighters south. Because the
bombing did not appear to be accomplishing the goal of sufficiently disrupting the flow of
soldiers and supplies south,56 American military leaders urged Secretary of Defense McNamara
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A study conducted by the Jason Group in July 1966 concluded that Operation Rolling Thunder
had “no measurable effect on Hanoi’s ability to mount and support military operations in the
South” (quoted in Brush 1996). The Jason Group (also referred to as the Jason Division, or
Jasons, depending on the source) were a group of American academics who provided advice to
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to widen the war by sending ground soldiers into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam to destroy
sanctuaries and convince those states to refrain from aiding the southern insurgency (Brush
1996).
McNamara, wary about the prospects for escalation, sought another way to deal with the
problem of infiltration into the south. In 1966, a group of academics known as the Jasons advised
the construction of a pair of barriers to reduce infiltration. The first barrier, on South Vietnam’s
side of the DMZ with the north, would be composed of sensors that would direct aircraft and
would also enable soldiers to respond to breaches of the DMZ (Brush 1996). The second barrier
also called for sensors and mines to be dropped along the infiltration routes in Laos. The sensors
would indicate where air power should be directed and the mines were placed to maim those who
used the Trail, and to impede its use by others. The U.S. Military Command, Vietnam (MACV),
altered the proposal with a call for erecting considerable physical barriers to movement and
attack, such as the use of barbed wire, clearing swathes of land, and sensors to direct artillery.
This proposal was, in effect, a call to create a Morice Line in Vietnam. The Morice Line referred
to the series of fortifications the French built on Algeria’s border with Tunisia (see Horne 1977).
This idea almost certainly came from this Morice Line, given that the proposal for the barrier in
Vietnam was identical in many respects (Brush 1996).
However, neither the Jasons’ original proposal nor the MACV alternative were initially
implemented because the sensors that were appropriated for the barrier, and were supposed to be
in place by November, 1967, were instead diverted to prevent the overrunning of the U.S.
Marine base at Khe Sanh that was a part of the North Vietnamese “General Offensive, General

top American policymakers throughout the 1960s and the group was a part of the Institute for
Defense Analyses.
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Uprising” from 1967 until 1968 (Brush 1996). Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, replacing
McNamara, who resigned at the end of February 1968, announced in March 1969 that the barrier
project had been cancelled because “It did not work out as expected” (Quoted in Correll 2004).
American air power gradually turned from attacking North Vietnam to attacking the
infiltration routes. U.S. President Johnson initially believed that increased bombing of the north
would dissuade them from supporting the insurgency in the south, but he halted the bombing of
most of Vietnam on March 31, 1968, and subsequently redirected American air power against
the south and against the infiltration routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos (Brush 1996).
Whitcomb states that the bombing halt on North Vietnam freed up hundreds of American aircraft
for missions against the Trail in Laos.
From 1968 until 1972, the U.S. carried out a very technologically sophisticated air
interdiction effort against those using the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Trail itself. Aircraft and
some special operations units placed electronic sensors along the Trail. The sensors were quite
advanced. Some detected sound, vibration, chemicals, and smell. Aircraft surveilled the Trail
looking for signs of infiltration and relayed signals from ground sensors back to the Infiltration
Surveillance Center in Thailand, which then relayed the information to aircraft that were sent to
attack the Trail. The U.S. created an aircraft for the task of destroying trucks, which were the
primary means of moving supplies as the war went on.57 The Trail was repeatedly mined from
the air as well (Banner 1993; Brush 1996).
Despite the technological sophistication of the equipment used in the interdiction effort
and the increased focus on countering infiltration from 1968 on, U.S. air power was unable to
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Supplies were also moved by human beings and sometimes were packed in airtight barrels and
floated downstream (Dommen 1972).
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destroy enough of the supplies going south to significantly threaten the survival of the
insurgency.58 The air interdiction effort failed to destroy enough supplies and stop enough men
for three reasons: it was mitigated by the countermeasures the NLAF and PAVN took; air power
rarely dismantled sanctuary infrastructure; and the insurgency managed to be flexible in its
logistical requirements.
Air interdiction efforts could destroy what it could find, but it missed a lot because the
communist forces adjusted their methods of infiltration and took countermeasures to fool the
sensors. Communist forces operated more at night and less during the day, they used herds of
livestock to fool the vibration sensors, and they hung buckets of urine in trees to fool the sensors
that detected smell (Brush 1996). They re-used damaged or unusable trucks as decoys so larger
convoys could pass or to lure aircraft into an ambush from ground-based antiaircraft. The North
Vietnamese engineers tasked with building the Trail used camouflage to hide some parts so well
that the Americans never found them during the course of the war (Correll 2004; Whitcomb
1997). The introduction of surface-to-air missiles on the Trail, at least by 1972, if not earlier,
reduced the number of aircraft that could safely strike the Trail. The North Vietnamese invested
heavily in air defense for the Trail. The antiaircraft defenses were so dense in some parts of Laos
along the border with South Vietnam that there was very little air support for the ground forces
incursions into Laos (Whitcomb 1997).
The sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos were not actually physically destroyed until late in
the war, when America was publicly committed to leaving Vietnam, and even then, there was
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This is despite a very large increase in the number of Vietnamese trucks thought to have been
destroyed on the Trail. Dommen cites a 1971 Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation
that found that the number of trucks thought to be destroyed on the Trail increased from “7,332
in 1968, (to) 9,012 in 1969, and 12,368 in 1970.”
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little done to prevent communist forces from rebuilding them. Prior to the Nixon Administration,
large numbers of U.S. forces did not frequently cross the border into Laos or Cambodia to
destroy sanctuaries.59 However, a large joint ARVN-U.S. incursion into Cambodia to destroy the
sanctuaries there took place between May and June 1970. In Laos the following year, Operation
Lam Son 719 was an attack by 15,000 ARVN and American soldiers against sanctuaries near the
border with South Vietnam (Starry 1999). But this significant incursion into Laos, late as it was,
is largely regarded as a failure. While ARVN and American forces successfully destroyed vast
stores of supplies in these neighboring bases, they were not able to significantly impair the
logistical effort on the Trail for even a small amount of time (Whitcomb 1997). North
Vietnamese forces in Laos and the Laotian communists, the Pathet Lao, met the advance and
managed to send the South Vietnamese back after a three-week operation.
Finally, the logistical needs of the insurgency, even with the growing demands from
PAVN units, were quite modest and did not require all that much supply to get through.
Insurgent units that ran short of soldiers and/or ammunition would revert back to guerrilla
warfare until they could be resupplied or brought up to full strength.
To recapitulate, the Ho Chi Minh Trail became more important both for the communist
and American-aligned forces from 1968 until the end of the war. The insurgency needed soldiers

Starry’s (1989) record of the amounts of supplies captured during the Cambodian raids gives a
sense of how extensively the sanctuaries were developed through 1970:
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“By the end of June free world forces in Cambodia had captured or destroyed almost ten
thousand tons of materiel and food. In terms of enemy needs this amount was enough rice
to feed more than 25,000 troops a full ration for an entire year; individual weapons to
equip 55 full-strength battalions; crew-served weapons to equip 33 full battalions; and
mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle ammunition for more than 9,000 average attacks
against free world units. In all, 11,362 enemy soldiers were killed and over 2,000
captured.”
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from North Vietnam to fight in the south, those soldiers brought with them increased logistical
demands, and American aircraft was largely redirected south and west after the 1968 bombing
halt on North Vietnam. The Trail would only increase in importance for the insurgency as
infiltration by sea became precarious, and the port of Sihanoukville was lost as an infiltration
route after 1970.
Causal Mechanisms
This is the only case that allows for a direct test of all four causal mechanisms that
support my refined conventional wisdom. The causal argument I advance holds up well in the
case of Vietnam. All of the causal mechanisms receive strong support in this case, except for the
one that predicts that sanctuary confers relative protection from attack, which only receives
limited support from this case.
This case provides some limited support for the causal mechanism that predicts
insurgents receive relative protection from attack from transnational sanctuaries. Diplomatic
concerns restrained American action in all three sanctuary states to a greater degree than the U.S.
felt constrained in their actions within South Vietnam. Escalating the conflict in any of the
neighboring states, either by increasing the intensity of bombing, including using nuclear
weapons, or sending in ground forces, risked weakening the U.S. position in Southeast Asia. The
U.S. experience in Korea appears to have strongly influenced its behavior in Vietnam. The U.S.
leadership did not want the Chinese to massively intervene in Vietnam with ground forces, as
they had in Korea. The United States could not engage in regime change or occupation of North
Vietnam to win the war in the South. In Cambodia, too, the U.S. was reluctant to engage in
attacks that would have possibly led to the ousting of an officially neutral government and
replacing it with a communist one. Political stability in Laos was more precarious than
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Cambodia. Despite having a vigorous communist insurgent group, the Pathet Lao in Laos, the
government was officially neutral in the conflict in Vietnam because neighboring and outside
powers wanted it to be. The Pathet Lao with North Vietnam’s backing was likely strong enough
to overthrow the government in Vientiane, but the North Vietnamese did not help their Pathet
Lao allies60 overthrow the tripartite government in Laos61 as long as the U.S. continued to
observe the Geneva Accords, in which the parties agreed to keep Laos neutral. Although a party
to those Geneva Accords, North Vietnam still used Laotian territory for the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
aided by their Pathet Lao allies, who insisted the Trail remain secret (Whitcomb 1997). The U.S.
feared that committing a large ground force to Laos in order to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail would
have given the North Vietnamese an excuse to help the Pathet Lao overthrow the government
and the entire north of the country would fall. Moreover, many in the U.S. feared that even if
they were able to establish an effective barrier in Laos that the Vietnamese would simply
infiltrate supplies through Cambodia, defeating the purpose of any invasion of Laos (Banner
1993).
Because the United States was concerned about the countermoves of others arising from
any move it made to curtail infiltration and root out the sanctuaries in neighboring states, it
pursued measures, such as aerial interdiction, for much of the war that were less than optimal for
pursuing their objectives. Erecting a physical barrier across Laos and stationing large numbers of
soldiers there would have been preferable from the point of view of ending infiltration into South
Vietnam and eliminating sanctuaries in southern Laos and Cambodia, but the U.S. believed that
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Donnen argues that tensions between the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese came under strain
in 1970.
61
This was the solution arrived at by fourteen states during the Geneva conference on Laos
between 1961 and 1962.The government was composed of Royalists, Neutralists, and
Communists (Whitcomb 1997).
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that would have given an excuse to the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese to topple the
tripartite government in Laos and replace it with a communist one. That would have been a
setback for broader U.S. aims that called for containing the spread of communism. The U.S.
frequently used special operations forces to gather intelligence on the Trail, but only very late in
the war did the U.S. commit very substantial ground forces into Cambodia to attempt to destroy
the sanctuaries there, and that happened after a coup in Cambodia that brought about a more USfriendly regime. The 1971 attacks against sanctuaries in Laos lasted several weeks, but was
strongly contested by the North Vietnamese Army in Laos, contributing to the larger failure of
the operation. Compared to the extent to which U.S. and ARVN ground forces were used in
South Vietnam against NLAF and PAVN forces, those Vietnamese in sanctuaries in neighboring
states were relatively more protected than those in South Vietnam where both the U.S. and
ARVN forces had a fixed presence.
The mechanism that predicts insurgents may wait out counterinsurgents is only partially
confirmed in this case. The Vietnamese who were fighting the South Vietnamese government did
not leave South Vietnam to go to Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam to wait for the U.S. to
withdraw before resuming the war against Saigon. The insurgency, though its strength waxed
and waned over time, continued the length of the war. For reasons just explained in the review of
the first causal mechanism and for reasons that will be discussed in the third, the Vietnamese
communists did not feel that they needed to commit most of their forces to force the U.S. to
withdraw. The North Vietnamese were well aware of the antiwar movement in the United States
and probably knew that it could not win a conventional fight against a nuclear power, and so
continued the insurgency to keep the government in Saigon from winning over the people of
South Vietnam, while waiting for the U.S. to withdraw. As long as the government in Saigon
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appeared too corrupt and ineffective for many South Vietnamese, insurgency was a way of
keeping a military solution open while waiting out the Americans.
Sanctuary also facilitated three general offensives against South Vietnam launched in
1964, 1967-68, and 1972. The relative protection from attack that was described in Mechanism
One, coupled with the extensive Trail network in Laos and Cambodia, permitted large numbers
of troops, vehicles, supplies, and ammunition to be moved near South Vietnam’s borders prior to
attack. Therefore, the relative protection from attack analyzed in Mechanism One should not be
understood as solely a defensive boon for insurgents, as the relative protection from attack
enabled them to launch significant offensives. However, as will be explained in Mechanism
Four, below, those offensives were usually ruinous for the attackers as long as the U.S. was
willing to use its considerable firepower to aid the South Vietnamese government.
This evidence in this case generally supports the mechanism that predicts that insurgents
face an organizational inflection point. The NLAF and PAVN launched three conventional
attacks that failed to achieve their ultimate objectives at the time and cost them dearly. The 1964,
1967-68, and 1972 offensives were conventional assaults supported by guerrilla-style attacks,
and all three demonstrate the dangers of premature concentration of military forces against foes
with vastly superior firepower. As I explained in the analysis of the second mechanism,
sanctuaries in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia facilitated the three large offensives that
occurred during the period of significant U.S. involvement. This appears to be strong support for
the conventional explanation of sanctuary, which argues that sanctuaries allow insurgents to
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increase their relative military power on the way to militarily defeating the incumbent regime. 62
U.S. air power, which was only partially successful in its air interdiction operation against the
Trail and sanctuaries in neighboring states, played a significant role in defeating the 1964 and
1972 offensives. The 1968 Tet Offensive is often explained as a mixed success for the
insurgents in South Vietnam. The scale of the offensive further eroded U.S. public support for
the war, but the South Vietnamese composition of the insurgency was decimated by the losses
from the conflict.
This case strongly supports the mechanism that predicts that external interveners are
likely to fail at building viable states in other countries. The U.S. attempted to increase the
fighting capability of ARVN and encourage the government in South Vietnam to make reforms
that would win over a significant share of the population. It was relatively more successful at
strengthening South Vietnam’s military than reforming its government. Dembowski (2009)
concluded that the U.S. adviser mission for the military region encompassing Saigon left its
ARVN counterpart in a reasonably good condition, although there was still much improvement
ARVN would benefit from, but the government failed to enact reforms to dispel widespread
perceptions of corruption and ineffectiveness about the Saigon government. The military was
slow to enact reforms that would have hastened a more meritocratic officer corps, and the
government’s land reform program redistributed very little land and largely confirmed land
redistributions carried out by the insurgents.

It is unclear if it is even true that sanctuary enhanced the insurgency’s relative military power
as the U.S. undertook a significant buildup of personnel in South Vietnam between 1965 and
1968, while simultaneously continuing its adviser mission to enhance the capabilities of ARVN.
62
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In retrospect, it is easy to understand why the Saigon government was not able to embed
itself firmly in society, and why it constantly relied on outside support, primarily from the United
States, to maintain itself. Ngo Dinh Diem was the first significant autocratic ruler of the Republic
of Vietnam. That his overthrow and assassination in November, 1963, was greeted with
rejoicing throughout South Vietnam should give some indication of his popularity. However,
what followed was a string of successions that provided little continuity for policy over the long
term and preoccupied sitting South Vietnamese leaders with the task of fending off rivals for
their position rather than building a durable state.
The American commitment to leave Vietnam likely undermined those who considered
supporting the regime among the people of South Vietnam. Few were willing to step forward to
embrace a regime that had behaved so badly toward its own people, many of whom came to
believe that the Saigon government would lose the war. With that possibility very much in the
forefront of South Vietnamese minds, the fear of post-war retribution by the communists kept
many Vietnamese from embracing the government in the south.
Conclusion
All four mechanisms that I proposed to explain a refined version of the conventional
wisdom were expected to be well tested in this case, and the case of Vietnam presented strong
support for all four mechanisms. Specifically, insurgents used the relative protection from attack
conferred by transnational sanctuary to choose how strongly they wanted to challenge the U.S.
and South Vietnamese forces, while the U.S. was unable to create a domestically constituted
regime that could endure once the U.S. withdrew. The apparent presence of an organizational
inflection point for insurgent groups was strongly supported by the three disastrous conventional
offensives launched by the NLAF and PAVN, indicating the limits of the conventional
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explanation’s increased relative military power argument. It is unclear if the presence of
sanctuary actually increased the relative military power of the insurgents because so many
variables affect military power and were constantly in flux, and many are difficult to measure.
None of this means that transnational sanctuary is unimportant. All sides of the conflict in
Vietnam recognized the importance of transnational sanctuary for the NLAF and PAVN; they
likely would not have been able to defeat the government in South Vietnam without bases and
Trail in Laos and Cambodia. The conventional wisdom’s predictions about the kind of benefits
that insurgents would receive in those external base areas—training, rest, infiltration, planning—
were present. Those bases were important though, not because they created more deadly
insurgents, but because it allowed the NLAF and PAVN to remain in the fight until the U.S.
withdrew. Following the U.S. withdrawal, the next conventional offensive against the south
routed the South Vietnamese armed forces and led to the collapse of the Saigon government.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
This dissertation asks whether transnational sanctuary helps challengers in civil wars and
insurgencies defeat the incumbent regime, and, if so, how? I argue that insurgents with sanctuary
are more likely to win against external interveners, but not domestically constituted regimes,
because the relative protection from attack conferred by sanctuary allows insurgents to wait for
the external intervener to withdraw. Insurgents may materially benefit from sanctuary in a
neighboring state, but it rarely allows insurgents to approach or surpass parity with the
incumbent, regardless of whether it is an external intervener or a domestically constituted
regime. Four causal mechanisms explain this result: the stopping power of international borders;
the “waiting game” that insurgents pursue in sanctuaries against external interveners; an
organizational inflection point in insurgent organizations; and, the inability of external
interveners to create durable domestically constituted regimes where they did not previously
exist. Below, I summarize the findings with respect to these four mechanisms from the cases
detailed in this dissertation and from cases not included.
This dissertation relies on a bargaining framework of insurgency to explain why
transnational sanctuary aids insurgents opposing external interveners most of the time, but also
why they do not beat domestically constituted governments more frequently than those groups
without sanctuary. Force and the willingness to use it seem to decide the outcome of insurgencies
examined in this study. By their very nature, insurgents tend to lack military force relative to the
regimes that they challenge.63 Therefore, they need to either increase their relative military
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Interestingly, many of the cases of external intervener-led counterinsurgency were those where
challengers posed a great threat to the regime in power. The challengers were not necessarily
militarily stronger than the incumbent government, but they were relatively stronger than many
of their peers, and appeared to present an existential and immediate challenge to their
governments. Some of the cases where insurgents’ relative military strength was a cause for
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power or they must weaken the resolve of the incumbent regime to continue to resist the
demands of the challengers.64 Most challengers begin at a significant disadvantage when it
comes to the ability to project military force and most groups are unable to achieve parity with a
state’s military forces. Because the stakes are often higher for domestically constituted regimes
than for external interveners (who may lose an election or prestige at home), insurgents are likely
to have a relatively easier time wearing down the resolve of external interveners. Because many
external interventions occur to stave off the defeat of an ally, ending the external intervention
often means a return to a precarious status quo where the incumbent government faces the
possibility of a military defeat.
Can external interveners prevent a return to the negative pre-intervention status quo? Not
usually. There are two ways this could happen: strengthening the regime so it can resist future
attacks, or permanently degrading the armed resistance to the regime. Most external interveners
choose to pursue both. Despite considerable efforts by a number of external interveners spanning
several decades, almost all have failed to find a way to make the temporary balance of forces
brought about by external intervention permanent. External interveners may temporarily redress

external intervention, or led to a significant escalation in an ongoing intervention (in the case of
colonial or imperial conflicts) to prop up an embattled ally include the U.S. in South Vietnam,
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the French in Algeria. The British also faced a number of
military challenges that precipitated various degrees of intervention in Malaya, Kenya, and
Oman. While it was not a cause of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, many worry that the
current Afghan government may not be able to defeat the Taliban should the International
Security Assistance Force withdraw. Here, the Taliban’s perceived strength is a cause for the
continued international intervention by the U.S. and others.
64
I am referring to the projection of conventional military forces, especially ground forces.
While it is true that many insurgent groups seek to avoid government forces as much as possible
in the opening phase of a conflict, their ultimate aims often require them to develop conventional
military forces that can defeat those of the regime they seek to replace. Controlling the
countryside and using guerrilla warfare alone have won few victories, and conventional warfare
is often necessary for the challengers to take and keep urban areas.
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the balance of forces more favorably for their client, but that favorable balance usually only lasts
as long as the external intervener chooses to continue devoting substantial resources to that
country.
The evidence presented in Chapter Two demonstrated that: Insurgencies against external
interveners are much more successful than against domestically constituted regimes, regardless
of the presence of sanctuary;65 groups with sanctuary fighting against external interveners tend to
win more often than those groups without sanctuary fighting external interveners; however, even
those groups without sanctuary fighting against external interveners win more frequently than
groups fighting domestically constituted regimes, regardless of sanctuary. However, groups with
sanctuary fighting domestically constituted regimes do win about 50% more frequently than
groups without sanctuary, although both lose about a third of the time. Those results in Box 1
create a bit of a problem for testing my refined explanation because it is one of the two boxes
where my refined version predicts different outcomes than the conventional wisdom, but both
explanations explain the same percentage of outcomes, making any definititive conclusion
difficult. However, Box 4 has an unusually high number of ongoing cases, about a third of all
Box 4 cases are ongoing, and 45% of all Box 4 cases fall outside of the Insurgent Win/ Insurgent
Loss dichotomy, which means a few insurgent victories could significantly raise the relative
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This is an interesting finding for a couple of reasons. First, these conflicts often demonstrate
greater disparities in military force between the challengers and incumbents than in cases where
domestically constituted regimes are left to fight challengers. This indicates that even an
overwhelming imbalance of military capabilities in favor of the incumbent may not be enough to
achieve victory in civil wars and insurgencies. Second, it is also interesting that many of these
groups have what can be described as maximalist aims. These groups almost always sought the
replacement of the current regime with a new one. Taken together, this is an unexpected finding
given the bargaining model on which I have relied—groups that are vastly inferior in military
power relative to the incumbents that they face achieve their maximalist aims more often than
insurgents with a more favorable balance of power, often less than maximalist goals, fighting a
domestically constituted regime.
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insurgent win percentage.66 These findings largely confirm my refined version of the
conventional wisdom about sanctuary and challenger success: groups with sanctuary are more
likely to win than those without it when the target regime is an external intervener. Sanctuary is
not likely to be decisive for groups opposed to a domestically constituted regime. This begins to
address the first question in this dissertation—does sanctuary help insurgents win? But Chapter
Two has not addressed the second question—how does sanctuary aid insurgents? I argue that
sanctuary does, in fact, confer a number of benefits to insurgents, but it is the relative protection
from attack that is most important for insurgent success. Insurgents wait for the external
intervener to leave before more fully engaging the regime left in place. The four case studies that
followed Chapter Two illustrate how insurgents have fought both external interveners and
domestically constituted governments with and without sanctuary.
Before I summarize the causal mechanisms that collectively challenge the conventional
wisdom, I have to admit that the conventional wisdom gets a lot correct. Sanctuary provides
insurgents with many, if not all, of the benefits articulated in the conventional wisdom:
insurgents benefit from the arming, training, recruiting, protection from attack, and provision of
medical services. Not only does sanctuary confer those benefits, but the conventional wisdom is
also correct in observing that many groups with sanctuary in neighboring states frequently win.
The tendency of insurgents with sanctuary to win is most evident in those cases where they
oppose an external intervener. The data compiled in Chapter Two also supports the conventional
wisdom: insurgents with sanctuary fighting domestically constituted regimes win about 50%
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Recoding Abkhazia seccession from Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan as
insurgent victories would reduce the difference in insurgent win percentage with/without
sanctuary from 32:21 to 32:29. Box 1 does not have any ongoing conflicts that appear likely to
result in insurgent victories as of June 2017.
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more frequently than insurgents without sanctuary, although insurgent groups lose at nearly
identical rates. But while the conventional wisdom gets a lot of the details about sanctuary
correct, the big conclusion—those groups are likely to win because of it—finds little support in
this dissertation. Because the conventional wisdom is largely unsupported, its policy implications
for counterinsurgents—widening a war to sanctuary states, construction of physical barriers, and
coercing sanctuary hosts to get rid of their sanctuaries—may be no more likely to produce
victory.
The first and fourth mechanisms have the most support and are generally confirmed in all
cases. International borders place relative limits on the duration and, sometimes, intensity of
cross-border attacks, and external interveners almost always fail to build enduring regimes
abroad. With respect to the stopping power of international borders, the two cases where
insurgents had transnational sanctuary demonstrate strong support for this mechanism, as do a
number of previous case studies on the same subject, which are not included in this dissertation.
There is mixed support for the third causal mechanism, the organizational inflection point for
insurgent organizations. Vietnam and El Salvador demonstrated strong support for this
mechanism, while Peru and Kenya did not.
Chapter Two reported a strong correlation between external interveners losing and
insurgents using transnational sanctuary, which lent support to the conventional wisdom that
transnational sanctuary helps insurgents win when they otherwise would not. The qualitative data
relevant to mechanism three provides a rival explanation: external interveners lost most of those
conflicts because they could not create enduring governments and the presence of transnational
sanctuary was a correlation. The Vietnam and Kenya cases demonstrate strong support for this
causal mechanism, and evidence from previous research conducted outside of this dissertation
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confirm this finding. The U.S. in Vietnam and Soviet Union in Afghanistan both witnessed the
fall of regimes they put in place not long after withdrawing. The British were slightly more
successful at cultivating a pro-British elite in Kenya, but that was only after they were unable to
keep the colony under British control. In Rhodesia, the white settler government, which does not
meet the definition of an external intervener despite its historical ties to European colonialism,
was so much reduced by the end of its civil war that many of the remaining supporters were able
to pack up and leave. That kind of resolution to a civil war or insurgency appears to be rare and
proves the rule that domestically constituted governments that have the support of significant
sections of the population are difficult to topple through armed struggle. I have to admit that this
mechanism is probably less true prior to 1945, and so it may prove to be less true in the future if
the norm prohibiting foreign conquest erodes. The world prior to 1945 is replete with cases of
successful colonizers and empire-builders who constructed orders that lasted, in some cases,
hundreds of years. Since 1945, there has been strong condemnation of conquest and formal
empire. The United Nations Security Council would primarily address conquest while the U.N.’s
Trusteeship Council was to work in conjunction with the Security Council to oversee
independence for those non-self-governing territories who wished to be independent. Whether
empire fell out of fashion because of the interests of Great Powers, international institutions, or
normative shifts (Fazal 2007) is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but if those are some of the
causes for the decline of empire, their reversal may portend empire’s future reemergence.
The second mechanism, the “waiting game,” insurgents may carry out in sanctuaries
against external interveners, receives only limited support from the evidence presented in this
dissertation. Insurgents use sanctuary for more than just waiting for the external intervener to
withdraw. The two cases of insurgency against external interveners only provide limited support
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for mechanism two. Several large offensives were launched against American and South
Vietnamese forces during America’s Vietnam War; the Vietnamese who opposed the U.S.
presence were not merely sitting idle in neighboring North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Yet,
they never appeared to feel compelled to risk their entire organizations in a “do-or-die” gamble
to overrun American forces before they became irrelevant. The insurgents alternated between
periods of waiting, infiltrating, building up their strength, and some cases of very large-scale
attacks. While the full case was not presented in this dissertation, the varied uses of sanctuary by
the Viet Cong are very similar to the Afghan mujahedeen’s use of sanctuary in Pakistan. In the
case of the Mau Mau in Kenya where there was no sanctuary in a conflict against an external
intervener, I found no evidence that any significant part of the Mau Mau strategy relied on
waiting for the British to withdraw, although such a withdrawal would have made it easier to
achieve the land reform they sought. They opted for a strategy of direct armed confrontation with
the British, white settlers, and Africans and Asians who supported the government.
It is unclear whether an organizational inflection point exists for all insurgents in all
conflicts. From the cases presented in this dissertation and investigated in prior research,
insurgent organizations appear to incur significant losses when they concentrate their forces in
the face of significant counterinsurgent firepower. If counterinsurgents can strike concentrated
formations of insurgents, often through advantages in airpower and artillery, they inflict severe
losses on insurgents. El Salvador and Vietnam are the two cases that best demonstrate the
potential pitfalls insurgents face when they attempt to concentrate their forces in the face of
technologically advanced counterinsurgents, regardless of whether they are external interveners
or domestically constituted. In El Salvador, the concentration of forces that was necessary to
move from rural to urban areas also exposed them to withering attacks by government forces. In
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Vietnam, the insurgents launched several large-scale attacks against the south, and they all
resulted in horrendous casualties for the insurgents. Neither the Mau Mau in Kenya nor the
Shining Path in Peru attempted massive concentration of forces in preparation for seizing and
holding large urban areas, so those cases are less instructive about whether insurgent
organizations face an organizational inflection point.
While more research is needed to determine the prevalence of a potential organizational
inflection point, the limited support for this causal mechanism undermines the importance of
transnational sanctuary because the material benefits conferred by sanctuary may lead to military
failure if insurgents concentrate forces prematurely. If the organizational inflection point exists,
then having too many soldiers, heavy weapons, and training to fight like a conventional military,
which can and are done in sanctuary, only improves insurgents’ chances of winning up until a
certain unknown point, after which the group becomes more vulnerable to the superior firepower
of counterinsurgent forces.
Generations of counterinsurgency practitioners and theorists have promulgated and
reaffirmed the conventional wisdom that sanctuary in neighboring states helps insurgents win
when they otherwise would not. But these writers have disproportionately been Western, close to
or fully enmeshed in their respective military establishments, and were almost always writing
from the perspective of external counterinsurgents who lost their conflicts. In trying to “learn
lessons” from past failures in order to avoid them in the future, the frequent presence of
sanctuary in these external military interventions was a noticeable correlation. Moreover,
because of the numerous benefits sanctuary conferred to insurgents, it was plausible.
Because the conventional wisdom’s chief conclusion finds no support in this dissertation,
the policy implications that have traditionally flowed from this assumption are worth examining
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and reconsidering. If sanctuaries are generally not vital, then expanding wars into neighboring
states is probably unnecessary. The historical record should also engender some caution for those
arguing to expand existing conflicts into neighboring states. Many incumbent governments
facing insurgency have undertaken great efforts to degrade, eliminate, or cut off sanctuaries from
their state. They often experience limited and temporary success in degrading sanctuaries by
forcing insurgents to flee from their bases and destroying existing infrastructure. But insurgents
return and rebuild once counterinsurgents withdraw, which there is often considerable
international pressure to do, although some states can more easily ignore that pressure than
others. Efforts to fully eliminate sanctuaries through military force, as far as I can tell, have
never worked for counterinsurgents. However, counterinsurgents have experienced success in
getting sanctuary hosts to crack down on insurgents using their territory, but sanctuary hosts are
often unable or unwilling to do so. Efforts to cut off sanctuaries from their target states, often
through the construction of walls, barriers, and landmines, have experienced some success, as the
French demonstrated in Algeria, and the Rhodesians were able to do to a degree on their eastern
border. Yet, for the varying degrees of success at eliminating, degrading, or cutting off
sanctuaries, none of them translated into ultimate success for the counterinsurgents: the
Rhodesians fled, the French withdrew, Turkey has not eliminated the PKK, the United States did
not eliminate the Viet Cong, etc.
While it was not a causal mechanism, the importance of internal sanctuary warrants a
comment. Internal sanctuaries provide many of the same benefits conferred by transnational
sanctuary. The Shining Path’s internal sanctuary in Peru was a boon to the organization because
it allowed them access to food, which allowed them to provision their considerable forces, it
provided a sympathetic population who provided intelligence on government activities, and it
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gave the group some strategic depth, allowing them to avoid costly counterinsurgent attacks. The
Mau Mau’s internal sanctuaries in the forests demonstrated the pitfalls of not possessing arable
land. Eventually cut off from food supplies from Nairobi, the Mau Mau fighters began focusing
more of their attention on finding food than fighting the British or their native allies. Yet, the
forests provided significant relative protection from attack for the Mau Mau, whom British
forces had difficulty locating and engaging deep in Kenya’s forests. Both of thse cases also
illustrate another point: internal sanctuary, just like external sanctuary, is not a sufficient
condition for insurgent victory.
Future Research
In this dissertation, I have attempted to more fully demonstrate the circumstances under
which transnational sanctuary aids insurgents. The conventional wisdom passed down from
generation to generation of counterinsurgency experts was that insurgents with sanctuary are
more likely to win than those without it. I proposed a slightly different version of that
conventional wisdom, which could explain why sanctuary was nearly perfectly correlated with
insurgent victory against external interveners, but not domestically constituted governments:
insurgents could wait for external interveners to withdraw in the protection conferred by
sanctuaries. Unfortunately for insurgents, but good news for the counterinsurgents who oppose
them, “stayin’ alive” does not appear to be the primary concern for the insurgent groups studied
here. Force protection is a concern for insurgents, too, but all four of these groups actively
sought armed conflict with the governments they opposed; there was little evidence that
insurgents facing external interveners sought to wait them out. Usually, they chose a mix of
armed confrontation with the external intervener and appeals to the population to unite in the
face of an occupying power. But before completely discounting this waiting game argument,
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more research could be conducted on those cases in which insurgents had sanctuary and faced
external interveners. Not much new research is needed for those, because, in fact, those tend to
be the most thoroughly researched conflicts, especially among Western counterinsurgency
scholars. Nevertheless, sanctuary tends to be an ancillary focus for most scholars, so gathering
the research of what has already been produced would be doable and useful.
Probably the most fruitful direction of future research on this topic would be to carry out
comparative case study research on those Box One (insurgents with sanctuary against
domestically constituted regimes) cases to determine why sanctuary sometimes facilitates
insurgent victory and, perhaps more important, what the limits of sanctuary are. Why does
sanctuary not empower more insurgents to defeat domestically constituted regimes, and why do
they continue to lose at the same rate as groups without sanctuary? This dissertation, consistent
with the literature, suggests domestically constituted regimes provoke less domestic resentment
as they are not an occupying force, they are permitted to use armed force to defend themselves,
according to contemporary international norms, and domestically constituted regimes can be
greatly empowered through foreign aid, giving them significant material advantages over
insurgents. Case studies that seek to examine differences between Cold War and post-Cold War
cases may be able to confirm whether insurgents have a more difficult time obtaining external
support when there is often no superpower ready to provide them with weapons, training, and
diplomatic support. Furthermore, domestically constituted regimes seem to have incredible
staying power, even when they faced multiple insurgencies lasting decades. Colombia, India, and
Myanmar are three of the best examples of this: all have faced a variety of insurgencies over
decades, and, at least in the cases of Colombia and India, the governments have delivered some
measure of prosperity and democracy to its people while combatting multiple insurgencies.
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Both Peru and Kenya provided examples where self-defense forces were an important part
of counterinsurgency. I had considered advancing a fifth causal mechanism in this dissertation:
external interveners lose because they find it difficult to create local self-defense forces, but I
decided that could be subsumed under the causal mechanism about building enduring regimes
abroad. However, self-defense forces were not a significant part of most of my narratives
presented here, and what evidence is presented here does not strongly confirm my intuition: the
British, external interveners in Kenya, successfully cultivated Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu native
troops to fight the Mau Mau, while in Peru, a domestically constituted government, many of the
rondas were created on the peasants’ initiative, not the government’s. This mechanism does not
relate to the presence of sanctuary, but it may explain why insurgents sometimes fail to achieve
their goals.
Addressing the core grievances that give rise to insurgency does not appear to be necessary
to defeat it, as I made clear in the case of Peru, and to an extent is also true in the other three
cases. I summarized the Peruvian government’s serial incompetence in all areas of public policy
for more than a decade, yet it still defeated the Shining Path. El Salvador’s government had not
won the hearts and minds of its people, many of whom has suffered violence, or knew others
who had, at the hands of the government, and land and other reforms did little to address the
widening inequality. The British defeated the Mau Mau without giving the land reform the Mau
Mau wanted. And in the case of Vietnam, the NLF/ Vietcong insurgency, once comprised largely
of Vietnamese from the Republic of Vietnam, was later replaced by NVA soldiers carrying out
irregular warfare in the south, as the NLF ranks had been decimated by several large-scale
uprisings that inflicted heavy losses on the NLF. More evidence is necessary to prove the
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conventional wisdom that addressing core grievances is a necessary prerequisite for ending
insurgency.
It is still unclear if insurgents face limitations on the degree to which they can concentrate
their forces without making themselves an easy target for the counterinsurgent, who usually
possesses superior firepower. The evidence in the Vietnam and El Salvador cases suggested this
may happen, but the Kenya and Peru cases did not demonstrate this phenomenon.
One other area of future research that is consistent with the goal of questioning long-held
assumptions about what works in insurgency was raised in footnote 8. Politicians, members of
the military, and even academics appear to have bought into the analogy that an external
intervention “buys time” for an embattled ally to “right their ship” before it goes down. I
speculated in footnote 8 that this may be yet another doubtful conventional wisdom because it is
not so simple for an embattled ally or client to take security forces who otherwise would be
engaged in counterinsurgency and have them become the agronomists, urban planners, or social
workers, or whoever else may be necessary to address the complaints that give rise to
insurgency. But it would be interesting to see what clients have done in response to massive
external interventions to save them.
The evidence presented in this dissertation has produced some sobering conclusions:
external-led counterinsurgencies almost always fail. This dissertation has argued that the failure
is more attributable to political failings: it is very difficult for external interveners to create
durable regimes in other countries in the post-colonial age. However, external interveners have
often done much to assist incumbent regimes in their counterinsurgency efforts; the “light
footprint” model seems to be the better option for external interveners, but there is not always an
effective incumbent government with whom they can partner.
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